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Prior to 1755, British-American colonial forces and American Indians (hereinafter 
Indians) predominantly conducted the military campaigns in the North American theatre of 
European conflicts. From 1755 to 1815, however, the British Army itself became heavily 
engaged and had to consider its use of Indians as allies or auxiliaries. Indian War customs, 
such as torture, mutilation and killing of prisoners and civilians, were at odds with an 
emerging, although uneven, consensus against these practices in Europe. Therefore, British 
officials often had to decide if the use of Indians was compatible with their concept of 
military honour.  
The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the British concept of military 
honour hindered the effective use of Indians in the era of the Sixty Years' War (l755-1815). 
The author will attempt to persuade the reader that it did and it ultimately cost the British 
Empire its direct control of, then even its influence in, the American midwest. 
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‘Every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar 
preconceptions.’  
- Carl von Clausewitz1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Prologue 
In 1755, Major General Edward Braddock III, son of a British Army Major General, 
was killed in his attempt to take the Forks of the Ohio River from the French. In 1815, 
Major General Edward Pakenham, brother-in-law to the Duke of Wellington, was killed in 
his attempt to take New Orleans, at the mouth of the Mississippi River, from the 
Americans. These two battles formed the opening and closing chapters of the British 
Army’s major combat operations in North America. Both officers had their commissions 
purchased in youth by families with Royal connections. They had different levels of 
combat experience, but both had served in conventional and successful Army careers. Each 
officer had been sent to North America directly from Europe to take control of an unstable 
situation and deliver decisive victories. Both operations were in aid of decisively retaining 
Britain’s North American colonies’ geographic and commercial security as well. The forces 
both officers commanded were working against enemy forces that were, at least in 
conventional warfare terms, inferior to them. Both men had the confidence of the 
Monarchy and Parliament as well as the respect of the European military establishment. As 
was common in both eras, neither officer lacked loyalty to the King, nor courage. The risk 
to senior officer’s lives was real as shown by both of their deaths and the deaths of many of 
their direct subordinates on the battlefield. Critically, each Major General had Indian 
components available to them that were dismissed, either through choice or inept co-
ordination. The similarities between these two officers are striking. In short, these two 
officers pose classic examinations for this paper. However, if every situation and every 
British Army officer in North America from 1755 to 1815 were as similar as these two at 
the beginning and the ending of the era, the answer to the question of the present paper 
would be very straightforward. However, this was no ordinary age and the similarities mask 
significant variations in British Army officer behaviour within the era. 
                                                
1 Carl von Clausewitz, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 593 
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1.2 Purpose 
This paper was inspired in part by an article entitled ‘Early American Ways of War: A 
New Reconnaissance, 1600-1815’. In it, Wayne E. Lee examined the cultural factors of 
warfare in the American colonies, then the United States, and how contradictory they could 
be depending on the situation, especially against or with Indians on the frontier. Lee 
explained that ideology has taken the fore with most early American history, but has its 
limitations and an examination of military culture might help explain events further. Lee 
suggested that honour could explain some of the contradictions.2  This author agrees and 
the purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the British Army’s concept of military 
honour hindered its effective use of Indians as allies or auxiliaries. Specifically, this paper 
will examine the different behaviours and beliefs of the most prominent leaders of the 
British Army when confronted with the choice to use American Indians or not. The author 
will attempt to persuade the reader that military honour did hinder the effective use of 
Indian forces and ultimately cost the British Empire its direct control of and, eventually, its 
influence in the American midwest. 
1.3 Preface 
Even after two centuries of European exploration and settlement, the bountiful area 
between the Appalachian mountain chain in the east and the Mississippi River in the west 
from the Great Lakes in the north to the Gulf of Mexico in the south (hereinafter the 
‘midwest’) was still largely controlled by American Indians (hereinafter ‘Indians’) in 
1754.3 However, the French and Indian War in North America, eventually part of the Seven 
Years’ War in Europe, began a sixty year period during which Indian hegemony was 
extinguished. It also coincided with the only era that the British Army conducted large 
scale operations in North America. Prior to 1755, most European based conflicts in North 
America were conducted overwhelmingly by colonial militia and Indians on behalf of the 
Europeans as secondary theatres to larger European conflicts. However, with the expansion 
of European trade with North America, the control of the midwest began to take on greater 
importance. Although usually concerned primarily with events in Europe, the British Army 
became a critical part of the struggle for this area. With each stage in the era, it had to 
                                                
2 Wayne E. Lee, ‘Early American Ways of War: A New Reconnaissance, 1600-1815’ The Historical Journal 
- Volume 44, Number 1 (2001): 269-289. 
3 The author uses the term ‘midwest’ with a lower case ‘m’ rather than the technical geographic term 
‘Midwest’. See 1.6 Definitions for further explanation. 
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consider its use of Indians as allies, either as auxiliaries or as independent units. Although 
warfare customs had changed in Europe to somewhat encourage restraint, the Indians still 
valued their traditional customs in warfare. Some of these customs, such as mutilating dead 
enemies, torturing and killing prisoners, and raiding civilian settlements, were at odds with 
an emerging, although uneven, consensus against these practices in Europe.4 As a European 
institution, the British Army, its officials, and officers often had to decide whether the use 
of Indians was an unacceptable compromise of their military honour. 
1.4 Scope 
The central question of this paper is, ‘Did military honour hinder the British Army’s 
effective use of American Indians in North American combat from 1755 to 1815?’ This 
paper will address and answer this question through three different lenses. 
First, this paper will address the history of the period in the context of which groups 
would control the midwest. Although from the perspective of the British army and its 
political leadership it makes little sense, the term ‘Sixty Years’ War’ to refer to a long 
contest for control of the Midwest is an important, new conceptualisation of the conflicts 
around the North American Great Lakes region between 1754 and 1814. The term emerged 
out of a 1998 conference at Bowling Green State University in Ohio. This paper will 
expand the definition geographically and also chronologically by an additional few months 
to include the first quarter of 1815. The era has traditionally been viewed, and certainly was 
by British Army officers at the time, as a series of discrete wars: the Seven Years’ War 
(known as the French and Indian War in the British North American colonies and later the 
U.S.A.), the American Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812. There were a series of 
Indian conflicts that occurred within these wars, but also sporadically in between them. Yet 
if one views the native occupants as a single entity, as the thirteen colonies often are, the 
war can also be seen as a more coherent, single conflict with sporadic cease-fires as 
participants entered, exited and re-entered in various alliances. Furthermore, if one views 
the geography as a key element of the origin of the conflicts, the concept of the Sixty 
                                                
4 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1815 (London: Pimlico, 2003), 182-185 & 
Geoffrey Parker, ‘Early Modern Europe’ in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World. 
Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, 40-58 (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1994), 52-58 
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Years’ War may be one of the best ways to examine the period comprehensively.5 
Therefore, whilst recognising that British attitudes to the use of Indians was necessarily 
conditioned by the context of the wars being fought in Europe and that control of the 
midwest was not the overriding concern of British Army officers in much of their decision 
making, this paper also recognises the ‘Sixty Years’ War’ as a way to examine the Indian-
related combat in North America from 1755 to 1815 and to limit the geographical scope of 
the British Army’s combat in North America in the era. 
To be as inclusive of British-allied Indian combat as possible, this paper will expand 
the geographical focus on the Great Lakes to include all of the midwest between the 
Appalachian Mountains chain west to the Mississippi River and from the Great Lakes south 
to the Gulf of Mexico.6 This long funnel shaped slice of North America is characterised by 
its waters, which made it unusually fertile and which provided communication links to the 
outside world, either through the St Lawrence River in the north or through the ports of 
New Orleans, Mobile, and Pensacola on the Gulf of Mexico in the south. These 
communication links held the key to this massive area before the colonial road networks 
were established back over the Appalachian Mountains to the east coast ports.7 Crucially, 
the routes going to the Gulf of Mexico were normally open year round, whereas the routes 
going through the St. Lawrence River were often frozen shut from November to April. 
Additionally, somewhat counter-intuitively, there were localities in the upper Ohio Valley, 
less than one-hundred miles from Lake Michigan or Lake Erie that would require long 
portages to get to the Great Lakes, but had unbroken riverine access to New Orleans. 
Therefore, areas that seem linked to the Great Lakes by proximity actually were closer to 
the Gulf of Mexico in some strategic and commercial calculations. Furthermore, the Indians 
of the Gulf south and the Great Lakes area had historical and familial connections that 
made a confederacy and concerted action more than just a theoretical possibility.8 Like the 
                                                
5 David C. Skaggs & Larry L. Nelson, Eds, The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814 (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001), xvii - 20 
6 See section 1.6 definitions for a detailed geographical definition of the area. 
7 Ellen C. Semple, American History and Its Geographic Conditions (Cambridge, Massachusetts : The 
Riverside Press,1933), pp. 84-86 
8 Alex Cameron forwarded letter to Gage, 18 June 1774, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 121 & Stuart to 
Haldimand, 5 July 1774, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 121 & Josiah Martin forwarded letter to Gage 21 
July 1774, WLCL, Thomas Gage Papers, AS 121 & Stuart to Gage dated 14 September 1774, WLCL, 
Thomas Gage Papers, AS 123.  Examples are present throughout Gregory Evans Dowd,  A Spirited 
Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1993) 
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very different southern and northern British colonies before the American Revolutionary 
War, these Indian nations did not need to establish a formal union or even agree on all of 
the particulars of a confederacy to act in their combined self-interest. Nor, like the 
American states in the lead up to the War of 1812, did they always need to agree on when, 
how, and with whom they would go to war to be considered an aggregated historical 
entity.9 Furthermore, the area has special distinction; if one accepts that the area could have 
had several different futures with Indian, French, Spanish, or British control or even as an 
independent nation(s). 
The second lens is a linear, operational examination of the use of Indians by the British 
Army for the entire period. Although the British Army was not primarily focused on the 
plight of the Indians, the British Army’s inability to understand how their previous use of 
the Indians would affect their actions in future combat will be examined. British Army 
officers often made decisions based on broader geo-political and European cultural 
considerations, but their potential Indian allies did not. This fact had a direct bearing on the 
reasons why the Indians were used or not. While the point of view of the British Army 
officers will be considered when trying to determine their frame of reference in decision 
making, the objective of this examination is to see the relationship of all of the events in the 
midwest as a natural progression, rather than discrete actions in individual wars of only 
British conceptualisation. It is important to see the British-Indian relationship from the 
Indian point of view as well. This paper seeks to understand the British Army’s actions, but 
it must also consider why the British Army was so poor at understanding Indian 
motivations and aspirations. The period of 1754-1815 in North America has been covered 
like very few others, but mainly from a British or American point of view and with the 
common idea that the midwest was always going to become part of the United States of 
America. There have been a few books that examined the period exclusively from the 
Indian point of view.10 However, none look at the period in a British Army operational 
sense from beginning to end. This paper will not provide a battle by battle progression of 
the entire period; that would require a multi-volume tome. However, it will attempt to 
explain each major campaign where the British Army had the opportunity to work with 
                                                
9 Dowd, Spirited, 24-26 
10 Dowd, Spirited, Colin G. Calloway, The Shawnees and the War for America: The Penguin Library of 
American Indian History series (London: Penguin Books, 2008), Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian 
Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003) 
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Indians against a third party, be it French, Spanish, American, or another tribe(s) during this 
period. Several books have examined British and Indian relations, but they have not 
focused on honour as a determining factor, nor have they covered the entire period.11  
The third lens is a cultural history of military honour in the British Army leadership 
during the period of 1754-1815. British Army leaders were part of the British political, 
social, and often aristocratic cultures, as well as the professional culture of ‘Military 
Europe’.12 These forces exerted pressures and rules upon them that contributed to their 
decisions, especially when it came to the application of the laws of war as Europeans 
understood them. 1754-1815 was a time of great political, societal, technological, 
commercial, and philosophical change. This paper will document those streams of history 
as they pertained to the overall character of British Army leaders to examine how they 
affected their decisions to use Indians or not. 
To summarise the scope, this paper will examine British Army operations with Indians 
in the North American midwest between 1755 and 1815, bearing in mind that the geo-
political and cultural attitudes of the British Army officers meant they rarely saw the era in 
the way that the Indians and the white frontiersmen did. 
1.5 Out of Scope 
This paper will not consider British military or diplomatic operations between 1755 
and 1815 that were not controlled by or through the British Army, namely those controlled 
by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines. British Army operations in North America that fall 
outside of this paper’s geographical definition of the American midwest (see section 1.6 
‘Definitions below) will likewise not be covered, primarily because Indians were rarely 
available for combat outside of this geographical area.  
                                                
11 Robert S. Allen, His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policies in the Defence of Canada, 1774-1815 
(Toronto and Oxford: The Dundurn Press, 1993) & Colin G. Calloway, Crown and Calumet: British-Indian 
Relations, 1783-1815 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987) & Timothy D. Willig, Restoring the 
Chain of Friendship: British Policy and the Indians of the Great Lakes, 1783-1815. Lincoln & London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2008) & Paul Lawrence Stevens, ‘His Majesty’s Savage Allies: British Policy 
and the Northern Indians During the Revolutionary War. The Carleton Years, 1774-1778’, Ph.D. diss., State 
University of New York at Buffalo, 1984) & James Roger Tootle, ‘Anglo-Indian Relations in the Northern 
Theatre of the French and Indian War, 1748-1761’ (Unpublished PhD Dissertation : The Ohio State 
University, 1972) 
12 ‘Military Europe’ was coined by Christopher Duffy in The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 1715-
1789  (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1987), 3-34 and expanded upon by Stephen Conway in ‘The 
British Army, “Military Europe,” and the American War of Independence’, The William and Mary Quarterly, 
Volume 67, Number 1 (January 2010): 69-100 
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1.6 Definitions 
This paper addresses distinct historical groups, terms, and concepts that have often 
been used, but with little uniformity. Therefore, it is appropriate to define the terms that 
will be used to ensure consistency.  
The ‘British Army’ is defined in its widest sense to include all military units, as well as 
civilians in governorships, and other political appointments, such as Indian agents, when 
these positions fell under the direct control of the British Army. Where they were directly 
involved in decisions relevant to this paper, the civilians who directed the British Army in 
ministerial posts are also included. However, it will not include the Royal Navy and 
Marines, or militia, unless their personnel or units were under the direct control of the 
British Army. There are also specific instances where non-British citizens are as classified 
as British Army officers when serving in the British Army. Examples are Colonel Henry 
Bouquet and Major General Frederick Haldimand who were both Swiss-born officers who 
had distinguished and long careers in the British Army. 
The term ‘Indian’ is used throughout this paper as a synonym for ‘American Indian’ 
and ‘Native American’. The author uses this term as the historical record is replete with this 
usage and most modern day American Indians do not take offense to the term. Indeed, 
many modern Native-Americans refer to themselves as ‘Indian’. Where there are instances 
that may render confusion with ‘Indians’ of the Asian subcontinent, the author will use 
‘American Indians’ locally in contrast. The ‘middle ground’ was also filled with characters 
of mixed parentage. This paper will refer to these individuals, where known, as ‘metis’ or 
by their known roots, such as Scots-Creek. The term ‘savage’ is found throughout the 
historical record as a descriptor of the Indians, but will be used only when it is quoted or 
when making a specific point about the term itself in this paper. The terms ‘tribes’ and 
‘nations’ are used to describe groups of Indians with shared political, cultural, and kinship 
identities. The author is aware of the insufficient preciseness of these terms, but uses them 
as terms of convenience and to avoid confusion. 
The term ‘white’ is sometimes used when describing those of European ancestry in 
racial terms when the race is the more appropriate description than the national identity. 
Finally, as an American, but eighteen year resident of the United Kingdom who has worked 
in England and Scotland, the author is well aware of the difference between England and 
Britain. However, in the era being examined, the term ‘English’ was often used rather than 
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‘British’, especially amongst the Europeans when speaking of the residents of Britain. 
Therefore, the term ‘British’ is used liberally, but not intentionally carelessly. The British 
residents of North America are referred to as residents of their colony, e.g. Virginians, or 
‘colonists’ from 1755 to 1776. From 1776-1787, residents of the thirteen colonies south of 
the St. Lawrence River are referred to as residents of their colony or future state, but also as 
‘rebels’, ‘Whigs’, ‘patriots’, ‘loyalists’ and ‘Tories’ depending on their allegiances. After 
1787, the residents of the thirteen states are referred to by their states or as ‘Americans’. 
The residents of frontier settlements are referred to by their state of origin or by the well-
known independent regions in which they settled, such as ‘Kentuckians’ or ‘Ohioans’.13 
The term ‘midwest’ with a lower case ‘m’ is used rather than the more formal 
‘Midwest’ to denote the difference between this paper’s definition and the modern day U.S. 
Census Bureau’s Regional definition.14 The midwest is defined as the area between the 
eastern edge of the Appalachian mountain chain to the Mississippi River and from the 
Great Lakes down to the Gulf of Mexico. More specifically, the eastern edge of the 
Appalachian chain is defined as a line starting in modern day Quebec, Canada that travels 
south to the mouth of the Apalachicola River on the Gulf of Mexico. Using modern day 
locales, it is demarcated by a line running south from the mouth of the Chaudière River to 
the source of Lac Megantic in Quebec. It then proceeds west-southwest to the source of the 
Connecticut River in northern New Hampshire to the intersection of the Mohawk and 
Hudson Rivers near Troy, New York. From there, it proceeds to the source of the north fork 
of the Susquehanna River and follows that river south and west to the fork with the west 
branch at Sunbury, Pennsylvania and follows that branch to its source. At the source of the 
west branch of the Susquehanna, then the line runs generally south connecting the sources 
of the Potomac, Savannah, and Chattahoochee Rivers. Finally, it follows the Chattahoochee 
to the fork of the Apalachicola River and finishes at that river’s mouth at Apalachicola, 
Florida. The western boundary is formed the Mississippi River from its source in 
Minnesota to its mouth near New Orleans, Louisiana. The northern line is defined by the 
modern day U.S.A. and Canada border. The southern boundary is the Gulf of Mexico. 
                                                
13 Thanks to Calloway, Calumet, xi-xiv for guidance on how to deal with many of these definitions sensitively 
and eloquently. 
14 Census Regions and Divisions of the United States http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-
data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf - Last accessed, 31 July 2014 
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Due to the central question of this paper, the terms ‘honour’ and ‘military honour’ are 
deserving of more comprehensive definitions. See Chapter 2 for a full discussion on the 
definitions of honour generically and military honour specifically. 
1.7 Historiographical Context 
The concept of military honour is well known. It has been an object of cultural and 
historical discussion for centuries. However, it has rarely been discussed in the context of 
the decisions made about war and strategy. The current literature does not directly address 
the issue of military honour as a constraint on the British Army in North America from 
1755-1815. Therefore, to help isolate and evaluate the effect of honour on decision making, 
the related literature has been organised into three broad categories; the geo-political 
environment from 1755 to 1815 in North America and Europe, the martial tradition of the 
Indians of the midwest and their methods of warfare in the era, and the British Army 
officers of the era and the societies in which they operated. The intention of this section is 
to place this paper within the context of the current scholarship on these three categories. 
The remaining chapters will examine honour in detail, then analyse individual periods as 
case studies to determine what role military honour played on military effectiveness 
throughout the period. Finally, a combined analysis and conclusion will complete this 
paper. 
To begin the historiography, the author would first like to acknowledge that six books 
have exerted extraordinary influence on this author and paper. The styles, content and 
analysis of these books allowed the author to conceive the blueprint for this paper. Each 
covers its content masterfully, but in important ways do not address the central question of 
this paper.  
Paul Robinson comes as close as any author has in considering how military honour 
affects the conduct of war in Military Honour and the Conduct of War. He examined the 
elements of honour, but also looked at the sometimes paradoxical results of honour in the 
fog of war. To test his thinking, Robinson looked at seven case studies from classical 
Greece and Rome to the Cold War. However, when it came to the British Army, he skipped 
from Elizabethan England (1558-1603) to the second British Empire after 1815. 
Additionally, Robinson examined the effects of honour on the causes of war, motivation for 
fighting, recognition and rewards, death, conduct of war, the enemy, ending wars, and the 
women. However, he did not specifically address the effect of military honour on choosing 
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allies of differing customs in war.15 The next two books examined the type of warfare that 
was prevalent in North America from 1755-1815. Armstrong Starkey contrasted the 
differences between European and Indian warfare in European and Native American 
Warfare: 1675-1815. Although Starkey covers the timeframe, he does not look 
comprehensively at military honour and whether it was a decisive factor in how the British 
Army conducted warfare with and against the Indians. Starkey also does not consistently 
look at the midwest as a discrete objective through the period.16 In The First Way of War: 
American War Making on the Frontier, John Grenier demonstrated that the Americans had 
a distinct style of war before Washington built the Continental Army. War on the frontier 
was often based on revenge, terror, and sometimes total extirpation of foes. Grenier’s 
importance to this paper is in establishing the fact that there were other ways of fighting 
wars in the era. In between European and Indian warfare laid the American militia tradition 
and ‘ranging’. Grenier covered the era, but only cursorily examined the effects of honour 
on the British Army’s choices of allies.17 
Colin Calloway, one of the most respected authorities on the subject of the Indians 
during this period, examined British Indian relations in detail in Crown and Calumet: 
British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815. His chapters on the Indians as allies to the British and 
the British as allies to the Indians are exhaustive, but he does not make the distinction of 
whether British Army military honour was a deciding factor in British objectives. Finally, 
this extraordinary book covers only half of the period of this paper which is a fact that 
humbled this author in attempting it.18 Robert S. Allen’s His Majesty’s Indian Allies: 
British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774-1815 covers an additional nine years, 
but is focused exclusively on determining how well the alliance worked in protecting 
Canada as part of the British Empire. In this attempt, Allen is superb and makes the 
excellent point that Canada remaining British was not a foregone conclusion and the 
Indians had a lot to do with securing Canada for the British. The enduring lesson from this 
                                                
15 Paul Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2006) 
16 Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1998) 
17 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
18 Calloway, Calumet 
L i n z y  | 14 
 
book was that the British were far more likely to use the Indians in defence where they 
could control them more readily.19 
Finally, as indicated above (1.2 The Purpose), Wayne E. Lee provided the original 
inspiration for this paper and his work has also considered culture as a defining feature of 
how and why warfare is practiced. Dr. Lee recently published a new book entitled 
Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865, that comes very close to 
the analytical heart of what this paper aims to accomplish. Lee examines how Anglo-
American armies decided on how much violence was enough to win. In this decision 
making process, the actors had to decide if the enemy was a like-minded ‘brother’ who 
deserved the humanity of the modern conventions of war or a ‘barbarian’ ‘other’ who did 
not deserve the honours of war, but warranted total destruction of their war making 
capability. Lee’s only omission to this paper is that he chose not to examine the British 
Army from 1754-1815. The closest he came was a section on the Continental Army’s 
warfare against the Indians and British in 1777-1779. However, what Lee did provide was 
an analytical framework for how his subjects made their decisions. Lee proposed that 
commanders had two ways to escalate violence in warfare, quantitatively with more 
resources or qualitatively with practices like torture, mutilation and attacking women and 
children. Lee then asserted that there were four categories for analysis: capacity, control, 
calculation, and culture.20 Culture is the most pertinent to this paper and I will use some of 
Dr. Lee’s analytical framework in my analysis throughout this paper and in my conclusion. 
The author has used these six books extensively as guides to researching and writing 
about this period. The remaining historiography is also important to this paper, but more to 
specific points rather than in the fundamental way these six books apply. 
1.7.1 The Geo-Political Environment from 1755 to 1815 in North America and Europe 
Looking at this era from the Indian perspective, the traditionally named wars in the 
midwest from 1754 to 1815 make little sense. In each war, various tribes of Indians 
interchanged foes and allies in a quest to maintain their sovereignty over their portion of the 
midwest. In the confusing world of European alliances in aid of imperial ambition, all the 
Indians could perceive was that the Europeans, then Americans, were fighting over land 
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that they had no right to in the first instance. From the British point of view, this was not 
one strategic engagement over the midwest and different strategic contexts affected 
attitudes to the use of Indians. Equally, however, one must not lose sight of the fact that the 
Indians, and indeed the Americans for that matter, did not see the wars the way the British 
saw them either. Cases have been made for and against the midwest, even North America 
as a whole, as a British strategic objective.21 However, this paper must take into 
consideration the traditional British and European view of the combat in North America in 
order to gain insight into the decisions made by the British Army. Therefore, the 
historiography examined in this section will look at the British view of the conflicts as well 
as the Indian and American views. 
David Curtis Skaggs gives an overview of the era in the introduction of a collection of 
essays from the 1998 Bowling Green State University entitled The Sixty Years’ War for the 
Great Lakes, 1754-1814. Skaggs argues that one should view it in the way Thucydides 
viewed the Peloponnesian War, not as a series of individual wars, but as an ongoing 
strategic encounter to determine if the Spartans or Athenians would rule Greece. If one can 
view the vast midwest area as an important piece of geography as it existed in the era, 
without the benefit of hindsight and its eventual subsumption into the U.S.A., it can be seen 
as a strategic encounter rather than individual wars.22 The Sixty Years’ War has chapters 
that cover many of the social, economic, military, and strategic interactions of the time. 
However, honour as a motive for alliance building and military action is not discussed. This 
is a lacuna that exists throughout the historiography and one that this paper intends to fill. 
At the beginning of the era, the British were not interested in immediate development 
of the midwest themselves, but they were concerned about the effect of the French 
strengthening their hold on the midwest and encroaching on British claims. This issue is 
important in many ways. French involvement, and to a lesser extent Spanish involvement, 
in North America was constantly at the forefront of the British Army’s mind. Whether 
France was developing the country themselves, or supporting the American rebels or 
selling land to the Americans to finance war in Europe was far more prominent of a 
consideration to the British than the ultimate ownership of the midwest. Prior to 1755, the 
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British government had treated their North American colonies with what was known as 
‘salutary neglect’ and had avoided serious expenditure of blood and treasure while reaping 
substantial commercial benefits. As long as the colonists stayed close to the east coast, 
there was little need for more involvement. However, as the east coast became more 
crowded and rudimentary farm practices exhausted farm land, the demand for western land 
increased. Simultaneously, the French had determined that their light-footprint model of 
North American settlement needed upgrading and began establishing their formal authority 
over Canada and the midwest. One of the most important areas was deemed to be the forks 
of the Ohio River at present day Pittsburgh. Land companies from Pennsylvania and 
Virginia had long coveted this area and raised the alarm to London when the French 
claimed it. Important factions in the British government began to see France’s moves in 
North America as part of an international strategy to pressure British holdings world-
wide.23 
The Seven Years’ War began very badly for the British in North America from 1755 to 
1758 as they lost a series of forts and claims along the eastern perimeter of the upper 
midwest. The Indians of this area took the time between Braddock’s defeat in 1755 and 
Forbes’ capture of Fort Duquesne in 1758 to wreak havoc on the frontier by killing or 
capturing three thousand British settlers in a campaign of terror. In the older histories, it 
was often said that the Seven Years’ War was fought over Canada, but if Britain’s focus 
was on beating the French conventional forces on the St. Lawrence, it was not the focus of 
the Indians on the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier.24 The conflict was not only limited to 
the Ohio Indians as the same issue of misunderstanding the Indians’ reasons for fighting 
caused an unwelcome outbreak of hostilities in the Carolina backcountry. There, the 
Cherokee who had been encouraged by French-supported Creeks took up the hatchet 
against the settlers closest to them.25 The lack of Indian allies meant the British had to focus 
on defeating France in areas where its conventional military forces dominated. Although 
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the lack of Indian allies has been examined as a weakness of the British approach, the 
historiography has not grappled with the issue of why the British were hesitant to 
encourage Indian allied warfare or develop it. Through choice or expediency the British 
used colonial units of backwoodsman, known as Rangers, to perform the duties for which 
the French used the Indians.26 
This is not to say that a near universal Indian alliance with France was a foregone 
conclusion. The choice of allies in the Seven Years’ War was not merely one of history or 
personal connections, but one where the Delaware and the Shawnee Indians of the Ohio 
River valley came to the conclusion, independently, that a British alliance was not in their 
best interests. The Delaware had been offended by Major General Edward Braddock’s 
high-handedness over land ownership in preparation of his doomed campaign of 1755 and 
then being wrongly blamed for the massacre on the Monongahela. Displaying the 
traditional connection between the Ohio Indians and the southern Indians, a group of 
Shawnee warriors were seized in South Carolina in 1754 whilst on a raid against their 
traditional enemies, the Catawbas. They were captured and jailed on suspicion of raiding 
frontier farms. The South Carolina Governor, in holding Shawnee warriors in jail, opened 
up a blood feud from the Shawnee perspective.27 Although these events are historically 
known, the historiography does not engage in why the British Army declined to pursue 
Indian alliances aggressively.  
By 1759 British fortunes had turned. A series of victories in North America, Europe, 
and Asia had the French in retreat. However, other than a tenuous road connection to the 
forks of the Ohio, most of the British victories were in areas that midwestern Indians did 
not view as critical to holding their land. The fighting would wear on for another three 
years, but it was largely between Britain and France and France’s late arriving ally, Spain. 
Without active French support, the Indians did not risk major attacks, so an uneasy truce 
held in the midwest as the peace was determined in Paris. British colonial settlers began to 
cautiously re-enter the Ohio area. However, these events were laying the groundwork for 
further problems. Between 1759 and 1763, both the settlers and the Indians thought they 
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had won the war for that area, virtually guaranteeing further conflict. By 1763, the 
particulars of a peace between the European powers were concluded. France was to be 
excluded from mainland North America completely. France reluctantly accepted this, but 
began planning her revenge. The Indians of the midwest, virtually undefeated in the war, 
were befuddled that the British thought they had won the midwest. However, the 
Commander -in-Chief of British forces in America, General Sir Jeffrey Amherst, was so 
sure that he had won the midwest that he immediately took the action of treating the Indians 
as defeated enemies. Unbeknownst to Amherst, the French had implanted the idea with the 
Seneca of an Indian uprising against the British.28 Amherst’s malevolence towards the 
Indians is well documented, but the reasons for his attitude, other than a cultural superiority 
complex, are much less developed. 
By 1763, the Indians of the midwest had started to explore, through prophets such as 
Neolin, the spiritual concept that they should revert to their pre-European contact way of 
life. Along with the prophets came warriors, such as Pontiac, who believed that the 
Europeans had to be pushed back for the Indians to reclaim their way of life. What 
followed has been called the ‘first declaration of independence’ in North America. 
Historiographically, Pontiac’s War or rebellion has been seen as an addendum or epilogue 
to the Seven Years’ War. However, it has enjoyed renewed interest in recent years, but 
from authors who have been critical of many of the stereotypes. Francis Jennings critically 
examines the relationships between the British and the Indians and concludes that from 
Braddock through to Amherst, the British mistakenly held the Indians in complete 
disdain.29 Gregory Evans Dowd explains that while the British were busy consolidating 
their gains against France, they were sowing the seeds of the next conflict by ignoring the 
sovereignty and concerns expressed to them by the Ohio Indians.30 David Dixon argues that 
the Indians entered the conflict with the idea that the British were incapable of managing 
the backcountry, and the American frontier settlers came out of the conflict thinking the 
same. These points of view and their impact on British Imperial policy would become the 
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critical issue in destabilising the area for the next fifty years.31 The British eventually 
waited out the Indians’ siege of British forts in the midwest, but not without coming to 
some uncomfortable conclusions about how the midwest could best be used and managed 
for imperial benefit. 
The fact that the British were willing to risk another costly war to deny France the 
midwest displayed the British interest in keeping France’s imperial ambitions at bay. The 
war followed similar wars in Europe over the previous century, but seldom had a European 
power so decisively defeated another. The vast conquests obtained by Britain were the 
beginning of her problems, not the end. An interesting part of the history is what British 
ministers of trade and colonies designed after they won the midwest, amongst other 
possessions, in the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The men responsible for formulating a coherent 
policy for the midwest changed regularly over the next ten years. King George III’s 
boyhood tutor, John Stuart, the 3rd Earl of Bute and the Secretary of State for the Northern 
Department, kicked off the effort with the remarkably uncontroversial decision to keep a 
substantial part of the British Army in the midwest after the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The 
plan was to keep the remnant French population under control and keep the British 
colonists and Indians apart to avoid an explosive situation. However, Bute could not stand 
the heat of British politics and resigned. Next, the Northern Secretary, George Grenville, 
wanted to control colonist and Indian alike in a larger mercantilist empire, but make the 
colonists pay for it. When this failed, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Charles 
Townshend, wanted to tame the hotheads on the coast with more British troops, but still 
could not raise the money for the troops or war debts. The Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department, William Petty, the 2nd Earl of Shelburne, decided to give the 
colonists some room to maneuver with two new colonies in the midwest, but he was 
politically outmaneuvered by Secretary of State for the Colonies, Wills Hill, Viscount 
Hillsborough, before he could implement his plan. With a revolution brewing, Viscount 
Hillsborough abandoned the Indians to the settlers and tried to stop the revolt in the east. 
Finally, as war clouds grew, Secretary of State for the Colonies, William Legge, 2nd Earl of 
Dartmouth, decided the best course of action was to incorporate the Ohio valley into 
Quebec in 1774. Many have seen this period as the inevitable build up to the American 
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Revolution, but Fred Anderson has refocused the era and argues that this line of reasoning 
is historical hindsight and the events up to 1766 can be better seen as the consolidation 
period of a great imperial conquest.32 
Anderson’s view, although very influential, has still not removed the vast decades of 
work that make the midwest a critical part of the build-up to the American Revolution. 
Clarence Alvord and a generation of historians basing their work on his believed the area 
was an important part of the British government’s plan for its empire. Although it was a 
spectacularly rich agricultural area, the British were far more interested in keeping 
European powers and American settlers out, so they could continue the real business of 
empire which was trade in a mercantilist network. Examining the workings of the revolving 
door that was the British government and hence, colonial administration, in the 1760s and 
early 1770s, Alvord argued that the British ministers did try to actively manage, albeit 
fitfully, the newly acquired midwest.  Alvord’s contention was that all of this constituted an 
active and reasonable policy given the events of the time and Whitehall always considered 
the midwest a crucial part of the North American and Imperial plan.33 Somewhat 
foreshadowing, Anderson’s argument, Jack Sosin rebutted this assertion forcefully with 
archival research unavailable to Alvord that British goals were made by bureaucratic 
ministers who dealt with problems as they arose with little strategic planning, albeit 
couched in mercantilist terminology.34 Although most historians have focused on the Great 
Lakes area, Sosin acknowledged that the conversation needed to be extended to the south. 
John Alden’s exploration of the actions of the Indian Superintendent for the south, John 
Stuart, during Pontiac’s rebellion is important to this paper for its inclusion of the southern 
Indians as a midwest control force. Whereas Alden was focused on Stuart, J. Russell Snapp 
Snapp takes a more a top down view from London and how it applied in the southern 
midwest. Snapp argues that the transition from Indian trading to land speculation, and the 
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British opposition to it, was an important factor in encouraging the southern elite to join the 
American rebellion.35   
There are fundamentally three schools of thought over the issue of how the midwest 
was viewed from Whitehall, although they take a broader view of American policy than 
just the midwest. The Imperialists saw America as part of a great building of the Empire, 
whether America was central to a broader strategy or merely a set of problems to be solved. 
The socio-economic school says the driving force was the nature of property greed within 
the colonies and Britain. The Namierists are named after Lewis Namier, a British academic, 
who wrote extensively about the political figures of the time and came to the conclusion 
that their only focus was personal political gain.36 More recent arguments have contended 
that Britain’s fixation on North America in this period caused it to stop looking for the 
balance in Europe that it had always sought.37 Each of these views make clear that the 
midwest was on the British government’s mind in some degree, but what is not discussed is 
why the British did not use the Indians themselves to police the midwest in this period. The 
British government expected colonial governments to police their own areas within a legal 
framework of rights and responsibilities to the Crown. Why would the British not invest 
their new imperial charges, the Indians, with the same capability in the midwest? 
This paper cannot penetrate all of the vast literature on the American Revolution, but it 
must look at the parts of the war that directly speaks to the British Army’s mindset and the 
circumstances that might affect their decision to use Indians or not. John Shy focusses on 
the British Army’s development in North America from 1763, and examines how its use 
and misuse triggered events that only served to make the decisions taken in Whitehall more 
complex. Although Shy looked at how the British Army worked with and around the 
Indians, he does not examine the issue of how the Army viewed the Indians as allies.38  Shy 
also provides a series of articles in A People Numerous and Armed that examines how 
visceral the battles of the Revolution were; lest one begin to imagine that the combat 
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involving Indians was uniquely vicious.39 Armstrong Starkey also focuses on this issue in 
examining several nighttime bayonet massacres by British troops during the war.40 Beyond 
the diplomatic and political considerations, merely fielding a force on the frontier was 
difficult. Don Higginbotham has described the enormous logistical, tactical and operational 
restraints under which the British, Indians and rebels were working. For the British Army, 
Indians often took on a mythical status for their ability to operate, seemingly with little 
effort, in a wilderness that often claimed more lives than battle.41   
As the Revolution began in earnest and early thoughts of reconciliation receded from 
view, the strategic planners began to consider the use of the Indians. The broader issues of 
the Revolution are beyond the scope of this paper, but sources that focus on the British 
Army, the Indians, and the midwest are considered. The British war was larger than North 
America as her alliances in Europe were failing. While Britain in 1763 enjoyed an 
embarrassment of riches, a decade of domestic political wrangling had caused it to lose 
sight of the larger strategic workings against it. The decision making by the British Army 
officers and Whitehall for the war at large form the psychological backdrop for their 
decisions to use Indians or not. These examinations are critical to this paper to analyse 
where the timely and prudent use of Indians might have proved effective.42  The question of 
which side deployed Indians first has always been contentious. One of the first authors to 
examine the issue was Andrew McFarland Davis in ‘The Employment of Indian Auxiliaries 
in the American War’ and his timeline is still accurate. Davis argues that the facts show that 
the Americans deployed the ‘civilised’ Stockbridge Indians first, but they were so 
integrated into American colonial society that to say the Americans brought in the 
‘savages’ first makes the reasons for the argument questionable. Davis concludes that both 
sides worked to gain the Indian support or at least neutrality, but in the final analysis, the 
British were at least somewhat aware that their efforts would be more likely to affect 
civilians, loyalist and rebel alike, as well as military forces. 43 Jack Sosin takes a slightly 
more even-handed view of the ways the Indians were used by both sides in ‘The Use of 
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Indians in the War of American Revolution: A Re-Assessment of Responsibility’. 
However, Sosin still blames the British General Gage for over playing the fact that the 
Americans first used the Stockbridge Indians at Boston and starting the escalation of the 
issue into a full blown frontier conflagration. Critically, Sosin points out that had his 
subordinates followed his commands, the British would have unleashed the Indians much 
earlier in the war. Only the restraint shown by Quebec Governor General Guy Carleton in 
the north and John Stuart in the south kept the allied Indians from falling on the frontier. 44 
Carleton and Stuart’s actions and character will be examined at length later in this paper. 
Although Davis and Sosin examine the issue chronologically in great detail, neither 
approaches it specifically from the angle of the British Army’s view of honour in warfare. 
Best known of the battles of the Revolution, but little explored in the sense of Indian 
involvement, is Major General John Burgoyne’s Saratoga Campaign. Burgoyne made much 
of his use of Indians in the planning and early parts of the campaign that many historians 
argue sealed the fate of the British Empire in North America. However, an Indian atrocity 
forced Burgoyne to curtail their use at a critical juncture and arguably caused him to 
blunder into the heavily fortified American position near the Hudson River. A supporting 
campaign to Saratoga was the Mohawk valley campaign led by Lieutenant Colonel Barry 
St. Leger that culminated in the British tactical win at Oriskany, but strategic failure at Ft 
Stanwix. The battle of Oriskany is routinely named as one of the most vicious fights of the 
war involving Indians on both sides. Several British allied Indian tribes lost a significant 
number of their leaders and were reluctant to work with the British afterwards. Burgoyne’s 
actions and subsequent defence of them in Parliament is one of the most fruitful areas of 
study for this paper as the issue of Indian use is addressed at length and exposes the 
divisiveness of the issue in Britain.45  
Beyond Saratoga, Indian participation in the Revolution as allies to the British is not 
well covered in the general histories, especially the midwest as defined by this paper. To 
find Indian involvement, one must look into specialised studies. In 1777, allied raids on the 
Cherry and Wyoming valleys led by the Mohawk Joseph Brant in concert with the British 
Indian agent, Sir John Johnson and Ranger leader Lieutenant Colonel John Butler raised the 
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specter of frontier warfare on long established settlements of New York that were 
frightfully close to Albany.46 This critical area was a bread basket for the Continental Army 
and could not go unprotected, so Washington sent Major General John Sullivan into the 
Iroquois heartland in the modern day Finger Lakes region of New York in 1779. Of course, 
where the Americans saw massacres in the valleys, the Iroquois saw town destroyers in 
their villages.47 The participants on both sides began to see things differently. Indians, like 
Joseph Brant, were known to stop atrocities and Americans began to see the ‘savages’ as 
people who lived in houses in long established villages with crops surrounding them. 
Less explored, but more fruitful for this paper, is the Ohio frontier during the 
Revolution. From the beginning, the Americans accused the British Governor of Detroit, 
Henry Hamilton, of ‘hair buying’. Hamilton figured prominently as the dark figure that 
encouraged the rebels to send George Rogers Clark to the Ohio country to interdict raids 
against the frontier. Hamilton is an interesting character with the British Army and a search 
into his background and humanity rewards with a much more complex portrait than popular 
history has given him.48 By looking at the Kentucky backcountry in the years before the 
Revolution, the context of how a term like ‘hair buyer’ would carry such strong feeling on 
the frontier becomes clearer.49 The American campaigns of Clark and Sullivan effectively 
ended the large scale British and Indian attempts to gain the northern midwest, but small 
scale raids became the norm and far more vicious. Raids led by Joseph Brant, John Butler 
and Simon Girty, as well as some with Captain Henry Bird set the Pennsylvania and 
Kentucky backcountry alight and constituted some of the last battles of the war in 1782.50 
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Finally, the area least covered is the southern campaign where many of the lesser 
known frontier battles that involved the Indians occurred.51 The southern Indians were 
attended to by the British Indian Superintendent, John Stuart. Stuart was accused by the 
Americans of stirring up the Cherokee against the Carolina backcountry in 1776. This 
action shared many similarities with the Iroquois campaigns in terms of frontier raiding and 
retribution campaigns. Philip M. Hamer argues that Stuart had far less to do with 
instigating the Cherokee to combat than the northern tribes who, visiting early in the war, 
demanded the Cherokees join them. Stuart was blamed in American frontier circles for this 
early action, but had far more influence as the war progressed. East Florida Governor 
Tonyn and a loyalist named Thomas Brown may have had more to do with Indian raids in 
the south than Stuart did. Little known is the allied support of the Creeks, Choctaws, and 
Chickasaws in West Florida that helped the British keep the American allied Spanish at bay 
late in the war. 52   
After the end of the Revolution, the British maintained their posts in the upper midwest 
that had been ceded in the Treaty of Paris to the Americans and still had powerful trading 
influences in the gulf south, now owned by Spain and France again. These posts and 
commercial dealings were to be the source of power initially for the Indians of the midwest 
as British support helped keep the American settlers at bay for a while. The alliances are 
examined in detail in His Majesty’s Indian Allies by Robert S. Allen who looks at the 
Indians as a critical part of the defence of Canada from the Revolution to the end of the 
War of 1812. 53 Allen digs deep into the background of the relationship, all the way back to 
Sir William Johnson’s death and Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774. In what is the best book on 
the topic post-Revolution, Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815, Colin 
G. Calloway argues that the British truly committed to the Indian alliance after the 
Revolution as a check on American expansion and to maintain the still lucrative fur trade. 54 
Calloway explains how the British and the Indians changed their view of warfare over the 
years with the Indians seeking more work with British units and the British being less 
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concerned with the Indian ways of war when they worked together. For a narrower view 
geographically, Timothy D. Willig examines British policy in the Great Lakes alone in 
Restoring the Chain of Friendship. 55 Willig states that the quality of the relationship in the 
Great Lakes depended on local factors, mainly the loss of lands and the viability of the fur 
trade at British Indian department outposts. However, none of the books that deal directly 
with the British-Indian alliance address the issue directly of how honour affected the British 
battlefield, campaign, and war decisions. 
As American and British relations normalised after the Revolution, the issues of trade, 
the frontier outposts, and Indian alliances came to the diplomatic fore. The British justified 
retaining the midwest outposts as a favour of maintaining the Indians, but concluded that it 
was no favour as the Americans used the British bogeyman as a reason to attack the Indians 
repetitively. The relationship changed again as the Anglo-French rivalry heated up again in 
the early 1790s when the British realised that they would need to rely heavily on Indian 
help to protect Canada in any future conflict. 56  Simultaneously, the Cherokee group 
known as the Chickamauga was still fighting with encroaching settlers along the Tennessee 
River in the south. The ongoing raids and retribution led to the Cherokee and parts of the 
other southern tribes forming a nascent confederacy with the Ohio tribes. In the Northwest, 
George Rogers Clark was on the march again in 1786-1787 to the Wabash River to try to 
settle local anarchy that the settlers claimed was being caused by the British agents in 
Detroit, but whether the British were trying to extend their outposts to their former extent is 
questionable. 57 This era brought the issue of the British posts in the upper midwest to a 
head and the new American Republic felt it had to address the issue of the Northwest once 
and for all. 
The situation in the Ohio valley would not calm down until the Americans sent a series 
of expeditions up the Maumee River valley in modern day Ohio. The Americans sent three 
expeditions into the area in the early 1790s. In the Autumn of 1790, Major General Josiah 
Harmar sent too small of a force to deal with the Shawnee and Miami near the Indian 
village Kekionga and was forced back into a defensive position with severe losses in his 
reconnaissance element. The St. Claire expedition was next in late 1791 and was caught off 
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guard near Fort Recovery, Ohio, by a force of two thousand Indian warriors led by Little 
Turtle. The defeat was total with Major General Arthur St. Claire losing more than nine 
hundred people dead, missing or wounded. In 1792, two diplomatic parties were sent by 
Washington to meet the Indians, but every member of both parties was killed by the 
suspicious Indians. Following the initial debacles, Washington appointed General ‘Mad’ 
Anthony Wayne to take the area in 1793.58 Far from being helpful, the presence of British 
Indian Department Agents had the unintended effect of bringing unwanted American 
attention to the Indians. Having also been encouraged by the Canadian Governor-General 
Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, to prepare for a war that the British would inevitably join, 
the Indians met Wayne on the Maumee River, near the British Fort Miamis. At the Battle of 
Fallen Timbers in 1794, Wayne defeated the Indians, and they retreated to Fort Miamis 
where the British unexpectedly closed the gate and denied them refuge. Wayne induced the 
Indians to peace at the Treaty of Greenville the following year, and the British influence in 
the area was largely broken.59  
American expansion into the upper midwest and deep suspicion of British motives 
drove American Indian policy for the next fifteen years.60 State governments and 
frontiersmen saw British influence behind every Indian sighting. The new federal 
government was trying, at least on paper, to ensure that it treated its Indian neighbours with 
the values established in the new nation’s founding ideals. Britain’s role on the American 
frontier became one of influence and defensive preparations, rather than open hostility. 
Britain believed its best chance of securing Canada was to secure the river outlets to the 
Gulf of Mexico. However, by the turn of the nineteenth century, Britain was thoroughly 
engaged with Napoleon in Europe, and the American midwest was not top of her priorities. 
In fact, Britain and America had established an uneasy detente from Jay’s Treaty in 1794 to 
1803. The Americans were also somewhat worried about Napoleon as France owned 
Louisiana and had influence over Spanish Florida. When Napoleon sold Louisiana to the 
USA in 1803, the Anglo-American rivalry began to heat up again. The Louisiana Purchase 
removed most Americans’ fear of France, but tested patience in Britain as Napoleon was 
given a new financial lease on life with the proceeds. Britain began to re-establish its 
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influence in the midwest and used a variety of methods to do so, including diplomatic and 
commercial dealings with the Indians in the midwest.61 As the USA became more confident 
in its new acquisition, it returned aggressively to maritime commerce with Europe, 
including France. This issue and the lure of American prosperity for war-weary British 
sailors would become two of the issues that would once again bring Britain and America to 
war. 
Neutral trading rights and impressment of sailors caused an affront to the honour of 
some in the new nation. The positions in the commercial northeast and east coast seaports 
were far more conducive to peace than the ‘War Hawks’ of the south and midwest led by 
Kentuckian Henry Clay.62 Although the tension slowly built over the years after the 
Chesapeake affair in 1807, by 1812 the USA had decided to challenge Britain and renew 
the midwest as a geopolitical objective of Britain and the USA in the War of 1812.63 The 
Americans wanted Canada and the British wanted to keep effective control through their 
trading relationship with the Indians. Neither got their ultimate objective, but the 
Americans won from Britain a formal acknowledgement of the status quo ante that meant 
the Americans now had full rights to the midwest and control over the Indians. Many 
authors have made light of the western qualms about the British and Indians, but Julius 
Pratt argues that the western aims of the War Hawks really were due to the frontier’s fear of 
the British and Indian alliance. The official record, pamphlets and newspaper accounts of 
the time are full of western citizens, soldiers, and politicians stating their concerns. If we 
are to claim it was not a cause of the war, we must discount this substantial record 
according to Pratt.64 
Simultaneously, the years between 1794 and 1811 saw the continued march of 
American settlers into the midwest. The areas left in Indian control were the western Great 
Lakes to the Mississippi River held mainly by Shawnees and the wilderness middle of the 
Mississippi Territory held by the Creek Indians which is modern day Mississippi and 
Alabama. The Shawnee leader Tecumseh had a Creek mother and, after getting the 
northern tribes to agree to a pan-Indian confederacy, travelled south to recruit the southern 
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tribes to the Confederacy in 1811. Tecumseh managed to convince only one half of the 
Creeks to rise up against the Americans. To add to the insult, his brother, the Shawnee 
Prophet, had kicked of the war in the north at Tippecanoe against Tecumseh’s express 
wishes.65 The Battle of Tippecanoe of 1811, which began the confederate Indian war that 
would be subsumed in the War of 1812, as well as the Creek War of 1813-1814, is often 
not mentioned in conventional histories. By including these Indian battles and the Gulf of 
Mexico campaign that concluded with the Battle of New Orleans, the midwest’s 
importance in the overall war becomes more obvious. J. Leitch Wright believed that Britain 
still had hopes for holding New Orleans after the war to help secure Canada.66 
A glaring weakness of many histories of the War of 1812 is that there is very little 
consideration of the comparative issues with the Napoleonic struggle, especially the 
Peninsular War. Jeremy Black attempts to bridge this gap with The War of 1812 in the Age 
of Napoleon.67 Black draws on the tactics and operations of each war to show how they 
differed and how much more important the European combat was to Britain’s strategic 
goals. These comparisons go a long way in explaining the British reliance on the Indians as 
allies in the midwest compared to previous wars. As the War of 1812 began, Britain faced 
the possibility of losing Canada if it did not ally with the Indians, and Whitehall knew it. 
The use of Indians in the northern campaigns of 1812-1813 by Major General Isaac Brock 
and Colonel Henry Procter provide an interesting look into two different officer’s view of 
the same Indians.68 Brock had a strong affinity with the Indians, especially Tecumseh, and 
immediately took the opportunity to promise the Indians a homeland in the Great Lakes if 
they joined the British cause. Unfortunately for the Indians, Brock was killed at Queenston 
Heights early in the war. Procter, who has been much maligned, was left to carry on the 
Indian war as best he could. Significantly, an Indian atrocity against wounded prisoners 
occurred under Procter’s command at Frenchtown that became a rallying cry for 
Kentuckians’ revenge. Taken into the union in 1792, the majority of Kentuckians were War 
Hawks, and their men swelled the ranks of the American forces in the northern theatre.  
Kentuckians served in the northern and southern midwest throughout the war, and a 
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Kentuckian, Colonel Richard M. Johnson, was feted as the killer of Tecumseh at the Battle 
of the Thames in Canada.69   
Although Kentuckians did serve in the Gulf of Mexico campaign, most of the southern 
campaign troops came from Tennessee and were led by the future President, Major General 
Andrew Jackson. Except for the Battle of New Orleans, this campaign is little known and 
often left out of the War of 1812 histories. The Creek War where Cherokee, Chickasaw, 
Choctaw, and friendly Creeks aligned with the USA to defeat the Tecumseh aligned faction 
of Creeks over two years secured millions of acres of Creek land for the USA. Shortly 
thereafter, the British arrived on the gulf coast to recruit Creeks for the upcoming British 
assault on New Orleans and Mobile. However, Jackson and his Indian allies defeated the 
British at New Orleans, securing the valuable gulf outlets for midwest agricultural produce. 
With the extinguishing of the Shawnee and Creek resistance to American settlement, the 
Indians’ war for the American midwest was over.70  
Throughout their participation in North America, the British Army faced a number of 
serious constraints on their ability to project British strategic power into the development of 
the midwest in terms favourable to them. Manpower limitations, wilderness 
communications, and European commitments all favoured the use of Indians as allies. 
However, the Indians practiced a type of warfare that was at odds with the best British 
practices, so they were often not deployed early enough or supported well enough to 
materially help the British objectives. This paper seeks to determine if the British Army’s 
sense of internal or external honour hindered the Indians’ effective use. 
1.7.2 The Martial Culture of Indians and North American Methods of Warfare  
The second part of the historiography is a survey of the methods of warfare employed 
by the Indians and, at times, by the British Army. As Skaggs and Nelson mention, the 
modern trend of the study of the Indian midwest can be traced back to a seminal work 
edited by Helen Hornbeck Tanner entitled Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History.71 This work 
is a classic in unifying geography, cartography, ethnology, and history into a single volume 
that provides an overview of how the Indians viewed the midwest. The Atlas provides an 
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antidote to most European historical depictions of the area as an unsettled wilderness by 
provided a chronology of the Indian settlement of the area. Another book that came before 
Tanner, but is still widely quoted is the classic Council Fires on the Upper Ohio by 
Randolph C. Downes that set the standard for telling Indian history from the Indian point of 
view.72 Downes explains how the Indians managed to hold back loss of their homelands 
during much of the period by playing the whites off of each other. 
In contrast to the traditional histories of the era and area is the relatively new field of 
Ethnohistory. In older histories, European actors were followed minutely, but the Indians 
were often mere foils built from racial prejudices and stereotypes, both good and bad. 
Ethnohistories and other studies that used ethnohistories to build a fuller view of all parties 
proliferated from the 1960s to the present day. They provided a much needed tonic to the 
traditional view and over time outgrew their earlier cloying depictions of Indians as 
completely naive and faultless in the conflicts. An example of this growth in the context of 
this paper is the sensitive issue of scalping. During the early days of Ethnohistory, a myth 
took hold that the Indians only began scalping when the Europeans introduced scalp 
bounties. James Axtell took great pains to dismantle the myth with ethnic, archaeological, 
forensic, and artistic studies in ‘The Unkindest Cut, Or Who Invented Scalping’ in The 
European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America.73 In 
subsequent books, Axtell provides further detail that Indians were not just the pawns or 
unwilling dupes of the colonising Europeans.74 Axtell depicts the Indian shrewdness and 
subtlety to show how they retained their culture and values for two and a half centuries 
after first contact.  Furthering Axtell’s work is Richard White’s The Middle Ground which 
disputed the traditional view that Indians and Whites were always at odds.75 White explains 
that the Great Lakes region was often a place of cooperation and conciliation. Although 
initially incomprehensible to each other, Indians and Whites over time concocted ways to 
understand each other. Values were often compromised by both sides to establish a working 
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world from which each could profit. This view of Indians and Whites living together, albeit 
with some difficulty, has continued through recent ethnohistories.  
Although most explorations of Indian and White interaction in the midwest are from 
the Great Lakes and Ohio valley, Kathryn E. Holland Braund examines the trade in 
deerskins between the British and the Creek Indians in the Gulf of Mexico south.76 In much 
the same way that the Iroquois controlled the Ohio interior through their connections with 
the British on the coast, so did the Creeks control the trade with the interior tribes of 
Choctaw, Chickasaw, and to a lesser degree, the Cherokee. This alignment would later be 
the basis for conflicting alliances amongst the tribes as it was in the north, but with contrary 
results due to local constraints.  Braund, along with Gregory Waselkov, edited and 
annotated the papers of one of the most exacting observers of the early southern wilderness 
and its Indians on the eve of the American Revolutionary War, William Bartram.77 
Bartram, a Quaker natural philosopher, went to great pains to be objective in treatment of 
the natural surroundings, Indians, and the whites he encountered in the area. Braund and 
Waselkov add value in assessing the veracity with other accounts and archives from the era. 
Colin G. Calloway, one of the foremost scholars of Indians and their contact with 
Europeans, continues the trend of challenging Indian and White stereotypes. In New Worlds 
for All, Calloway counters many of the stereotypes in pointing out that communication and 
transportation networks existed long before the Europeans arrived, but they quickly became 
shared.78 Calloway also exposes the obvious in that horticulturist midwestern Indians who 
fought the ever moving European settlers would have found it odd that they were 
considered the nomads. Calloway also makes some interesting observations in the ways 
Scottish Highlanders and Indians were and were not alike. This comparative study is 
especially pertinent to this paper as both groups experienced the British Army as foes and 
employers in the eighteenth century with many of the attending issues of honour and 
atrocities present. In The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America, 
Calloway makes the point that the first declaration of independence in North America came 
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from the Indians of the Great Lakes with Pontiac’s rebellion.79 The end of the Seven Years’ 
War and the transfer of so much land from the French to the British without even 
consulting the Indians who lived on the land made 1763 a critical juncture for all three 
parties involved. Moving from Pontiac’s rebellion to the American Revolutionary War, 
Calloway describes how the different tribes and villages of Indians experienced the war. 80 
When the primary goal was to preserve their culture, land, and life, it is not surprising to 
find that the revolution split Indians as well as Britons. Each group or geographical area 
had to choose a side or try to stay out of the way as best they could, much like the colonists. 
In what might be the only published history that traces the British Army and Indian 
relationship in a unified form, Calloway provides a short history of the Shawnees in The 
Shawnees and the War for America.81 This small volume is an excellent introduction into 
how all of the wars from 1755 to 1815 could be seen from a viewpoint other than the 
European. The Shawnees were originally a southern tribe that moved into the Ohio valley 
with European expansion. They and the Delaware, who had also moved west to disentangle 
from the Whites, formed the basis for the coming Indian confederation attempts to stop the 
westward spread of settlement. Tecumseh, a Shawnee with a Creek mother, would form the 
ultimate expression of this attempt in the War of 1812 with a pan-Indian confederacy. 
Alfred Cave delves into the world of Indian unity and spirituality in ‘The Delaware 
Prophet Neolin: A Reappraisal’.82 Cave explains that there are two views of this 
phenomenon. One is that the Indians adopted many Judeo-Christian elements of sin and 
redemption into their revival sermons. The other is that it was a ground swell realisation of 
what they had lost and their contact with Whites merely gave it the appearance of western 
religion. The various attempts at Indian unity are explored in A Spirited Resistance: The 
North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745-1815 by Gregory Evans Dowd.83 
Examining four tribes, two northern and two southern, Dowd describes a distributed 
spiritual awakening in the 1760s as the threat to their lands was becoming acute. Prophets 
were often key players in these revivals and often became the impetus for a return to native 
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self-reliance and an assertion of the divine right to the land they occupied. Dowd provides 
no easy answers to the questions posed and insists the Indian spiritual awakening was not 
just atavism, because it often incorporated modern, even western ideals. Cave’s conclusion 
is that religion was also part of the ‘middle ground’, but in the end it was too elemental in 
its appeal to the Indians to have been completely foreign. Dowd makes clear in that he is 
trying to explain an Indian phenomenon; he is not telling the story from the Indian point of 
view. In contrast, in Facing East from Indian Country, Daniel Richter examines the 
period’s history from a completely Indian point of view.84 Richter takes a decidedly Sixty 
Years’ War perspective by looking at the radical change that visited the midwest Indians 
after centuries of white contact, but Indian control of this vital geography.  
Not all contact between Europeans and Indians produced war. Some Indians, and the 
Iroquois specifically, practiced diplomacy as high art to keep the major European powers 
balanced against each other. Timothy J. Shannon argues that the Iroquois withstood 
European expansion due to their tool of choice, diplomacy over fighting when it could be 
avoided.85 Through their deft use of diplomacy, they were able to get what they wanted 
more often than not. No discussion of Iroquois diplomacy would be complete without Sir 
William Johnson, the British Indian Superintendent of the north. Fintan O’Toole traces 
Johnson’s family from Ireland and Johnson’s quick rise under his uncle’s patronage 
(British Admiral Sir Peter Warren) in New York.86 By the Seven Years’ War Johnson is 
commanding British troops along with his beloved Mohawk and other Indians. Johnson 
turned a close relationship with the Indians into a very lucrative and influential post for him 
and his associates, such has his nephew Guy Johnson who succeeded him and the Mohawk 
Joseph Brant who was to lead Indians in battle throughout the period. Brant’s life can tell 
much of the British-Indian alliance story from both the Indian and British perspective and 
Isabel Thompson Kelsay does so with Joseph Brant.87 Brant was educated in England and a 
frequent visitor. More than any other Indian leader, he understood the pressures on both 
sides.   
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John Sugden is the biographer of two other important Indian leaders of the epoch, 
Tecumseh and Blue Jacket, both Shawnees. Sugden removes the myth of Tecumseh that 
has made him the most famous Indian of the eastern woodlands and places him in the 
context of his people and time that explains his force and popularity.88 In Blue Jacket: 
Warrior of the Shawnees, Sugden brings this little known warrior to life.89 Blue Jacket was 
a contemporary of Brant, but much more grounded in the Ohio country with little direct 
contact with the British Army. Blue Jacket was a true Indian of his age. A chief that liked 
rum too much and held petty grudges over years, he was also a warrior amongst warriors 
and understood very early on that his people could never move far enough for the settlers to 
be happy. 
One topic that pervades the study of the warfare in North America from 1755-1815 is 
the inescapable fact that the style of warfare in Europe was largely not practiced in North 
America due to cultural, manpower, technological, and terrain constraints. This fact has 
been acknowledged from the earliest histories. However, a treasure trove of recent 
scholarship on the subject has redefined which style prevailed and which parties practiced 
which style when it was required. Thomas Carlyle stated that the ‘rifle made all men tall’, 
but John Mahon in ‘Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794’ stated that 
American folklore tried to portray the lone rifleman as differentiator in the woodlands, but 
in reality it was closely knit units that could fire and maneuver who mastered the art of 
North American warfare.90 Mahon goes on to say that those who mastered woodland 
warfare and could tie tactics to a strong set of strategic goals eventually won the conflicts. 
In ‘The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal’, Don Higginbotham 
examines the ways that North American warfare affected social norms and civil-military 
relationships.91 Higginbotham asks some difficult questions that have yet to be answered, 
such as, why did early Republic writers like Franklin and Paine stress that republicanism 
was peaceful when all around them was evidence that it was not? Matthew Ward shows the 
difficulty in getting British Army regulars to adapt to the Indian way of warfare in tactics as 
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well as supplying them in the wilderness in ‘The European Method of Warring is Not 
Practiced Here: The Failure of British Military Policy in the Ohio Valley, 1755-1759’.92  
Armstrong Starkey, in the same vein as Richard White, argues that the development of 
warfare was as much about cultural exchange as it was cultural conflict.93 Starkey says that 
Indians and Europeans fought as allies as much as enemies and the experience transferred 
to both groups to form a new style of North American warfare. In Conquering the 
American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast, Guy 
Chet argues, in a geographically constrained way, that in the Northeast, the European way 
of war actually won out and the major battles there were more European than native.94 
However, John Grenier takes a broader geographical view and comes to a different 
conclusion.95 According to Grenier, not only did Americans learn the Indian style of 
warfare, but learned to practice it with extravagant violence against civilians and their 
infrastructure. Finally, Peter Silver says that Indian warfare made disparate immigrant 
groups on the frontier join together, but it also made them accuse each other over old world 
differences when convenient.96 The fear mongering resulted in a savage racism against the 
Indians and any group that dared befriend them. It was into this complex situation that the 
British Army stepped in 1755 with mixed results. 
 1.7.3 The British Army and Eighteenth-Century British Society 
The third and final section of the historiography provides a look into the British culture 
that supported the British Army. The British Army changed dramatically from 1755 to 
1815. The force that had traditionally fought on England’s borders and Western Europe 
prior to 1755 began to be used widely in support of the first British Empire. The way it was 
recruited, trained, supplied, and moved had to adapt to the changing missions and 
geography of a world-wide empire. No conditions were more challenging than those of 
North America where a lack of infrastructure and a pre-modern form of warfare was the 
                                                
92 Matthew C. Ward, ‘“The European Method of Warring is Not Practiced Here”: The Failure of British 
Military Policy in the Ohio Valley, 1755-1759’, War in History, Volume 4 (3) (1997): 247-263. 
93 Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1998) 
94 Guy Chet, Conquering The American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial 
Northeast (University of Massachusetts Press, 2003) 
95 Grenier, First Way 
96 Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company, 2007) 
L i n z y  | 37 
 
norm. In addition to the tactical and operational challenges were the changing mores of a 
society that was also going through radical change at the beginning of the Industrial Age. 
Prior to looking at the British Army in North America, it is critical to understand the 
background of it as entered into this critical period. The term ‘Military Europe’, coined by 
Christopher Duffy and expanded upon by Stephen Conway, is an excellent descriptor of 
how the British Army viewed itself during this period. Military Europe assumed that 
serious nation-states would have large standing armies that embraced the idea that there 
were proper physical, ethical and political constraints on warfare that made it more 
civilised. Although national patriotism was present, members of Military Europe also held 
an occupational solidarity and the officers were members of an occupational fraternity. 
There were national variations of course. The British (or the English as Military Europe 
knew them) were known for their contempt of foreigners. They showed a remarkable 
condescension for the French and Germans as well as the Americans and the Indians. As 
soldiers they were known for their unflinching bravery, but not particularly well versed in 
the military arts. They certainly were not viewed as intellectuals. However, more important 
than the differences between national armies were what they shared in common. When 
asked if he identified more closely with an Indian, an American, or a European officer, a 
British Army officer would almost inevitably chose the reverse order of precedence. 97 
Sir John Fortescue chronicled the British Army’s actions from the Norman conquest to 
World War I in The History of the British Army.98 Although slightly outdated in style and 
national temperament compared to modern histories, his work covering the years 1715 to 
1815 still form the basis of most modern campaign histories. However, notably absent is 
any deep discussion of Indians which makes its usefulness to this paper limited, except as 
an institutional record of the British Army and the context in which they were operating. A 
modern day historian of the British Army, Richard Holmes, gives a wide ranging view of 
the average soldier’s life in Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket.99 
Holmes leaves high command to others and focusses on the weapons, recruitment, medical 
treatment, and camp followers of the British Army in the field in Europe, North America 
and Asia. 
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Moving to North America exclusively, Stephen Brumwell examines the common 
soldier in Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763.100 Brumwell 
shows how the soldiers adapted to irregular warfare in the completely foreign wilderness of 
North America. Specifically pertinent to this paper is the chapter on the British Army’s 
confrontation with the type of fighting conducting by militia, Rangers, and Indians. 
Brumwell makes clear that it was not an easy, or complete conversion to North American 
warfare, but their persistence allowed them to win the crucial campaigns from 1757-1760. 
Michael McConnell splits the difference between Holmes and Brumwell by talking about 
the everyday lives of the British Soldier in North America between 1758 and 1775 in Army 
& Empire: British Soldiers on the American Frontier.101 Having finally forced the French 
out of the midwest, the British Army settled down to the harshness of frontier life. 
McConnell covers health, society, and military work that began the British Army’s history 
of life on the edges of empire. Life in the British Army in North America was often, to 
borrow a descriptive phrase, nasty, brutish, and short from recruitment through death often 
due to excruciating disease and horrific wounds. However, the British soldier was not an 
automaton. In ‘rebellion of the Regulars: Working Soldiers and the Mutiny of 1763-1764’, 
Peter Way describes how the Indians were not the only ones disgusted with British penny 
pinching after the Seven Years’ War.102 The British Army’s attempt to dock two-thirds of 
the average soldier’s pay for his upkeep was the primary driver of the mutiny, but Way 
argues that the reasoning must be followed further to find similarities with their civilian 
counterparts of the age. Conditions of release from duty, re-assignment, and the treatment 
of camp followers were some of the many complaints filed as the British Army tried to rein 
in the heavy spending previously needed to win the war. In short, Way argues that the 
British soldier would put up with a lot, but was no push-over. 
One of the historical inaccuracies that have been leveled wholesale at the British Army 
is that it was too rigid in its application of formalised European battlefield maneuvers in the 
wilderness.  From the very beginning of the French and Indian War, the British officers and 
men adapted to their missions. As early as 1947, Franklin Thayer Nichols wrote in ‘The 
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Organisation of Braddock’s Army’, that Braddock had trained his soldiers in light infantry 
techniques, drastically lowered the load they carried, and had covering forces to the fore 
and both flanks during his march to the forks of the Ohio.103 In Braddock’s March, Thomas 
E. Crocker argues that Braddock did realise that he needed Indian scouts, but was let down 
by his naiveté of colonial governors’ promises and the need to bend to the niceties of Indian 
diplomacy.104 Furthermore, in Braddock’s campaign were officers named Gage, Gates, Lee, 
and Washington, as well as support men like Boone, Croghan, and Morgan. These men 
may not have been experts at Indian warfare in 1755, but their intelligence shown later in 
life meant they would not have taken the situation in 1755 lightly. ‘Redcoats in the 
Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760’ 
by Peter E. Russell is an often cited work, because it dissolved a two century old historical 
belief that the British Army had never dealt with irregular warfare and could not adjust.105 
Russell details how the British Army adapted to irregular warfare in Flanders and the 
Jacobite rebellion in 1745.  The Duke of Cumberland used a Ranger unit designed to fight 
in the American colony of Georgia to disrupt Jacobite patrols. Officers that became senior 
leaders later in the Seven Years’ War such as Jeffery Amherst, James Abercromby, Lord 
Howe, and John Forbes had seen grenadiers acting as skirmishers and reconnaissance 
parties working the flanks of large formations in Europe. The experience in Scotland and 
Flanders was translated into North America by many such serving officers and Highland 
regiments sent to North America in the late 1750s. 
In ‘The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763’, Daniel J. 
Beattie details the advances in logistics that the British Army used to conduct large scale 
operations over areas where they had never been conducted by European armies.106 
Standardisation and planning enabled consistent logistics routes which in turn enabled more 
consistent campaign planning along the Mohawk and Hudson valleys in New York. 
Another of the well-known adaptations was the use of special units of woodsmen called 
Rangers to conduct patrols, reconnaissance, and shield larger units on the move. The 
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Annotated and Illustrated Journals of Major Robert Rogers is a good introduction to their 
service throughout the 1750s and 1760s, including his attempt to create a training regimen 
for would be Rangers at the behest of Lord Loudon with Thomas Gage as the leader of a 
separate regiment of Rangers.107 Rogers was a good combat leader, but also a world class 
publicist, so his journals have to be mined carefully, but Timothy J. Todish does a good job 
with the annotation to put the exploits in context. Rangers continued to be used throughout 
the period and into the Revolution, especially in the New York frontier regions. As with 
much of the literature on the topic, most of the aforementioned books neglect the southern 
portion of the midwest and it is left to a specialist work to close the gap. In Militiamen, 
Rangers, and Redcoats: The Military in Georgia, 1754-1776, James M. Johnson examines 
how the mixture of militia, Rangers, and the British regulars together managed the southern 
frontier against the Cherokee and Creek Indians.108 Johnson gives a pragmatic view of the 
value of citizen soldiers and believes that have been too much maligned. 
Adaptation of the officers to North American warfare was critical, but the operational 
capabilities of the army as a whole were also important. Matthew H. Spring examines how 
the British Army adapted operations when required in the Revolution in With Zeal and with 
Bayonets Only.109 Spring argues that the British Army was remarkably adaptable in 
integrating new skills into their tactics, but more importantly, converting those tactics into 
coherent operational plans. Spring concludes that although the British Army were the better 
in the field, the rebel resiliency in reforming after defeats meant that British operational 
victories could never reach a strategic victory.     The idea that rebellions, insurgencies, and 
other forms of asymmetric warfare were always inevitably lost by the imperial forces is 
quite common, but as G. J. Bryant shows in ‘Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience 
in Eighteenth-Century India’ points out, the British adapted quite well to the cultural, 
political, and military conditions in India that were presented to them.110 Many of the same 
conditions were present in America as were in India, but the British were able to exploit 
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their strengths better in India. This raises the question of the capability and the prejudices of 
the British Army leadership in America.  
The leadership of the British Army and the British political establishment would 
ultimately determine the use of Indians in North America. However, these two groups were 
not mutually exclusive. Fifty-nine army officers were elected as Members of Parliament in 
1761, but only nine had served in the American colonies during the Seven Years’ war.  In 
1766, there were fifty-four. Their status and political orientation were critical to their 
decision-making. Even some of the officers who were not Members of Parliament held 
senior civil positions in the various colonial governments.111 From 1755 to the end of the 
American Revolution in 1783, this military/political honour group was still a relatively 
small group that shared an idea of honour that cut across European boundaries and appealed 
to an aristocratic group that was not skilled in the military science of large armies, but in 
personal prowess and courage on horseback. The individual soldiers were expected to be of 
low moral standing. The best that could be expected was that appeals to the higher 
authorities of God and King would keep the rabble from committing too many atrocities. 
Prior to the French Revolution, if one were to ask the average British Army officer whether 
he shared an honour code with a French Army officer or one of his British private soldiers, 
the answer would almost always have been with the French officer.  
In George Washington’s Generals and Opponents, historians give detailed critiques on 
the performance of each of the major American British officers in the Revolution.112 John 
Shy delivers a devastating assessment of Thomas Gage in ‘Weak Link of Empire’.113 
Although Gage had experience in wilderness and Indian warfare, Shy enumerates Gage’s 
several blunders of analysis such as thinking that Boston was the only problem and force 
would win the day once the political will was present. Shy paints a picture of a man who 
progressed despite his experience and was in over his head. Carleton is examined by Paul 
H. Smith in ‘Soldier-Statesman’.114 Carleton’s main drawback in relation to this paper was 
that he did not use the Indians available to him early in the war to ease the pressure on 
Boston. Carleton was against their use in the offense, but did not declare it openly. 
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Therefore, he sowed confusion between Whitehall and the senior leadership in America. In 
‘Ambitious General’, George Billias describes the overweening ‘Gentleman Johnny’ 
Burgoyne as showing the cultural prejudice present in so many British officers in their 
opinion of the American fighting force.115 Burgoyne’s inability to control his Indian force 
after much effort and his inability to appreciate the difficulty of attacking through the New 
York frontier doomed his expedition. Burgoyne gets high marks for strategic planning, but 
low ones for execution. 
Of course the British Army, especially its officers and politicians, did not live nor act 
in a vacuum. British society was also changing rapidly during this time. The advent of the 
Industrial Revolution at roughly the same time as the victory over France in America in the 
Seven Years’ War ushered in a new feeling of British-ness. The British nation was crafting 
a new national identity at the beginning of the Imperial period.116 The British Army, 
especially its officers, was becoming an accepted part of society. Even the lowly soldiers 
were on their way to a heightened status in this period. The British Army was beginning to 
identify with the nation and the nation with the Army. The seemingly natural Hanoverian 
military bearing and the Royal connection to the Army in the 1750s helped the process 
along. Additionally, island Britons were lucky to have had natural protection from their 
enemies, so as to obviate the need for masses of troops on their doorstep which was what 
often set standing armies against their populations.117 However, this growing acceptance by 
society of the Army and its missions came with a catch for the Army. The British people 
wanted a say as well in the conduct of wars through popular opinion. The British 
population was becoming worldlier with the growth of its new Empire and the British 
people had opinions on military issues and honour, such as the use of Indians. However, 
this growth in British patriotism was not linear. Contrary to H.V. Bowen and Linda Colley, 
Stephen Conway argues that the American Revolutionary War was very divisive politically, 
culturally, and economically.118 
By the 1770s, the new British pride in its power and sophistication was almost stillborn 
due to British society’s newly acquired opinions of the Indians and North American 
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warfare in general. The British public might not have had a perfect view of North America, 
but it had enough information to hold strong opinions. The American Revolutionary War 
was very divisive politically, culturally, and economically both in the colonies and back in 
Britain.119 The use of Indians against colonists was one of the great rifts in British society. 
The newfound pride in the Empire was one thing when it was used to rid North America of 
the French and the Jesuits. It was quite another when Indians allied with the British Army 
were mercilessly attacking cousins on the frontier. Much in the way a British officer might 
have felt closer honour ties to a French officer than a British private, many Britons felt a 
closer tie to the familial ties in rebel Americans than in a military alliance with the 
Indians.120 After the Saratoga defeat, one newspaper declared the British public’s honour to 
be sullied by the use of Indians. 121 The conduct of the British Army officer corps and the 
politicians were also torn between trying to ease the American cousins back into the fold 
with European style tactics and norms or cracking the whip on thankless rebels in the way 
the Irish rebellions had been dealt with. With the settlement of the American issue in 1783 
and a grudging reconciliation in 1794, the Americans and the British relationship improved. 
The same could not be said for the British and French relationship that was going from bad 
to worse with the French Revolution. France and its army took on a new complexion with 
the advent of the levèe en masse. Ideological issues began to take centre stage in the 
European rivalries. Along with the traditional values came newer ideas of justice, equality, 
and personal liberty, but with radical violence. These concepts might not have taken root in 
Britain as they had in France, but the identification of the individual with a higher purpose 
and a national cause was unmistakable. The growing British unity that came with the 
victory in the Seven Years’ War and onset of the wars with Revolutionary France have 
somewhat masked the irregular nature of its progress.122 
Wartime events in North America came to be viewed in Britain through a rapidly 
expanding press and literary establishment. The volume of soldier’s journals and captivity 
narratives exploded in the 1750s and 1760s giving the average Briton a slice of excitement 
and horror at the brutality that was experienced on the frontier of the American colonies. 
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Along with the base titillation of the narratives of torture and scalping came a real desire to 
understand the Indian better.123  The British certainly saw the Indian as the ‘other’ to use a 
modern academic classification. Britons came to know the Indians through warfare, 
missionary activity, and trade.124 The Indians were often seen through the British lenses of 
each of these domains, but were never considered equal, nor did they enjoy the full benefits 
and protections of the British systems of commerce, law, and customs. Although the 
Indians represented a small fraction of the indigenous peoples within the first British 
Empire, they garnered a disproportionate amount of interest.125 The Indians were often used 
as examples in philosophical works, art, the press, and religious reasoning. A decade of war 
in close proximity to the Indians and the well-publicised accounts projected the Indians into 
sharp relief to the Empire’s view of its mission in the world. Some of the impressions of 
Indians were personal as some travelled to Britain as slaves, traders, diplomats, visiting 
royalty, and students. How the Indians were viewed in Britain often depended on why they 
came.126 They often caused excitement and enthusiasm in theatres, churches and Royal 
courts, but if they were looking to negotiate with British ministers and plead their cases, 
they were often treated less well. Another area where the British had contact with the 
Indians was the missionary movement. The missionaries’ influence among the Indians and 
the Christians in Britain allowed another view of the Indian to emerge. This view brought a 
sense of moral obligation to improve the plight of the Indians. At first, this obligation was 
used as a justification for sidelining the Jesuit effort in North America during the Seven 
Years’ War. Later it was used to justify helping the midwestern Indians retain their territory 
from the acquisitive frontier settlers.127 The work of the missionaries encouraged a 
sympathetic view in some that led to the Indians’ Romanticisation. 
Indians entered the British consciousness through art as well. Paintings, sculpture, and 
graphic art were used to convey the role that the Indians held within the Empire. Many of 
the most famous, such as Benjamin West’s paintings of Wolfe’s death, were near 
propaganda, but less well-known and realistic representations were also popular in more 
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specific cultural and economic settings. The Indians were originally portrayed as exotic, 
then as allies, and finally as in decline. The depictions of the Indians were not wholly 
unrepresentative views of inferior people, but they could never be totally accurate either, 
because the artists were of a completely different world.128 Overall, the British conclusion 
in 1760s was that the Indian was a cruel and uncivil creature that had to be treated with 
respect in war and pitied for its poor development, but was not of the British standard of 
humanity in warfare. 
The Indian was not only a source of inspiration for the graphic arts, but also the 
literary. The literary depiction of Indians in the era was transformed from captivity 
narratives early on to a forlorn realization that a distinct period of human historical 
development was passing away forever. The idea of the Indian became especially important 
to the Romantic movement. Tim Fulford argues that Romanticism might not have taken the 
course it did without the Indian and the view of the Indian over the period changed from 
grand narrative to focused detail. The detail allowed a more nuanced view of the Indian and 
in many cases encouraged sympathy for them in their plight against the land voracious 
frontiersmen. 129  
 
1.8 Introduction Summary 
This introduction provides the purpose, scope, definitions and the positioning of this 
paper into the wider historiographical context. Although providing context to such a wide-
ranging period and setting can seem overwhelming, it is critical before one can begin the 
process of analysing how a cultural element (honour) affects strategic decisions (use of 
Indian allies) in an unconventional operational environment (North American petite 
guerre). In theory, one should be able to apply each of the components of the setting to a 
given British Army leader’s situation and make a determination. In practice, the setting and 
era discussed above makes this process very difficult. However, the benefit of doing so is a 
far more nuanced understanding of why the British Army performed as it did during this 
period. The rest of this paper will attempt to accomplish this objective. 
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SAY, what is Honour?--'Tis the finest sense 
Of 'justice' which the human mind can frame, 
Intent each lurking frailty to disclaim, 
And guard the way of life from all offence 
Suffered or done. When lawless violence 
Invades a Realm, so pressed that in the scale 
Of perilous war her weightiest armies fail, 
Honour is hopeful elevation,--whence 
Glory, and triumph. Yet with politic skill 
Endangered States may yield to terms unjust;  
Stoop their proud heads, but not unto the dust-- 
A Foe's most favourite purpose to fulfil: 
Happy occasions oft by self-mistrust 
Are forfeited; but infamy doth kill. 
-- William Wordsworth130 
2. Honour, Society and the British View of the Indians 
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether military honour caused the British 
Army leadership to ineffectively use a key resource during its prolonged engagement in 
North America. In order to make that determination, one has to have a firm concept of three 
issues relating to honour: first, a firm definition of what honour means; second, an 
understanding of how the definition might have changed over a period of great cultural, 
political, and social upheaval in Europe and North America from 1754 to 1815; finally, one 
must look at how the various societies viewed honour comparatively. This chapter will 
examine these issues. 
The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of ‘honour’ is varied, but the most 
pertinent variation is ‘code’ or ‘law’ of honour which is ‘the set of rules and customs which 
regulate the conduct of some particular class of person according to a conventional standard 
of honour’.131 In this paper, it is the code held by the ‘class’ of people who directed the 
British Army from 1754 to 1815.  
Honour was a term that pervaded much of public life in the early modern era. It was an 
aristocratic tradition that became a large part of the European military tradition, although its 
form shifted through the ages to mean different things to different classes of people. In the 
first half of the eighteenth century, to British Army officers specifically, honour meant 
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being a gentleman, being loyal to one’s commander and king, being a member of a self-
regulating group above and beyond official rules and laws, and proving courage by seeking 
glory.132 However, these concepts of honour were changing by the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Therefore, these definitions require careful handling to meaningfully 
relate the British Army to the society in which it operated. Therefore, the author will 
discuss the contemporaneous societal, contextual, and evolving meanings of honour in 
Britain. 
Although authors use different terminology, there is general agreement on Paul 
Robinson’s bifurcation of the two common types of honour, external and internal.133 
External honour is likened to reputation, fame, glory, right to respect, or ‘good name’. It is 
the concern of how others rate the individual against the code of honour. Internal honour is 
similar to personal integrity, conscientiousness, extended benevolence, self-discipline, or 
probity. It has more to do with conscience and how the individual rates himself against a 
code of honour, private or public. External and internal honours can, and often do, co-exist. 
It is often the case that internal honour is the pre-cursor of external honour. However, the 
opposite case may be harder to prove.134 As we will examine, external honour was often 
what needed ‘defending’, but internal honour was increasingly valued, especially during the 
latter part of this period. In theory, internal honour could be nourished and grown by a 
single individual working against an entirely internal view of the world. Yet if a solitary 
individual were to perform to a set of values known only to him or her and the code was not 
known to anyone else, it is doubtful whether that concept would be known as honour. It is 
analogous to a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it. Many religious people might 
claim that they are working to a unique set of values known only to them and their maker, 
but it still requires an external standard (provided by a deity or karma, for example) to 
recognise the performance against the set of values.  
Therefore, if the individual wants to be honourable, they must demonstrate that they 
adhere to values that are known, documented or not, by like-minded individuals or entities. 
The common name for the set of honour values is an ‘honour code’ and the name of the 
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like-minded individuals is an ‘honour group’. The seeker of honour is normally part of the 
honour group as well and will also pass judgment on others’ action within the group. These 
groups may be as small as one when a person is relying on internal honour alone. However, 
it is more often a group of people ranging from a small set of local individuals to nations or 
even all of humanity. The honour group strives to keep the code sacred by enforcing 
adherence. The enforcement may range from sanction to simple ostracism, to ex-
communication, or even physical elimination. Honour groups can often be found around 
existing social units whether commercial, religious, or military.  They can form around 
ideological concepts as well, such as political, cultural, or philosophical movements.  
Honour groups often form around organizations that exist for other purposes as they do 
for this paper around the military. The honour code is often adopted by the group as a way 
of helping the organisation stay together in good times and bad. A family may have a code 
that values the continuance of the bloodline and the members that further the bloodline are 
held in high esteem. Institutional religious groups value the adherence to the religious 
doctrine and its dissemination. In addition to organisational values, largely dispersed 
groups of people can value ideological concepts. Nations have bestowed honours on 
individuals who go to great lengths to uphold ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’, for 
example or “-liberty, equality, and fraternity’. These ideological honour groups pose special 
consideration for military units as they often pit one nation’s ideological narrative against 
others and layer them on top of a warrior code. This area is ripe for conflict as basic human 
values, that are the code for the entire human race’s honour group, can be tossed aside in 
the attempt to gain honour with one’s own nation, tribe, or unit. Great self-sacrifices have 
been endured for these ideological honour codes, but terrible depravities have also been 
committed in their name. An individual can also belong to several honour groups 
simultaneously such as family, church, charity, company, and country. In the best 
circumstances, the codes are similar and overlapping, but at times there may be conflict. An 
individual may be taught not to cheat in school, church and home, but then asked to cut 
corners at work to serve the organisation’s best interest.135 
Traditionally, the groups are oriented towards end goals that are moral or ethical to 
society as a whole, but not necessarily. The old adage that there is no honour among thieves 
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is only correct if one applies a code that does not value the art of larceny or deception. The 
nature of the activity dictates the values in some cases. Commitment to the honour group 
through all tribulations is an example of a value that could be virtuous or heinous 
depending on the nature of the group. Readily identifiable examples of honour groups that 
are not virtuous groups by their nature are criminal gangs and terrorist groups.136 Within 
these paradoxes lies the nub of why honour is such a difficult concept on which to cast 
concrete assertions. For clarity on honour judgments, not only must there be agreement 
within an honour group on the code, overlapping codes must also be in alignment, and 
confronting cultures and societies must also align. Obviously, this situation is rare, but the 
hope for it may have been present among some British Army officers from 1754 to 1815, 
because there had been an aligning of the overlapping military values and the laws of war 
going on in Europe during the Enlightenment. Unfortunately, the natives of North America 
had not been participating fully in the alignment. Many of the colonials in North America 
with European heritage, especially on the frontier, had not been participating for the last 
one-hundred years either. 
Finally, there is a possibility of disconnection if the honour seeker and the honour 
group diverge in their view of the code. If society rates warrior values highly against the 
society’s code of honour, then those values have an external value to the warrior’s 
reputation. Conversely, if the warrior accepts the society’s honour code, then adherence to 
it can become internalised and the source of his integrity. However, there may be times 
when the external and internal conflict. The internalised warrior traits can become 
dissociated from the societal norms and may take precedence over what a society currently 
values when warriors have been deeply inculcated by the warrior code of honour. Similarly, 
the pursuit of glory has led warriors to subsume their internal honour many times over the 
centuries to gain external honour.  
Great changes in the development of military honour occurred in Europe from the 
Middle Ages to the early nineteenth century that affected warfare and the British Army. 
This chapter has so far examined the definition and nature of military honour, but since it is 
a cultural, philosophical, and legal concept; it is prudent to examine how the concept 
developed and see how it affected the late eighteenth century British Army’s view of 
honour.  
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In Europe, war had been a constant concern of the Christian church, philosophers, 
noblemen and warriors for hundreds of years prior to 1754. Of course, philosophers, 
noblemen and warriors all over the world had been developing an honour code for 
millennia, but for early modern Europe, the Christian church was a defining element in the 
discussion. The Chivalric code provided the basis for limiting warfare and reducing 
violence against certain classes of people from the Middle Ages onward, but it also carried 
the positive attributes of the warrior code. Even though Enlightenment thinking provided 
most of the written basis for the modern era’s view of the laws of war, the Chivalric code 
drove much of the cultural behavior of military professionals before during and after the 
Enlightenment.  
In the Middle Ages, several of the traditional concepts of honour began to be 
transferred from noblemen to the knights who also fought on their behalf. Glory became an 
animating feature of knights. Prowess, often associated with martial skill on horseback, but 
also on foot, formed the core of the warrior’s honour, but his reputation and his public face 
was also integral to his honour. The keeping of one’s word took on a mythical quality 
where the more outlandish the vow, the more honour it accrued. Guile could be acceptable 
under the right circumstances, but breaking one’s word was condemned as dishonourable. 
Giving one’s opponent (only those opponents deemed worthy, of course) the chance to be 
victorious under the most extreme circumstances became the basis of gallant fair-play. As 
with all of the concepts mentioned in this chapter, they were not universally deployed and 
held by all in warfare, but the Chivalric code did form the beginning of a generally 
accepted framework for honourable conduct in combat. Many of these positive martial 
values have stood the test of time and still form the basis of the modern concept of military 
honour.137 
Alongside the extension of positive martial values to the knighthood came an extension 
of what we might today call human rights in warfare, mainly through the Christian church, 
but also through legal scholarship and philosophy. From the tenth century onwards, the 
Christian church attempted to limit the damage of war to the Christian faithful amongst the 
nations of Europe. The emergence of church decrees against warriors who indiscriminately 
killed non-combatant Christians during wars formed the basis of a societal norm on war 
time activities. The threat of losing one’s status as a warrior in good standing was a 
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powerful incentive to take note of the changing view of non-combatants. The Peace and 
Truce of God movements began to formally lay out who could be lawfully attacked in war 
and when. Another departure from traditional codes of honour encouraged by the Christian 
church was the exaltation of and the extending of formal courtesies to women.138 The idea 
of repercussions for killing people indiscriminately or brutalising particular groups of 
people in war seems as obvious as the consequences of criminal homicide to the modern 
observer. However, prior to these movements, the Christian church remained primarily 
concerned with the right to declare war or jus ad bellum, rather than jus in bello, or the 
justifiable conduct of war.139  
Although important in establishing the basis for how non-combatants were treated in 
war and eventually evolving into a comprehensive set of laws, it would be an error to 
conclude that most of the Chivalric code derived from religious doctrine. The majority of 
the code came from the combatants themselves. The eleventh century saw a slow build-up 
of the code starting with the extension to knights of the vague notions of the honour of 
noblemen. This was important in establishing the idea that one could extend the honour 
group. However, the combination of the honour extension to knights and the church decrees 
of non-combatant protection did not extend to the other combatants. The common soldier 
was not viewed as the equivalent of a noble or a knight. If a peasant were found fighting, 
the Chivalric code was not applicable. The knights were held accountable if they killed 
another knight who could have been taken prisoner instead, but this did not extend to 
peasants who could not command a ransom.140 Also, contrary to church pleadings, it also 
did not slow the short-of-death brutality on the non-combatant population. Plundering and 
pillaging of towns and regions that could be of service to the enemy was still seen as fair-
play.141 These value distinctions are important, because they defined the next age of 
development of the Chivalric code.142 
The primary difference between the knights and the noblemen was the fact that the 
knights fought as a profession and were much more concerned with the practical actions in 
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war. Therefore, much of the code was similar to contract common law. Special courts were 
convened in several different jurisdictions in Europe where disputes were adjudicated and a 
body of law was established that enshrined the Chivalric code. Legal representatives, 
arguing on behalf of the knights, began to develop what was acceptable behaviour on the 
battlefield built upon custom and the application of common law principles to new or 
aberrant situations. There were attempts to document the code, but much like the courts 
martial in the British Army of the late eighteenth century; much of it was left to the idea of 
“conduct unbecoming of” a knight.143 Who brought the charges, the parties involved, and 
the circumstances often mattered more than the principle itself. Therefore, the Chivalric 
code’s practices grew more practical and humane fitfully and unevenly.144 In the literary 
world the best and the worst are explored and the circumstances are laid out more clearly, 
Sir Thomas Malory’s Morte Darthur, for example, provided what is probably the most 
famous written version of the Chivalric code in the form of the oath of the knights of the 
Round Table, 
never to do outrageousity [sic] nor murder, and always to flee 
treason; also by no mean to be cruel, but to give mercy unto him 
that asketh mercy, upon pain of forfeiture of their worship and 
lordship of King Arthur for evermore; and always to do ladies, 
damosels, [sic] and gentlewomen succor, upon pain of death. Also 
that no man take no battles in a wrongful quarrel for no law, ne for 
no world’s goods.145 
Of course, circumstances matter more in real life than in stories and the circumstances 
were often ambiguous, because the type of war mattered also. The two primary types of 
war were public and private war. Whilst the Chivalric code was developing, so too was the 
emerging idea that war could only be legitimately conducted by sovereigns against other 
sovereigns. However, private war between nobles who were subject to a higher sovereign 
still occurred and often their legitimacy normally hinged on the age-old concepts of ‘might 
makes right’ and ‘winner takes all’. Since war’s legitimacy was often based on the 
credibility of men who were sovereign by declaration of royal bloodlines, war’s legal 
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theorists continued along more fruitful lines, such as the applicable conduct of war in 
certain circumstances.  
In guerre mortelle, war (often private war) meant the death of the losing side. When 
the red flag was flown (literally), the Chivalric code meant little. Because of this fact, 
knights tried to avoid this type of war. Legal theorists and military courts found very little 
purchase in a field where both sides had committed to total destruction of the other. 
Theorists, the Christian church, and Chivalric courts found much more fertile ground in 
bellum hostile, or public war between Christian sovereigns. Knights were far more likely to 
be involved in this type of war as there was a possibility of profit and glory. Peasants were 
still not considered equal and were subject to plunder and pillage, but restraint and rules 
were more likely to be followed.146  
Within bellum hostile several important concepts developed from the twelfth to the 
sixteenth centuries, such as prisoner parole, the rules of siege warfare, and rules of covert 
war. The concept of parole meant an honourable prisoner could be released on his word. 
His promise during this age was to pay a ransom or remain contractually in the captor’s 
service in return for his freedom. When released, he was accorded the rights of a non-
combatant as long as he fulfilled his side of the bargain. Sieges were especially dangerous 
and rules developed to lower the death toll on both sides. Attackers were subject to great 
losses in throwing themselves against a heavily defended fortress or town and defenders 
were subjected to terrible depredations if their fortress eventually fell.147 Everyone 
benefited from rules that acknowledged the probable outcome and which allowed both 
sides to save face.148 The theory of ‘conditional respite’ is a good example of how attacking 
warriors would allow their besieged opponents to save face in seeking help, but allowing 
them to surrender if the situation was acknowledged to be hopeless without loss of honour. 
Guile was also allowed in siege warfare and was not considered dishonourable.149 Finally, 
covert war was a private war between parties that both served the same sovereign. The rules 
of this type of war were based on the idea that people could be killed in a dispute without 
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the sovereign’s authority, but the normal business of war, such as plundering and ransom 
was prohibited.150 
From the lens of today’s formal declarations of the Laws of war, these beginnings may 
seem almost worthless, but from these humble origins we can trace a long, shallow arc of 
the idea of restraint in European warfare against other Europeans. Variations of restraint 
within the conduct of war were debated amongst theologians and philosophers with some 
degree of success from the Middle Ages to the early modern era. However, the main 
justifications for restraint among warriors came from the practical development of the 
Chivalric code. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, refinements of the 
rules of siege warfare, parole, exchange of prisoners and plundering progressed. Where 
there were exceptions, it was normally due to specific circumstances, such as rebellions and 
wars with non-Christians. Geoffrey Best has numbered four reasons why this was the case. 
First, armies were now being raised and supported by the state, so the state sought more 
formal control over the actions of the participants. Second, there was a steady reduction of 
war between Catholics and Protestants as the confessional conflicts began to settle into 
formal geographical boundaries that were respected for the most part. Third, there was a 
general realisation among sovereigns, the Christian church, and legal theorists that wars at 
the end of the Middle Ages had come perilously close to total destruction of the established 
order. Fourth, a rise in the notion of reciprocity drove restraint out of fear that what was 
doled out could just as easily be received. From the mid sixteenth century to the mid 
seventeenth, England went through a long period of relative peace where martial skills of 
aristocrats were in decline. When the English Civil War commenced, the Royalists were at 
a distinct disadvantage. In England, this became a transitional period between the 
traditional Chivalric view of honour and a more pragmatic approach.151 With the notable 
exception of wars of rebellion, the warrior class had largely agreed that mutual restraint 
was beneficial for all involved. By the English Civil War in the 1640s, British officers were 
predominantly practicing a version of military honour that would be recognizable in the 
1750s.152  
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Although the Chivalric code developed along common law lines and philosophical 
inquiry, late seventeenth and early eighteenth century inter-national relations thinking 
began to look toward a more formal declaration of the laws of war and acceptable practices. 
This followed a more general trend of favouring scientific and legal principles for more 
consistent and predictable outcomes. Beginning with the Enlightenment, scientific 
principles drove the way war was conducted, but the idea of honour was still derived from 
the Chivalric code and newly consolidated views of humanity in warfare. Going to battle 
often meant following certain principles that would ensure victory and loyalty to a monarch 
and courage in the face of extreme danger was demanded, even encouraged. The officers 
who led the armies were aristocratic, but the men who populated them were sometimes 
referred to as ‘the scum of the earth’.153 From 1748 to 1789, there was an explosion of 
military literature that emphasised standard principles for conducting warfare. These ideas 
on warfare can be crystalised in the concept of siege warfare where a victory was assured 
from procedure that was based on discipline, mathematical calculations, and engineering 
skill. Contemporaneously, in 1758, Emmerich de Vattel wrote the most prominent 
Enlightenment volume on the laws of war, The Law of Nations, wherein the treatment of 
prisoners on the battlefield and civilians was expected to greatly improve.154 Bruce Buchan 
argues that the Enlightenment ideals on warfare actually came in two forms. First, war 
became more civilised and less beastly. The wars that were fought in Europe during the 
Enlightenment generally were more humane and honourable to the honour group that 
valued those ideals. There was also a second form that emphasised operational efficiency 
and was more concerned with the rational and technical. Crucially, to this paper, Buchan 
stated that these ideals fit the petite guerre type of warfare much less well. Petite Guerre 
was well known in Europe as it was in North America, but Buchan argued that European 
leaders tried to provide rules for its use that would make it more technical and more 
humane.155 
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Along with the more formalised nature of legal and philosophical writing, Alexander 
Welsh argues that there was a ‘leveling down of Enlightenment fiction’ during this period. 
Beginning in the seventeenth century, fiction began to shift away from the idea that honour 
was the sole preserve of the aristocratic classes. Authors such as Daniel Defoe, Henry 
Fielding, Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, and Madame de Lafayette wrote of normal people 
who struggle with issues of honour. Their protagonists struggled with issues of honour not 
always based on external views of their conduct, but used their consciences to explore, 
often with internal dialogues, what was right based on reason and the comparative 
situations of different classes of people.156 As argued below, this trend accelerated during 
the Romantic movement, but that era needed the preceding Enlightenment to lend reason to 
the movement away from aristocratic-only honour. 
Armstrong Starkey argues that there indeed were Enlightenment values in warfare that 
were often discussed, but that it must be acknowledged that they were very unevenly 
deployed. The key was in necessity. If the warrior attempted to follow the Enlightenment 
values, he could partake in the honour of the group that wanted to promote those values. 
However, necessity could drive even honourable officers to do what was necessary to win, 
especially in the face of an enemy that was not deploying Enlightenment ideals to warfare. 
Starkey also makes a distinction between political leaders who often used reasons of state 
to justify their reasons for breaking the code. Army officers often relied on their own army 
culture to provide them with their answers.157 This relates to a point A.N Gilbert made that 
‘conduct unbecoming of an officer’ was a purposefully vague charge in the eighteenth 
century British Army, as it needed to constantly monitor the pulse of the army officer 
culture to understand how and when it must be applied.158 To summarise, honour had 
always had a code, but in the Enlightenment, warfare was also developing formal 
operational and ethical codes, but ones that were flexible in their execution when needed.  
From the 1760s to 1790s, a ‘counter-Enlightenment’ movement that would eventually 
be known as the Romantic movement began to infiltrate some of the Enlightenment ideals. 
Enlightenment rationality was fine for the sciences proponents argued, but the complexity 
of the human experience could not be reduced to a series of scientific principles. Human 
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reason and emotion were justifiable concepts and were at play in all human interaction. 
Warfare was just one of the more complicated human interactions. This new line of 
reasoning demanded not only a set of principles for armies to comply with, but also a more 
personal morality in war. Two well-known philosophers, Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, provided the moral and intellectual basis for warriors to act with honour to 
themselves, not only their honour groups.  
Kant promoted honour to his students in lectures where he discussed that it was better 
to die than live in servitude. This was a marked change in the definition of honour. 
Traditionally, service and loyalty to one’s master were elements of honour. Kant promoted 
internal honour, but as a duty to one’s self foremost. Kant was less critical of those who 
sought external honour for doing the right thing as he felt this was natural in human beings. 
To Kant, the key was to do the honourable thing in order to be the best person one could be. 
The worst thing that an individual could be was in servitude and uncritical of one’s own 
actions due to the servitude.159  
Jean-Jacques Rousseau worked to remove external acknowledgment as a prerequisite 
for honour. He felt that virtue in the individual was all the more enviable when it did not 
seek the approval of others. Contrary to Hobbes’ nasty state of nature, Rousseau believed 
that the state of nature was a better place where individuals thought of their highest 
thoughts and were not distracted by what others did or thought. This solitary view comes as 
close as any to the perfection of internal honour. Rousseau promoted the idea that, through 
proper education and cultivation, all men, even men in a state of nature, could know honour 
and it was not confined to wealthy or privileged groups.160  
This concept of inner and independent worth and the rationality of all humans was 
being developed across Europe with Adam Smith, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson being 
the most widely read in Britain. These ideas were in wide circulation by the turn of the 
nineteenth century. The Napoleonic Wars provided a perfect, if tragic, backdrop for people 
from all walks of life to test them in their own private circumstances. Whether manning the 
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barricades in Paris or fighting at Trafalgar or marching in the Iberian Peninsula, the concept 
of personal honour was no longer a nobleman’s privilege.161 
As Marilyn Butler has stated, one need not prove that societies are influenced by 
philosophers in strict causal fashion with their writing going through a certain gestation 
period and then enjoying wide circulation, because they did not operate in a vacuum. These 
thinkers were most likely writing what they had been discussing with others. Therefore, the 
ideas were in circulation even if limited and their development merely formalised them and 
made them available for a broader audience.162 Most of the men were also lecturers at 
universities or tutors to the aristocracy, so their ideas and the challenges to their ideas 
would have been public. It was through this ‘Republic of Letters’ and public discourse that 
these ideas began to spread and change honour in warfare. The British Army and its 
governmental masters could not have helped being influenced by some of these concepts. 
Some of the ideas enjoyed near simultaneous uptake through personal connections. Adam 
Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) that used Indians as examples of 
early development is a good example. Hume, Smith, and Henry Home, Lord Kames helped 
Ferguson secure the position of tutoring the Earl of Bute’s sons. The Earl of Bute was the 
tutor of a young King George III.163 
The age of Romanticism transformed British views of the Indians from the state- of-
nature philosophical analysis in the era of the Seven Years’ War to ruthless underdog in the 
Revolutionary period to a final state of romanticised decline at the turn of the nineteenth 
century.164 The ideal of the Indian became especially important to the Romantic Movement 
as a way to contrast modern man’s life with the simple life of the uncivilised native. 
Romanticism might not have taken the course it did without the idea of the aborigine and 
the view of the Indian over the period changed from grand narrative to focused detail. Of 
course, Romanticism was not only focused on the Indian. Much has been written about the 
Romantics and the Napoleonic era. Many in the British Army were changing their ideas 
about honour and including duty to one’s individual humanity and integrity along with duty 
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to King and country.165 This long, bloody period in the Napoleonic Wars left an indelible 
mark on the British Army and their views of honour would have carried over to their 
participation on the midwestern frontier and in the War of 1812.  
The rest of Europe, civil and military, was also experiencing the adaptation of 
Enlightenment thought to the beginning of the Romantic Movement at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. Philosophers were describing how individuals could act with honour 
without the need for their superiors to tell them how and what to believe. Poetry was being 
written that described the routine and daily honour of lives well lived in little villages and 
cities. Rather than lives of quiet desperation, there could be lives of quiet dignity and 
honour. Novels were beginning to be popular as well across Europe. Stories involving self-
made men doing what was right in the face of great adversity were describing a path to 
everyday enlightenment for the aspiring middle classes. By the time of the War of 1812, 
these concepts were in wide circulation in Europe. 166 With these developments, the laws of 
war and the changing concept of honour were gaining acceptance through the scholarly 
progression of Enlightenment ideals. However, with the rapid expansion of printed material 
in the 1750-1760s, the individual concept of honour was also taking root in a more popular 
fashion. Honour was now a trait to which the common man could aspire through his God 
given talents and determination.167 As N.A.M. Rodger explained, the rising status of British 
naval officers, ‘[t]his implied a new underlying ideal, one in which duty was beginning to 
infiltrate the concept of honour’.168 Status still mattered, but what always mattered most 
was a military that could win the existential struggles that faced Britain. An elite class was 
emerging that could mix with the nobles, but had the working skills and values of the rising 
middle class.169 Although many of the new ideals were associated with radicalism, they 
also sowed the seeds of a newer, stronger nationalism. This could be seen on both sides of 
the English Channel, but for different reasons. The culture was moving away from the 
Enlightenment ideals of scientific rationalism managed by a noble elite and more towards 
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the Romantic notions that the individual had thoughts, natural rights, and responsibilities 
that were just as valid. Mark Girouard contends that this era produced a renaissance of 
Chivalry in England that ran for most of the nineteenth century and touched virtually every 
facet of English life.170 These notions could be summed up by author Kenelm Henry Digby 
in The Broad Stone of Honour,  
...it is to you I speak who are gentlemen of England; I exhort you to 
remember, that if you are ambitious, honour, and not the passing 
splendour of the day, must be the object of that ambition; that if you 
will endeavour to arrive at distinction, the prize must be, not riches, 
but virtue. 171 
Well known authors of prose and poetry were becoming the first entertainers on a 
world-wide scale. Books of fiction, history, philosophy, poetry and natural science were 
best sellers. Britain was at the forefront of this printed revolution. Not only were its authors 
leading the British public to read and consider their lives, but many of these authors were 
serving in the British Army and Royal Navy. These were men of substance who were 
respected for who they were and for what they wrote. An anecdote that displays this 
phenomenon is the strong connection between Major Arent DePeyster and Robert Burns. 
DePeyster’s love of poetry was well known and he was one of the most prominent British 
commanders in North America from the 1750s to the 1780s where he spent much of his 
time with allied Indians in the Great Lakes at Michilimackinac and Detroit. He and Burns 
were great friends in Dumfries on DePeyster’s return from Canada in 1785. He and Burns 
talked at great length about war and the development of character. In 1813 DePeyster 
published a book that detailed many of his connections with the Indians and included verse 
about his service in Canada and the midwest.172 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and his friend and co-writer, William Wordsworth frequently 
discussed honour in their correspondence and prose. Wordsworth’s poem of 1809, ‘Say 
What is Honour?’ begins with ‘Say what is Honour -- Tis the finest sense Of justice which 
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the human mind can frame’.173 Poetry held a special place in British Army officers’ 
gatherings in North America. With little to do, but drill, gamble and drink in the wilderness, 
many sought the soul lifting nature of these favoured poets. Coleridge had a direct 
connection to the war-fighters and a personal understanding of military honour. He was the 
personal secretary to Admiral Alexander Ball, Governor of Malta, while Nelson was 
serving as the epitome of courage and honour in the Royal Navy. At Aboukir Bay in 1798, 
Ball was a Captain in Nelson’s Fleet. Through Admiral Ball, the ‘band of brothers’ was 
more than an abstract concept to Coleridge. As Ball’s private secretary, Coleridge 
understood the hard decisions that had to be made in war and wrote about it eloquently.174 
In his Biographia Literaria, Coleridge writes,  
It would be a sort of irreligion, and scarcely less than a libel on 
human nature to believe, that there is any established and reputable 
profession or employment, in which a man may not continue to act 
with honesty and honour; and doubtless there is likewise none, 
which may not at times present temptations to the contrary. 175 
Through authors like Coleridge and Wordsworth, literary expressions of honour were 
popular at the time of the Napoleonic wars. By the time of the War of 1812, in Britain 
especially, honour had attained a status that was separable from nobility of birth or social 
status. Linda Colley claims these romantic notions led to an ‘ostentatious cult of heroism’ 
where the blue bloods now sought the association of red-blooded heroes.176 
But it was Sir Walter Scott who did the most to separate honour from noble birth and 
privilege. He wrote best-selling novels that extolled the virtue of honour by merit. Scott’s 
heroes were independent men who knew they were not aristocrats, but carried themselves 
with dignity and integrity no matter what their profession. This appealed to men of the new 
military officer class who expected to advance due to their record of success and adherence 
to high principles in service to one’s king or country.177 Not only did these men get the job 
done, they performed it to a high moral code as well. These men did not seek grandiosity or 
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drama. They sought to be proud of their actions no matter who might inspect them. Scott’s 
novels also provided the seed of what would become ‘muscular Christianity’ later in the 
nineteenth century. Scott’s heroes, who often displayed racial tolerance, were the type that 
would later join Wilberforce in eradicating the British slave trade.178 Scott was also not 
shrinking violet himself. He served as a quartermaster with a volunteer cavalry unit in 
Edinburgh during the French invasion crisis in1797.179 Interestingly, Sir Walter Scott met 
and befriended Captain John Norton, a Mohawk of Cherokee and Scottish descent. 
Although distances were great, this period in the Atlantic world displayed an incredible 
amount of cross-pollination of ideas and friendships.180 
These well-informed philosophical and thought provoking works were widely read and 
discussed throughout Britain and Europe. Butler states that from 1790 was a period of 
remarkable sociability in Britain where gatherings were common. The coffee house culture 
in London, where serious topics were debated regularly, is the stereotypical venue. Literary 
and philosophical societies were spreading with the fast growing population in Britain. 
Ideas were being traded in an incredibly vibrant market place and military officers were 
very much a part of the movement. It seemed as if the whole world was trying to throw off 
the shackles of unquestioned restraint and focus their personal efforts towards higher 
emotions. Authors like Adam Smith and Sir Walter Scott merely provided the intellectual 
backing to such thoughts.181 
The British Army story from the early 1790s to the War of 1812 is predominantly 
about the wars with Revolutionary France, but one more concept that was unique to 
America must be considered. After the American Revolution, the size of the British Army 
in North America was radically lowered. What was left in America was in frontier forts of 
the upper midwest and Upper Canada (mostly modern day Ontario). In this arena, the 
British Army acted as support elements for the fur trade and the British Indian department. 
It was an army of old men and young men who wished to be in Europe earning their 
honour. However, one enduring belief in the ranks of British Army officers throughout this 
period was the supremacy of the British Army over the North American colonists and later 
the Americans. An element of external honour is pride in one’s associations. It was an idea 
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that doing things the right way meant that your group was better. As the British Army 
absorbed these ideas of humanity in warfare, discipline, and duty, it was hard to look at 
militias and draftees as being equal to them. This situation reached its zenith in the War of 
1812. British officers routinely underestimated their opposition regardless of the 
composition of their own force.182 Normally, when they had a full complement of well-
equipped regulars, they were correct in their assessments of the American troops, but the 
condescension often led them to conduct operations at extreme disadvantage. One of the 
disadvantages, that was often self-imposed, was not using Indians in the most effective 
manner at all times. Therefore, external honour drove a superiority complex and became 
one of the elements of the calculations on whether to use Indians or not. 
Romanticism was known in the USA, but American Romantic authors like Washington 
Irving, James Fenimore Cooper, and Nathaniel Hawthorne had yet to write their 
masterpieces by the turn of the century. As probably the most fervent students of the 
principles of the Enlightenment, Revolutionary America took longer to move onto to other 
concepts of formalised honour. There was a strong belief in individual freedom, 
independence and responsibility, but the older concepts of glory and fame lasted much 
longer on the frontier than in the salons of Europe. For most of its early history, Americans’ 
‘First Way of War’ was more Indian than European. John Grenier has argued that 
Americans of the time, especially those on the frontier with the Indians, were far closer to 
the Indians in the practice of warfare than with the Europeans.183 For a frontiersman, his 
honour groups normally consisted of like-minded individuals in his family, his church, and 
his heavily fortified community. Much like the Indian, the frontiersman did not care much 
for the opinion of those outside their tight honour groups.184 Many of them, like the family 
of the young Andrew Jackson in the Carolina backcountry, had recently moved there from 
places like Scotland and Ireland. They had risked life and limb to make a new start in a 
harsh country. They were not about to part with it easily. Protecting their communities from 
the Indians allowed for virtually any tactic available, if the situation warranted it. Quite 
often the distance from civilisation was the yardstick for how to act. The British were 
squeamish about using Indians in ways that the Indians preferred, but frontier Americans 
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were not, even if they demonised the British for doing what they were doing.185 For most of 
the American combatants from 1754 to 1815, who were overwhelmingly militiamen, the 
honour group that exerted the most pressure on them resided in their own communities, 
rather than in professional military units or east coast cities and towns. Protecting their 
communities from the Indians came first and European derived codes of practice came a 
distant second on the frontier. However, the rhetoric and propaganda often belied this 
fact.186  
Although it is difficult to examine all of the Indians in the midwest as a whole, it is 
safe to say that military prowess was valued as an external honour in Indian societies. 
Courage in battle and boldness in action were hallmarks of the Indian warrior. Great ritual 
and ceremony attended warfare, so that the code of honour was well known and any slight 
to the individual’s honour would need answering. The Indians also had very spiritual 
communities which took internal honour seriously as they felt connected to a natural world 
and had many commitments to it.  To most natives of the midwest, taking scalps was an 
ancient way to exhibit one’s external honour through military prowess.187 It also 
symbolised taking the defeated foe’s peace in the afterlife which was a point of internal 
honour. However, taking prisoners was a much more valued way of proving prowess. The 
act of bringing a prisoner back to the home village proved that the warrior’s success was 
undisputed and complete. It also gave the village a participatory role in war. The village 
could choose to ‘adopt’ the prisoner to ‘raise up’ a lost love one as this was a way of 
replenishing a declining population. The village could also choose ritualised torture as a 
way to test the adversary’s strength, but also as a way for the village to express their 
collective grief from the combat.188 These activities were at odds with the coalescing, if 
unevenly practiced, view of prisoner treatment in Europe. The captivity narratives that 
proliferated in the press and other publications in the 1750-1760s provided the British 
public and officials with a satisfaction that they were superior in this regard. During the 
Seven Years’ War, French prisoners had been kept in Britain and the public had taken to 
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creating charitable societies to provide relief from their plight. Britons held themselves out 
not only as the newest and greatest world empire, but also the most humane. The Europeans 
normally condemned the Indian practices in general, but often condoned them locally when 
they were necessary to win. Quite often the justification was that the enemy was inferior or 
in rebellion which excluded them from the restraints due respectable enemies.189  
When the British Army made contact with Indian warriors, they inevitably found that 
Indians took honour in warfare very seriously as well. It formed the basis for authority and 
rank within the Indian society.190 This was a good fit with the British Army as far as 
placing importance on winning the battles where they were in alliance with the Indians. The 
problem came from the ritualised activities of scalping and torture of the dead and captured. 
To the Indian, scalping was proof of a confirmed kill and was the source of the warrior’s 
external display of bravery and disregard for his own safety in combat. Scalping was not 
the highest goal, however. Again bringing prisoners back to the village was a far greater 
display of martial prowess and was highly valued in Indian society. Presentation of a 
prisoner also allowed the villagers, including women and children, to partake in the 
ritualised torture that displayed a village’s outpouring of violent grief. Alternatively, the 
prisoner could be chosen to ‘raise up’ a lost relative and join the family as an adopted 
member.191 Regardless of the final disposition of a live prisoner, it did not comply with 
what the Europeans viewed as humane or civilised. 
In Europe, these tactics were not unknown, but were slowly being weeded out with the 
emerging consensus on the law of warfare. Although the Indian practices were subject to 
laws of war in the British Army’s view, it is important not to equate military honour and 
the law of war. Honour holds many positive values that are thrust onto the member of the 
honour group, as well as restrictions. Values such as bravery, initiative and winning serve 
alongside values of humanity, magnanimity, and avoiding civilian casualties where 
possible. The laws of war are largely prohibitions on certain actions in the conduct of 
war.192 However, many of these values often made no sense to the Indians. The Indians 
truly struggled with European concepts like the parole of prisoners. They considered it 
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nonsense to let a man free on his word that he would not fight again. The European nations 
and their colonists who lived and fought in North America made very few attempts to 
understand the Indian way of life either. As with laws on property rights, western concepts 
did not reconcile themselves with the culture of the Indian. Therefore, Indians, Britons and 
Americans could often observe and respect the warrior spirit found in each society. In fact 
the historical record is filled with warriors thinking highly of some of the frontiersmen’s 
war making ability and vice-versa. The British were less complimentary of either, but did 
show a grudging respect for ranging tactics that they never seemed to master. However, the 
societal constraints that were developing at different paces in Europe and the American 
midwest were just too difficult to reconcile on the battlefield. 
Because of the life or death nature of combat and the cohesion it bred, military honour 
groups were often very strong. Soldiers were known to go to great lengths to uphold the 
code of honour, but also to have committed atrocities in its name. However, a soldier may 
have had several honour groups to which he belonged, often as hierarchies. A soldier may 
have had an international code of the laws of war, a national code, a service code, a small 
unit code, and a personal group code. Crucial to this paper is the fact that there almost 
certainly would have been other codes competing or complementing the military code, such 
as familial, cultural, or religious codes.  The interplay of each of these codes could have 
formed situations that were not easy to fathom in person or in history. This paper will 
examine these overlapping and sometimes conflicting codes amongst men who were trying 
to simultaneously maintain their codes of faith, family, king, and military units while 
fighting in a hostile terrain and often surrounded by enemies who did not follow their 
codes.  
The complex situations in which British Army officers found themselves in North 
America put some of these officers in devilishly difficult circumstances. If an officer had 
been told not to allow the Indians under his control to commit atrocities, but then was not 
given enough regular troops to control the Indians, was the officer responsible for the 
nearly inevitable resulting atrocities? Did the agent or officer who was expected to work 
with the Indians exclusively for years on end in frontier warfare have his first obligation to 
king or tribal chief? Were atrocities acceptable when only committed against men in 
uniform? Did an officer have a responsibility to stop an Indian atrocity if he knew the 
Indians would turn on him next? The answers to these vexing situations were almost 
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always personal. The British Army provided neither training, nor drill manuals to deal with 
the vast ethical permutations present on the North American battlefields. The national and 
familial honour groups back home in England could not possibly provide the answer to the 
officer in the field. The British Army officer in North America had to construct his own 
code from the various codes he was subject to and try to defend his actions based on 
context and circumstance. Those who were able to construct a way to balance these codes, 
live with their consciences, and deliver victory were rare. What is harder to determine is 
who, and how many, among the British decision makers developed a higher sense of 
personal honour or had responsibilities to other honour groups outside of the military. The 
earlier discussion of the Namierists becomes relevant again in this context.193 Since twenty-
three of the British Generals in 1780 were also serving Members of Parliament, their 
motives on the Revolutionary battlefield have to be compared and contrasted to their 
political motives back in London as well.194 
These multiple codes are especially hard to reconcile when one would have considered 
the European based laws of war to be supreme. Must a soldier have preserved the life of a 
prisoner if it put his or his honour group’s survival at risk? If a nation, tribe, or frontier 
community was in a war of annihilation, must they follow the laws of war even if it would 
have ensured defeat? The laws of war had developed since the Middle Ages along 
aristocratic, legal, religious, and Chivalric lines. Concepts such as when it was justified to 
start a war and what an army could do in war led to further restraints. Distinctions were 
made as to whom these protections were available. Inferior and rebellious groups often 
were not given the same treatment as they were viewed as undeserving. Overall, these 
innovations led the parties to understand the advantageous of reciprocity and mutual 
restraint, but obviously with some serious exceptions.195 Prior to 1754, the British Army 
had fought almost exclusively in Europe and was a product of the Enlightenment and all of 
the customs of European warfare. Britain’s home-grown talents, such as Marlborough, as 
well as its Hanoverian monarchy were part and parcel of the European military tradition. 
As such, the British had largely accepted the move to a more humane way of conducting 
warfare. A significant exception to this general trend was the Duke of Cumberland’s terror 
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campaign in Scotland after the Battle of Culloden in 1746, but this was considered a 
rebellion which was often considered a different species of warfare. Obviously, there are 
some parallels with the North American situation from 1755-1815.196  
For the British Army, in English colloquial terms, the law of war was quite often the 
equivalent of what was ‘done’ or ‘not done’, but not necessarily the same as military 
honour. The ‘law of war’ was the attempt to internationalise the various codes in like-
minded honour groups, such as the European military officer class.197 However, Europeans 
with Christian and western European values did not put much effort into reconciling 
themselves with the culture of the Indian. This was by no means unique, as the laws often 
did not apply when campaigning in eastern Europe either. Hence, the positive martial 
values were shared by the Indians, French, Americans, and British, but the constraints each 
applied were too specific to their societies for each to fully understand the others. In the 
Revolutionary era, British Army officers tried to follow their codes, which included their 
home society’s changing view of war and honour, but were often faced with trying to 
uphold the code whilst fulfilling the demand to win as well. The Americans often cited the 
Enlightenment ideals, but on the frontier, principles often succumbed to survival and 
revenge. The Indians not only were in a battle for survival, but also in a struggle to 
maintain codes of honour that they felt were linked to the land itself. 
In conclusion, military honour was a shifting concept from 1754 to 1815 in Europe and 
in North America. Each society’s views on honour had grown from its own particular 
circumstances. The difficulty was in choosing allies that could help win battles, campaigns 
and wars without sacrificing the values held dear to the respective societies. The British 
Army had the unenviable task of executing the political imperatives of a government an 
ocean away with very few resources and limited options to help them. This purpose of this 
paper is to examine whether the decisions made about Indians and military honour 
adversely affected the British cause in conquering and retaining the American midwest. 
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3. The British Army’s Introduction to Frontier Warfare 
Although this paper’s purpose is not to be a full history of the causes for the British 
Army to become involved in warfare in North America, the events that led up to the war 
contained important components that will shed light on how the British Army’s opinions 
about using Indians as auxiliaries or allies were formed. Therefore, a short summary of the 
major events in the area will set out the contours of the dilemma that faced British Army 
officers. 
From the late seventeenth century to the midpoint of the eighteenth, Britain, France, 
and to a lesser degree, Spain fought proxy wars in North America. These wars were parts of 
the larger wars in Europe with European biased objectives, but the North American 
components of each grew in importance as the imperial powers’ land claims began to 
conflict. France and Britain, especially, were at odds over the large area between the 
Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountain chain. From a European perspective, 
France had held the area with a light footprint model of a few traders in the area supported 
by colonial governors in Canada who fostered strong relations with the Indian tribes in the 
area. The Indians of the Ohio region were not heavily inconvenienced by the French model 
and were thankful for the European trade goods that they received for their fur trade. 
However, the reality was that the area was not as strongly French as the British seaboard 
colonies were British. As Richard White very influentially argued, the French traders and 
officials crafted a ‘Middle Ground’ with the Indians. The disparate groups of Indians 
managed a mutually beneficial way of living with the French, mainly because the French 
were not entering the midwest in great numbers, nor did they demand large tracts of land 
for farming or speculation.198 Therefore, the Indians of the midwest were not as threatened 
by the French as they were by the westward pushing British. However, by the early 1750s, 
British colonial traders and property consortiums were beginning to stake claims on a broad 
front from Lake Ontario to the Gulf of Mexico, but especially around the area where the 
confluence of the Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers formed the Ohio River, better known 
as the ‘Forks of the Ohio’.199 Seemingly, this would have pushed the Indians into closer 
alliance with the French and the British would be seen off. However, a key theme of this 
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thesis is that the various groups of Indians in the midwest had agendas of their own. Some 
of those Indians began to trade with the British over the objections of the French. With 
European strategic requirements in mind more than local ones, the French decided to 
change their view of the midwest. 
The French, who had had nearly exclusive trading rights in this area until the 1740s, 
became increasingly more possessive as the British colonies of Pennsylvania and Virginia 
began taking action on claims that their Royal charters and warrants, at least theoretically, 
gave them land rights that stretched to the Pacific Ocean. However, what they were most 
interested in immediately were the lands that lay in the Ohio and Mississippi River drainage 
basin. Not only were these lands spectacularly rich agriculturally, but they provided year 
round riverine access to sea ports. As the British interests probed the area, the French 
decided to begin enforcing their claims more actively. In 1749, the Governor of New 
France, Roland-Michel, the marquis de La Galissonière sent Pierre-Joseph de Cèleron de 
Blainville to lead a unit of Canadians and allied Indians to the Forks of the Ohio to 
investigate the scope of the British interest. What they found was not encouraging for the 
French. An Irish trader named George Croghan had made significant headway in 
developing trading links with Indians around a town called Pickawillany on the Great 
Miami River. Croghan had been so successful that the Indians were openly dismissive of 
the French force. Cèleron began burying lead plates around the area to declare France’s 
ownership of the area and reported back to the Governor of New France, now the marquis 
de La Jonquière.200 
La Jonquière did little to stop the British over the next two years, but his successor 
took decisive, if brutal, action in 1752 by sending French-Indian Charles-Michel Mouet de 
Langlade of the Troupes de la Marines to convince the Indians of Pickawillany that their 
future interests would be best served in returning to their previous allegiance to the French 
Crown. Langlade destroyed Pickawillany and killed or captured the six Pennsylvania 
traders present. The Miami chief, Memeskia (also known as ‘Old Briton’), was used to set 
an example. He was killed and ritually eaten by Langlade’s force. The residents of 
Pickawillany reconsidered their position and pledged allegiance to the French.201 
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Langlade’s raid warrants further attention in this paper as it exhibited some of the 
horror that accompanied frontier warfare. Frontier warfare was not always in support of a 
strategic goal. Sometimes, it was mere retribution. At other times, orgies of violence were 
meant to send a message. However, even when the goal was strategic, the methods bore the 
hallmarks of personal vengeance. The tactics used were often similar to what European 
armies called la petite guerre, or partisan warfare. While this type of warfare was often 
carried out by nefarious characters in Europe, the atrocities that occurred were not 
necessarily a political or cultural statement. On the North American frontier, where a 
constant and coordinated defence of outlying settlements or villages was nearly impossible, 
the assembly of a force to attack an enemy was an extreme hardship and social disruption 
on colonial and Indian communities alike. Therefore, the goal was often to make the 
strategic action or retribution so ghastly as to make the receiving community reconsider 
their position or refrain from taking further action. When one side would not submit to the 
will of another, extreme measures, even extirpation, were employed.202 The eighteenth-
century may have ushered in a new era of attempted martial restraint in Europe, but the 
warfare was distinctly seventeenth-century in nature in North America. John Shy states, 
From about 1650 to 1750, when European states were moving 
toward forms of military organization, techniques of fighting, 
goals of foreign policy, and a generally accepted code of 
military and diplomatic behavior that eliminated or mitigated 
the worst effects of warfare on society, the English colonists 
in North America found themselves re-enacting on a small 
scale the horrors of Irish pacification and the Thirty Years’ 
War.203  
Langlade’s expedition was quickly backed up by New France’s new governor Ange 
Duquesne de Mennville, the Marquis Duquesne. Duquesne put in place a plan to build a 
series of forts in the Ohio area, culminating with a fort at the Forks of the Ohio over the 
next 3 years.204 It was these actions that set in motion the Virginia Lieutenant Governor, 
Robert Dinwiddie. Virginia land owners were not satisfied with just trading with the Ohio 
                                                
202 Shy ‘The American Military Experience: History and Learning’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter, 1971): 205-228, 212-215 
203 Ibid., 212-213 
204 René Chartrand, The Forts of New France in Northeast America 1600 – 1763 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 
2008), 44-48 
L i n z y  | 72 
 
Indians. As large and bountiful as North America was, the Virginians had managed to tire 
much of the Virginia tidewater soil over the preceding one-hundred and thirty years with 
intensive tobacco farming. The lands over the Appalachians held great promise for 
speculators and the younger sons of plantation owners. The future President of the United 
States, George Washington, was one such younger son and Dinwiddie had a mission for the 
young Washington. 
In 1753, Dinwiddie sent Washington to the Ohio region with a message to the French 
Commanders there to leave the area immediately. Washington accomplished the mission 
with the help of a local trader named Christopher Gist and an influential Mingo Indian 
sachem named Tanaghrisson, also known by the British as the ‘Half-King’. Washington 
and Tanaghrisson moved from French post to post looking for a senior French officer who 
would accept Dinwiddie’s correspondence. Finally finding Commandant Legardeur, a 
veteran French officer with extensive North American experience, at Fort Le Boeuf, near 
present day Waterford, Pennsylvania, Washington delivered Dinwiddie’s ultimatum. 
Although polite, Legardeur told Washington that he would not evacuate the French forces 
under his control in the region. However, he did promise to send the correspondence to 
Duquesne for an official reply. Legardeur tried to separate Washington and Tanaghrisson 
with promises of trade goods and safe conduct, but Washington managed to convince the 
Mingo to accompany him back into British controlled territory. Washington would be the 
first in a long line of British officials who would need to seek Indian help for their 
missions, only to find that the Indians had designs for outcomes that were not entirely in 
line with British designs.205  
Tanaghrisson was a Seneca from the British-aligned Iroquois confederation that lived 
in the Ohio area. He was known as the ‘Half-King’ of the area, because the Iroquois League 
claimed suzerainty over the Ohio River area and its inhabitants due to conquest in late 17th 
century. The claim was questionable, but the British had accepted it as it made negotiations 
easier and, until recently, the British had had no serious interest in the area. Therefore, 
Tanaghrisson had a vested interest in helping the British oust the French who were 
becoming more onerous with their occupation of the area. He was generally favorable 
toward Washington and the British, but was known by and courted by the French as well. 
Any actions taken by Tanaghrisson have to be viewed as first serving Tanaghrisson, the 
                                                
205 Clary, First War, 62-64 
L i n z y  | 73 
 
Ohio Indians and the Iroquois, rather than the French or British. As many Ohio Indian 
leaders over the next sixty years would do, and as the Iroquois had successfully done for 
decades, Tanaghrisson was trying to balance the French and British interests against each 
other to obtain the best result for the Indians of the Ohio.206 In this particular instance, 
Tanaghrisson was leaning toward helping Washington and the Virginians, as the French 
were showing strong signs of putting down deep roots in the Ohio.  
Washington reported back to Dinwiddie in early 1754. Dinwiddie, probably expecting 
such an answer, had begun preparing the Virginia House of Burgesses to fund an 
expedition to use any means necessary to remove the French from the Ohio Country. 
Washington would lead a meager force of less than two-hundred Virginia volunteers and a 
few of Tanaghrisson’s Mingo Indians as allies. Wanting to make the first claim on the 
Forks of the Ohio, Dinwiddie dispatched a small force of militia, mainly carpenters, to 
build a stockade in February 1754. Ever eager to thwart the French, Tanaghrisson was on 
hand to lay the first log of the stockade. Washington was to follow immediately with his 
force to occupy the fort. Washington began his move in the March of 1754, but on April 
17th, Commandant Legardeur’s successor, Captain Claude-Pierre Pecaudy, seigneur de 
Contrecoeur, arrived at the Forks with a force of nearly one-thousand. Contrecoeur 
demanded immediate surrender and Ensign Ward, the Virginian in command of the 
company of carpenters, decided to surrender the fort. Contrecoeur immediately renamed it 
in honour of Marquis Duquesne. Ward was allowed to go back to Virginia. Along the way, 
he met Tanaghrisson who asked Ward to deliver an impassioned request to Washington for 
immediate support to retake the Forks. 
Washington, beset with desertions, a lack of supplies, and having to hack a road out of 
the wilderness was pressing on when Ward arrived with word of his surrender and 
Tanaghrisson’s request for help. Fearing that he would have no Indian allies when he most 
needed them, Washington sent a reply ahead to Tanaghrisson telling him to hold fast and 
Washington’s force would soon join him. Meanwhile, with intelligence that Washington’s 
force was approaching the Forks, but with no formal hostilities declared, Contrecoeur sent a 
force under Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville to warn Washington off from 
French territory. On his way to join Washington, Tanaghrisson and a small group of seven 
Mingoes found Jumonville’s small force. Tanaghrisson sent word to Washington that he 
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had found the French force. Washington took nearly half his force on a night march in a 
steady rain to meet up with Tanaghrisson which he did just before daylight. Tanaghrisson 
informed him where the French camp was and the combined force moved to it. 
When Washington’s force found Jumonville’s force, the French were just rising from 
sleep. The details of the fight have been debated since they occurred, but whether the 
French fired first or not, the Virginian force launched a devastating volley that killed 
several and wounded more. Jumonville was wounded, but managed to call for a cease-fire. 
Washington complied and the French were brought before Washington. Jumonville told 
Washington that he came in peace and was to deliver a message that Washington’s force 
should withdraw from French soil. At this point, Tanaghrisson stepped forward and 
tomahawked Jumonville in the head and exposed his brains with his hands. Washington 
was shocked, but immediately protected the remaining prisoners. Tanaghrisson and his 
small force left, having accomplished the goal of starting a war for the Forks. Washington, 
expecting a much larger French force to follow, gathered his force and pulled back to his 
base in the Great Meadow where he had begun erecting a small palisade that he named Fort 
Necessity. There, he was attacked by a larger and more professional force led by 
Jumonville’s older brother. Eventually, Washington surrendered and was presented a note, 
written in French, that he did not fully understand. Unwittingly, Washington signed the 
note that admitted that his force had “assassinated” the younger Jumonville. In another first, 
Washington became the first of many British officers of the period to have to explain the 
atrocities committed by their Indian allies. Along with Dinwiddie and Tanaghrisson, 
Washington had reversed the course of European conflicts that began in Europe and spread 
to North America. Washington and Dinwiddie began a torrid pace of correspondence to 
explain away their errors. Washington knew that his honour and reputation as a gentleman 
were at stake and his many letters to friends and family show this. He took preparing for the 
inevitable questions to come very seriously.207 Dinwiddie was not overly concerned about 
Washington’s honour, but he did decide early on that it would support his cause to adopt 
the version of the story that Washington was projecting. Eventually, officials in London 
would come to the same conclusion. London would soon decide that the French threat was 
so serious that only a British Army officer and British Army Regiments would suffice to fix 
the problem they now faced. 
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Meanwhile, Dinwiddie was tireless in his goals. In addition to his work on the Ohio 
front, where he conflicted nearly as much with the colonial Pennsylvanians as he did with 
the French, he was also engaged in trying to draw the Cherokee along the South Carolina 
border away from a self-saving dalliance with the French. In this endeavour, he was in 
competition with South Carolina Governor James Glen who was also trying to secure the 
peace along his border as well as the option for more land for South Carolina settlers and 
traders. Both Dinwiddie and Glen had promised to build a British fort in the Overhill area 
of the Cherokee nation to help them ward off Indian attacks from their traditional Indian 
enemies and the French. From the north, the Cherokee were continually attacked by the 
Iroquois and Shawnees. From the southwest, the Creek Indians, who were much closer to 
the French at Fort Toulouse (near present day Montgomery, Alabama), had been at war 
with the Cherokees several times in recent years. The pressure felt from all sides drove the 
Cherokee to look for any help they could find, but they too were looking out for their own 
interests first. This fact would play a key role in limiting the British Army operations that 
were soon to start over the Appalachians.208  
When the British government decided to take action in North America, it sent general 
Edward Braddock to lead the activities along with two Irish British Army regiments. At 
Alexandria, Virginia in April 1755, Braddock gathered several colonial governors including 
Dinwiddie, but crucially not South Carolina Governor Glen that were exposed to the French 
and Indian frontier. Additionally, William Johnson, the recently appointed Superintendent 
of Indian Affairs for the northern colonies, was summoned. Braddock commanded that four 
major operations would be attempted simultaneously in the campaign season of 1755. 
Johnson was to take a force of militia and Indians from the Iroquois nation, that he had so 
painstakingly assembled as allies, to attack up the Lake St. Sacrament (later renamed Lake 
George) corridor to eventually take the French Fort St. Frederic on Lake Champlain (the 
British referred to this fort as ‘Crown Point’). This operation was meant to protect the 
critical New York colonial capital of Albany from a French thrust and provide a base for a 
future thrust upon Montreal. The remaining three operations were designed to take back the 
Forks of the Ohio and prevent the French from resupplying the Forks again. Second-in-
Command and Governor of Massachusetts, William Shirley, would lead the force to take 
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Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario in an attempt to disrupt French supply lines into the midwest. 
Braddock, himself would lead the force to take Fort Duquesne. Finally, Colonel Robert 
Monckton would lead a force to take the French forts in Nova Scotia. Monckton’s 
expedition, although the only one of the four that would be ultimately successful, falls 
outside of the purview of this paper due to its geographical location. 
Each force was to make an attempt to recruit Indian allies to assist in defeating the 
French and their Indian allies. To the specific question of this paper, there did not seem to 
be any serious question of whether to use Indians or not from the British Army, the colonial 
establishment, or the British political establishment. The only question was how they would 
be used. Out of the three operations examined by this paper, only Johnson had any direct 
experience of war-making with the Indians as allies. He was also the only one that had any 
pre-existing trust with them as well, due to his long service to the Mohawks as a friend, 
business partner and blood relative. Neither Shirley nor Johnson had any qualms with using 
Indians as allies. Shirley also had a history of issuing scalp bounties on New England 
Indians in times of frontier crises.209 However, Shirley’s and Johnson’s bickering and 
mismanagement of their Indian allies during these operations would ensure that the 
northeastern Indians would also be reticent to support the English cause in the future. To 
the great aggravation of Johnson, Shirley began a bidding war for the Indians of the 
Northeast and casted aspersions on Johnson motives and equality as a commander to 
himself. He forced Johnson to use much of his considerable relationship capital with the 
Iroquois to get them to join him at the base of Lake St. Sacrament. The result was great 
confusion and, to some degree, reluctance amongst the Indians to join the British at all. 
Unfortunately, the confusion and reluctance from the northeastern tribes would only get 
worse for the British. 210 
 Shirley’s force was to fortify Fort Oswego on the south side of Lake Ontario as a 
forward supply base, before taking Fort Niagara further west. Having very little military 
experience, Shirley left far too much to chance in his taking and supplying Fort Oswego. 
The result was a shambolic movement and occupation of Oswego that took so long that 
Niagara could not be taken before the winter began. The allied Indians of the Oswego 
operation were not managed in their activities, or their expectations. What resulted, was a 
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group of Indians that took as much as they could gain from Shirley’s force, but also became 
convinced of the unlikelihood of a British success in the a Lake Ontario area. Therefore, 
they gleaned valuable information about Fort Oswego and the British force sent there and 
provided the information to the French in return for favours.211 
William Johnson, on the other hand, did have firm control over his Indian allies, most 
of which were Mohawk who esteemed Johnson greatly. However, Johnson asked his 
traditional allies to act in a new way. Although he had sent raiding and scalping parties in 
King George’s War (1744-1748), Johnson now needed his allies to stay close and fight with 
him in a much more formal military manner. In one of the most important statements that 
are pertinent to this paper, Johnson stated to one of his Indian recruiters that ‘they are not to 
go a scalping as in the late war [1744-1748], but to go with me wherever I go’.212 This 
manner of control would become a defining feature of British attempts to control their 
Indian allies. Why Johnson would change his way of conducting war at this point in his 
career is interesting. Frustratingly, Johnson’s correspondence does not elaborate on the 
topic directly. However, Johnson was a man who had constantly sought stature in the 
British Empire. He may have been trying to bridge the gap between his two cultural groups. 
His uncle, Admiral Peter Warren, was a well-known Royal Navy officer and helped 
Johnson in his setting up his new life in New York from Ireland. Johnson had arrived in 
New York to manage Warren’s land holdings. He built a size-able business of his own by 
the 1740s, although he still held no societal rank outside of the Mohawk Valley. In this 
phase of his life, Johnson was largely invisible to the British establishment. However, with 
the Albany Conference in 1754, Johnson’s stock had risen quickly. Johnson was designated 
as one of two official Indian Superintendents in the colonies. This may well have had an 
uplifting effect for Johnson. Johnson may have felt that he needed to act more European in 
his military dealings now that he held an official position by appointment of the King. 
Furthermore, for the first time, he was acting as a direct report to a British Army career 
officer. It is likely that Braddock would have spent time at Alexandria telling his colonial 
subordinates how the British Army did things. Whatever the reason, Johnson seems to have 
undergone a change, if only in practical terms, about how warfare was to be conducted with 
Indian allies. And it was not wholly spent on British superiors either. Johnson’s reputation 
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would gain European exposure in his battle at Fort William Henry with the well-connected 
French Commander Baron von Dieskau who had served as a trusted aide to the Marechal 
de Saxe in Europe.213 
Johnson decided to use his Indians and his old ally Hendrick, an elderly and highly 
respected Mohawk chief, in a much more conventional fashion at the base of Lake George 
at Fort William Henry on 8 September 1755. A large force of French regulars, Canadians 
and Indian allies led by Gen. Baron von Dieskau approached Forts Edward and William 
Henry at the southern end of Lake Saint Sacrement. The British thought Dieskau would 
most likely invest Fort Edward. Johnson deployed his small number of Mohawks and 
militia led by Colonel Ephraim Williams on a scouting mission along the road. The 
Mohawks were led by Hendrick. The historical record is ambiguous, but it seems that 
Hendrick had some reservations, either about the scouting mission or a previous plan to 
split his forces. Some historians have recorded that Hendrick stated, probably apocryphally, 
that his small force was ‘too few to fight and too many to be killed’.214 The narrative 
provided by the Indian agent Daniel Claus makes no mention of this in the context of the 
scouting mission. Claus does mention, however, that Hendrick had objected to an earlier 
plan to split his forces along the lake and along the road, so the statement might have been 
in reference to that mission. Hendrick favoured the plan to move along the road to Fort 
Edward to attempt a surprise on the French forces that were presumed to be investing Fort 
Edward. Unbeknownst to Hendrick and Johnson, the French allied Indians had also balked 
at the initial French plan of investing Fort Edward for fear of large casualties.215 
Whether the ‘too few... too many’ quote is genuine is disputed, however, the principle 
is not. The Indians on both sides were very concerned about large casualties due to their 
small population size. Indian tactics rarely used full frontal assaults and normally avoided 
most encounters where they were unsure of the outcome. Investing forts and economy of 
force missions were typical European maneuvers that required discipline and a precise 
response. Seen from the European military viewpoint, casualties could be high, but the 
strategic situation demanded the sacrifice from military forces that were units first and 
individuals second. For European societies and armies with more than enough employable 
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men, but little economic opportunity, high tactical losses were acceptable. Winning 
strategic victories that secured favourable terms for expanding mercantilist markets made 
sense. However, for the Indians, these were just the sort of engagements that were to be 
avoided, because losing warriors that were also the main economic actors in their 
communities was devastating. These communities had been racked by European diseases 
over the last two centuries and there was little room to spare healthy males. 
In the ‘Bloody Morning Scout’, as the action has been called, Hendrick and several of 
his warriors were killed in an ambush set along the road by Baron von Dieskau’s combined 
force. After ambushing Johnson’s patrol, Dieskau harried the survivors back to Fort 
William Henry. Alerted by the battle down the road, Johnson had the entire fort throw up 
whatever works they could to receive the French attack. The barricades held, which 
demoralised the French Indian allies. Dieskau threw his regular grenadiers at the works 
and, after terrible losses, the French attack failed altogether. Dieskau and many of his force 
were captured.216 Although Fort William Henry held, the heavy Mohawk losses and the 
spectacle of seeing the French forces cut up at the barricades, turned the Mohawks against 
supporting Johnson and the English as fully as they had before. This was not the kind of 
warfare they had experienced with Johnson before and they were not keen on experiencing 
more of it. 
The capture and handling of Baron von Dieskau by Johnson’s force is another 
interesting point of discussion. After being captured and under Johnson’s force’s care, 
Dieskau was assaulted by three unnamed Mohawks intent on taking him in retribution for 
their senior losses. Johnson, who was also wounded, stopped them and put Dieskau under a 
protective custody to ensure his safety.217 Surprisingly, Johnson, the Mohawk confidant and 
leader, exercised European gentlemen-of-war norms on a German born aristocrat. It seems 
through these actions that Johnson’s conversion was complete. Johnson and Dieskau struck 
up a friendship. Dieskau would write about Johnson’s care in glowing terms. Dieskau states 
that the Mohawks were furious with Johnson at this curtailment of the Indian version of the 
honours of war.218 
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The main thrust of the 1755 campaigning season was the Braddock led push to the 
Forks of the Ohio against the newly established Fort Duquesne. After gathering his two 
Irish Regiments and colonials, Braddock decided that he would take Indians as allies if he 
could recruit them on his terms, but did not feel large numbers were absolutely necessary. It 
seemed that he valued them more as auxiliaries or guides, but not as allied fighting forces. 
Furthermore, Braddock did not want the Indian families that showed up with the warriors. 
Braddock feared the ill-discipline that a large body of Indians and their dependents would 
cause on their movement to the Forks. When told to remove their dependents, the warriors, 
fearing for their families’ exposure to French retaliation, left with their families. If 
Braddock was overly concerned with this turn of events, the record does not show it. Eight 
warriors, including the new Mingo ‘Half-King’ Scarouday (following Tanaghrisson’s 
recent death) and his son joined Braddock, probably, because the Mingoes had the most to 
lose with French ownership of the Ohio region.219 Scarouday would later explain that 
Braddock was highly dismissive of the Indians when they tried to advise him. George 
Croghan, the Irish trader who helped recruit the Indians, was equally critical of Braddock 
and the British Army officer’s dismissal of the Indians from Fort Cumberland. Croghan 
went so far as to say that a mere fifty Indians rather than the eight taken would have made 
the difference between a minor altercation and catastrophic defeat.220 
Braddock’s handling of the Indian recruitment has been debated by historians, but it is 
clear that Braddock did not think Indian allies were a prerequisite to launching his 
operation. While making the attempt to recruit some Indians, he managed to offend most of 
the Ohio Indians. Those that did attend his meetings were told that once the Ohio Valley 
had been rid of French influence the King would do with it what he pleased. This displayed 
a profound, if unsurprising, lack of understanding of the Indian geographical and 
diplomatic sensitivities. Braddock not only lost them to his service, but actively drove them 
to the French service.221 The Indians around the Forks of the Ohio included many Mingoes, 
Delawares, Miamis, and Shawnees that had direct experience of being pushed further and 
further west by the expanding British colonies over the last one-hundred years. There is 
                                                
219 David L. Preston, ‘“Make Indians of Our White Men”: British Soldiers and Indian Warriors From 
Braddock’s to Forbes’s Campaigns, 1755-1758’ Pennsylvania History, Vol. 74, No. 3 (SUMMER 2007): 
280-306, 280-306 
220 Tootle, ‘Anglo-Indian’,  255-256 
221 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 151-156, & Croghan to Johnson, undated, William Johnson, James Sullivan, 
Preparer. The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 2. (Albany, NY: The State University of New York, 
1922), 40-41 
L i n z y  | 81 
 
some evidence to support the idea that they knew the Ohio Valley would be the place that 
they had to defend in order to stem the tide of the white settlers. Braddock’s brash 
statements only confirmed to the Ohio Indians that helping the British was the fast track to 
dispossession. French encouragement and a history of light contact with the French in the 
area made them a better bet for Indian autonomy in the region.222 
Braddock did have one more hope as a source of Indian allies. Governor Dinwiddie 
had promised Braddock a substantial force of Cherokee warriors. As mentioned above, 
Governor Dinwiddie had been attempting to encourage Cherokee warriors to join the 
Virginia cause in the Ohio. His machinations in the Cherokee Overhill villages, that had so 
upset Governor Glen of South Carolina, were meant to deliver four-hundred Cherokee 
warriors. However, the unfulfilled Dinwiddie promise of a fort in the Overhill to support 
the Cherokee made them less than enthusiastic. Glen had also sown doubts in their minds 
about Dinwiddie’s intentions.223 The Cherokee and other southern Indians would factor 
heavily as British allies later in the conflict with the Forbes expedition in 1758. Tragically, 
their experience as British allies there led directly to conflict with the southern colonies 
and, ultimately, the British Army in 1759-1760. 
Therefore, on the eve of the British strategic plan to oust the French from the midwest, 
Braddock’s two northern commanders were fighting over the Iroquois. Two southern 
governors were fighting over the Cherokee. Braddock, himself, was busy offending the 
Delaware, Shawnee and Mingoes who had come to help him. It is unsurprising that many 
historians have assumed that the British did not really want the Indians as allies, especially 
as part of the Fort Duquesne campaign. However, this fact alone is not enough to make any 
conclusions about the reasons for not using the Indians, for these same squabbles existed 
over provisions, staffing and most other military issues as well.  
Braddock’s part of the strategic campaign plan and its catastrophic failure are so well 
known that it has become part of American founding lore on why redcoats could never 
subdue North America. The image of redcoats, marching and fighting in ranks, being 
mowed down by more nimble North American woodsmen, white or red, used to be known 
to every American of school age. However, recent scholarship has brought most of the 
hoary legend into question. Braddock neither dismissed Indian tactics wholesale, nor was 
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he totally unfamiliar with irregular warfare. The topic of ‘petite guerre’ was widely 
discussed in European military literature. Irregulars had been used extensively in the 
previously twenty-five years, including the influential battle of Fontenoy. Many British, 
German, Swiss and French officers that would fight in North America had had direct 
experience of it.224 Braddock used his few Indians effectively as scouts and guides. For 
most of the march, he conscientiously used his grenadiers as flanking screens. He used his 
best and most nimble troops in the van and moved in a self-supporting fashion until he 
reached the Monongahela River, not far from Fort Duquesne. Unfortunately, over 
confidence and haste destroyed his admirable approach when he had the goal in sight. 
Dropping his flank guard and moving the van too far in advance of the main body gave a 
smaller French and Indian force the break they needed. The results were devastating. Nine-
hundred British troops were killed or wounded, including Braddock. Interestingly, the 
French force included a Troupes de la Marines officer, Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade 
that conducted the force at Pickawillany in 1752 and would figure prominently in French 
and British efforts to effectively use Indians as allies over the next twenty-five years.225 
The losses in General Braddock’s expedition were so shocking and so large that any 
armchair tactician with a theory has been encouraged to surmise the reason for the failure. 
Not long after the battle, sides formed where one group blamed cowardly soldiers and 
another group blamed bad leadership. The simplistic concepts about the battle were that the 
soldiers were using European tactics in the North American wilderness. The leadership was 
wrong in using these tactics and/or the private soldiers were wrong for not using the 
European tactics to their fullest effect. Recent scholarship has shown that obviously 
General Braddock did try to adapt to conditions by having flanking parties and the advance 
party to warn the main body of danger. The problem seems to have come from frustration 
at the slow pace of cutting through the wilderness. Security seems to have broken down at 
the moment when it was needed most. However, as one author has put it, the fact that there 
was a two and a half hour battle should put to rest any discussion of cowardice amongst the 
troops. No matter the reason for the defeat, there is no question that the British Army 
experienced one of the worst defeats of its history before or after at the hands of a small 
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French force that was supplemented with a large Indian force, most probably with some of 
the Indians that were spurned by Braddock. This defeat would encourage the Indians to 
hope that they could to defend their home in the Ohio Valley and much of the next one 
half-century would confirm this impression. The French and British were focused on each 
other, but the Indians had a strong say on the matter as well.226 
 Once tactics, planning, poor leadership and cowardice are set aside from 
consideration, the question of too few Indian allies comes back to the fore. Returning to the 
recruitment of Indians at the beginning of the campaign, the arrival of Gen. Braddock at the 
Alexandria conference of military and political leaders is crucial. Braddock’s dressing 
down of anyone standing in his way of doing things the British Army way set a command 
climate that left it clear that the British way of war would be used. This meant that Indians 
that were recruited as allies or auxiliaries would have to perform under the standards of the 
King’s army. For Johnson and Shirley, they could still recruit traditional allies, but they 
would have to change their tactics. This is best exemplified by the statement by William 
Johnson to his Mohawk brothers that it would not be possible to fight in their traditional 
manner when fighting with the English. However, the Braddock part of the campaign was 
led by Braddock himself who had no experience in recruitment, nor the diplomatic 
sensitivities of Indians. The Indians were just like the colonials in his view; lazy and 
insubordinate. It is important to separate the tactics and the atrocities that often followed 
the tactics upon submission of an enemy, alive or dead. Officers like Braddock did not 
dislike the tactics so much as they abhorred the lack of discipline that they thought it 
engendered. It seems fair to extrapolate that Braddock and his commanders did not mind 
using Indians as auxiliaries, but not as true allies who could take on independent missions. 
Whether they were not wanted due to considerations of them soiling the British Army 
officer’s honour is undetermined. However, it is clear that Braddock did not feel them 
necessary to accomplish his mission.  
The aforementioned situation can explain the good order and discipline part of the 
equation, but leaves the question of controlling the Indians in the heat of battle from 
committing atrocities while under the control of the King’s chosen commander. To explore 
this subtlety, one must consider how others in the era were viewed and their motivations. 
The Enlightenment had encouraged a developing, but uneven, consensus in Europe against 
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uncivilized behavior on the battlefield. There were certainly examples of atrocious 
behaviour still to be found in Europe. The British Army’s action against the Jacobites in 
1745 was but one, but it was notable for its decreasing trend.227 In the colonies, the 
conversation about limiting the effects of war was also underway, but the conclusions were 
not as wide-spread yet. Nor was it a question of the enlightened class versus the frontier. 
The Quakers of backwoods Pennsylvania were dedicated to non-violence, especially 
against non-combatants. Countless settlers and traders worked to forge harmony with their 
Indian neighbours. However, others, possibly the majority, were far more accepting of 
violence on the frontier. Whether violence was the inherent nature of the frontiersman is 
still a subject of debate, but it is clear that great violence was not unknown to either side of 
the cultural divide. 228 Governor Shirley was no stranger to encouraging scalping, the 
sensational action that significantly defined the Indian atrocity. As Governor of 
Massachusetts, he had instituted scalping bounties. One of these bounties is one of the most 
quoted of all in the colonial record where Shirley offered New Englanders a £100 bounty 
on Indian scalps at the beginning of King George’s War in 1744.229 Another colonial 
bounty stated, ‘For every Scalp of such Female Indian or Male Indian under the Age of 
Twelve Years, that shall be killed and brought in as Evidence of their being killed as 
aforesaid, Twenty Pounds.’230 The number and variety of these bounties across the colonies 
are used by authors who are making the case that the American colonists were as ruthless 
and prone to atrocity as their Indian neighbors.  
The key question of using Indians as auxiliaries or allies was not confined to strategic 
considerations. It was in the popular mind at the time and was not an academic discussion. 
In a little known book entitled ‘Proposals to Prevent Scalping, Etc.: Humbly Offered to the 
Consideration of a Council of War’ published in New York in 1755 by an anonymous 
author, the case is made that the laws of war should be observed on the frontier of North 
America as they were in Europe.231 There is significant reference to the practices of 
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irregular troops in Europe and how they are handled and then this comparison, ‘The Indians 
are only in the Nature of Hussars or Croats, but if they act contrary to the Laws of War, or 
of Nature and Nations, their Principals, or those that employ them, are accountable. The 
Case is the same, supposing them Auxiliaries or Allies’.232 
The anonymous author was not for shrinking away from lesser reprisals (eye gouging, 
hand amputation, castration) in order to discourage worse depredations. However, in 
dealing with old men, women, and children, ‘Proposals’ reads much like a modern day tract 
on the Laws of War in Afghanistan. It was mainly the Indian customs of killing innocents 
in the back settlements, killing the fighting wounded and taking their scalps that is the 
focus of his concern. The author was also not oblivious to the counter-arguments in support 
of the use of Indians stating, ‘It will be said, that unless the Indians have Leave to fight 
their own Way, that is, to scalp and murder, they will not fight at all; be it so, let them stand 
Neuter to both Sides.’233 
It is not clear to what war council this tract is directed toward, or if it was directed to 
any one of many war councils that would soon be forming to prosecute the war. It mentions 
the defeat of Braddock at the Monongahela in July of 1755, but it is not clear if it was 
directed toward the other campaigns of that season or not. The fact that it was published in 
book form probably indicates that the author was of means, but it is unclear how many of 
the tracts were published or distributed. What is clear is that at least one thoughtful author 
attempted to influence a council of war on the decision process of using Indians as 
auxiliaries or allies. Anonymous concludes, 
I beg leave to conclude, with observing what is indeed obvious to 
every Individual, that unless this, or something of the Kind, in 
relation to Scalping, be not put in Execution, with a Spirit and 
Resolution, those wicked alarms will be an eternal Barr and 
Discouragement to the settling of this Country.234 
However, this consciousness of the Indian war customs was also not confined those 
who were against their use, as a letter writer to the Boston Gazette or the Weekly advertiser 
states, ‘If the Indians are neglected, and nothing more done to secure them in our Interest 
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than has been, Time will shew the great Disparity between us (be we ever so regular) and 
the Indians in the Woods; for we are an unequal Match to them in the Wilderness.’ 235 
Colonial officials were concerned about how to deal with this issue as well. An old 
friend of William Johnson’s was Goldsbrow Banyar who was the secretary to New York 
Governor James De Lancey. He wrote to Johnson in July 1755,  
We should deal exactly with them as they do by us, destroy and 
scalp as they do: They set their Indians to scalping of our poor 
defenceless Inhabitants, in this the necessity pleads an Excuse for 
following so inhuman an Example, as the shortest way too perhaps 
to put an End to such Barbarities.236 
In summary, the British Army officers and colonial administrators were of divided 
opinion on the usefulness of Indians as a significant fighting force in the British order of 
battle. The American public also seemed divided on the issue. The British Army certainly 
attempted to recruit Indians to their cause, but the restrictions on their methods of warfare 
were impeding their usefulness. The restrictions on the Indians to fight the British way 
were also driving unacceptable casualties with the few allies they did manage to recruit. 
The cause of these restrictions was not exclusively due to fears of atrocities, but more likely 
due to the fear of a breakdown of discipline in general. Therefore, at the end of 1755, 
Britain was facing defeat on most fronts and had soured its relations with the few Indians 
that had considered a British alliance. The French, especially French regulars stationed in 
North America, had far better outcomes with their use of Indian allies, but they had far 
longer experience in their use. However, this situation would also change as the French 
began to use more European style forces and tactics. Both European powers would have to 
come to grips with the appropriate use of Indian allies and the European sense of honour 
over the next four years. 
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'Nothing has ever been made until the soldier has made safe the field where the 
building shall be built, and the soldier is the scaffolding until it has been built: and the 
soldier gets no reward but honour.' 
-- Eric Linklater 237 
4. Rangers and Indians 
 
After the miserable year of 1755, the British and the American colonists were virtually 
defenceless. The only thing stopping France from delivering the coup de grace was a lack 
of troops. Had Baron von Dieskau preserved his French regular force, rather than thrown it 
on Johnson’s defences at Fort William Henry, the French would have been in a very strong 
position indeed. British fears of Albany being the front lines might have come true. At the 
end of 1755, the British had no plan and a colonial governor with little military experience 
as Commander-in-Chief. France was sending an experienced General from France to 
Canada named Louis-Joseph Montcalm. For the type of war that was being fought, the 
British were at a distinct disadvantage to the French in Indian allies, militia, regulars and 
leadership that understood what was required. This state of affairs would not bode well for 
the British over the next three years. However, all was not well in the French and Indian 
camps either. The French were torn between rival factions over the use of Indians. By 1758, 
the French advantage in Indian alliances would be much degraded. 
Johnson’s Northern Indian Department estimated that the French held a three to one 
advantage in Indian recruitment.238 After the initial destruction of Braddock’s force at the 
Monongahela and other setbacks from 1755-1756, the British Army had to make some very 
difficult decisions about the use of Indians and Indian tactics in the war with France in 
North America. Although initially dismissive of Indian tactics, skill and cultural norms, the 
British Army eventually began to appreciate some of the Indian’s tactics and woodcraft. A 
slow realisation sunk in that if they were to fight the Indians, the Troupes de la Marines, 
and the French Canadian militia on their own soil, the British Army would have to adapt to 
the conditions, if not to the Indian cultural norms. The British Army experimented with 
irregular tactics, formations and alliances to meet the challenges posed by the North 
American eastern woodlands. This adaptation is crucial to the analysis sought by this thesis 
as it decouples Indian tactics from Indian cultural norms. Whereas Braddock felt no Indian 
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force could withstand the discipline of British regulars using European tactics, other British 
Army officers began to entertain the thought that their tactics needed modifying. In other 
words, no longer were British officers so dismissive of the tactics that had been used 
against them to great effect, but they were still wary of the brutal way those tactics were 
deployed. The British Army was familiar with the irregular warfare in Europe. The 
Pandours and the Croats of the European armies were a common feature of developing the 
battlefield and conducting reconnaissance.239 The fact that these irregular fighters were 
often spoken of in unflattering terms shows that they received some of the same 
condescension that the British Army used towards the Indians. However, the fact that the 
British Army similarly viewed Croats and the Indians does not mean that the tactics or the 
methods were the same. The European armies learned tactics that were similar in theory, 
but the open terrain of Europe was nothing like the wilderness of North America. British 
irregular and light infantry tactics would develop with a distinctive backwoods flavour.240 
By early 1756, the British Army was more open to allying with the Indians. However, 
their earlier missteps by Braddock, Johnson and Shirley had soured many Indians on a 
British alliance. Each of these commanders had misused Indian allies, but in different ways. 
Braddock had largely dismissed their usefulness, beyond scouting, and insulted them with 
his imperious manner. Johnson and Shirley had fought over them and Johnson had 
misemployed them in the ‘Bloody Morning Scout’. 241 Therefore, partly by choice and 
partly by necessity, the British Army began to deploy a dual track strategy of wooing select 
groups of Indians into an alliance and fostering units of colonial woodsmen known as 
Rangers. 
In this absence of a British regular force on the frontier, the Indians took the initiative. 
The colonies had been relying on Braddock’s campaign to secure the backcountry. After his 
defeat, it took the colonies time to summon their defences and Indian allies. The 
backcountry of Pennsylvania and Virginia was devastated. Some of these raids were 
directed and led by the French, but many others were carried out by the Indians 
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independently for their own objectives and benefit.242  However, there were some British 
successes on the frontier. There was also more Anglo-Indian cooperation during this period 
than has been generally acknowledged, largely through the alliance of the Cherokee and the 
Catawba from the southern backcountry. These Indian allies of the British were seeking 
security themselves from the French allied Indians in the south as well as the north. 
Although the Cherokee alliance would not last throughout the war, it may have been the 
only thing that prevented outright catastrophe on the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontier. 243 
The re-introduction of Ranger companies, often with the incentive of scalp bounties, help 
alleviate some of the wide-scale panic and evacuation of the backcountry. For men like 
Dinwiddie, it had been a very short two years from wanting to expand the backcountry to 
keeping it from being depopulated of settlers altogether. Whether the Rangers worked 
independently or with Indian allies, the tactics were much the same. Indian style warfare 
was to be the norm on the frontier in 1756 and 1757. This cooperation and understanding of 
mutual needs formed the basis of the eventual success of the Forbes expedition in 1758. It 
also was a preview of the lengths to which the British Army was willing to go.244 
The Indian way of war was not a settled issue for the French either. As so often 
happened away from Imperial capitols, it depended on who was in charge. New France 
Governor-General Vaudreuil and his Troupes de la Marines officer brother, Francois-Pierre 
de Rigaud de Vaudreuil (Rigaud), were enthusiastic advocates of using the French Indian 
allies and their modes of warfare. Being from the Troupes de Marines, the French regulars 
that were Canadian residents, Vaudreuil had no problem with the use of Indians in their 
traditional manner. In fact, the use of Indians and Canadian militia in conjunction with the 
Troupes de la Marines had been a successful strategy in the defence of New France 
throughout the previous colonial wars. Vaudreuil knew first-hand the devastation and 
confusion that frontier raids would cause. When the frontiers were being evacuated and 
general panic ensuing, it was hard for the northern colonial governments to mount offensive 
operations. It also served to keep the Indians happy by providing goods for services 
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rendered and opportunities for looting, taking captives and scalps. For Vaudreuil and 
Rigaud, the frontier operations were the perfect operations.245 
However, in the summer of 1756, Louis-Joseph de Montcalm arrived in Montreal. 
Montcalm was a thoroughly European officer. He feared the loss of discipline in 
operational matters and in the aftermath of a battle. Like many of his British counterparts, 
he had a strong belief in European regulars and the discipline they held in the most difficult 
situations, such as Dieskau’s grenadiers’ gallant, but suicidal rush at Lake George in 1755. 
For Montcalm, no amount of woodcraft and flexibility was worth trading for the discipline 
of well-trained regulars. Moreover, he felt the emphasis on the frontiers was a diversion. 
Montcalm wanted to inflict heavy losses on the British forces in the field. To do this, he 
needed a force that he could keep in the field and drive the war to a strategic conclusion 
with the decisive defeat of the British regulars that were bound to follow up Braddock’s 
loss. However, as with most military operations in North America, principle gave in to 
political pressure and pragmatic concerns. Montcalm simply did not have enough French 
regulars to quickly conduct the operations needed over such a huge geographic area. 
Therefore, Montcalm acceded to Vaudreuil’s demands to use a combination of Indians, 
militia, Troupes de la Marines and regulars. To keep the irregulars under control, he 
planned to use them on the march and to secure his movements, but would only trust the 
sieges to his regulars.246  
The objective of the French in 1756 was to isolate and capture the British operations on 
Lake Ontario in order to secure the supply lines to the interior. Vaudreuil had begun the 
process in the spring by cutting the British supply line to Fort Oswego that Shirley had 
secured in late 1755. On 27 March 1756, a small French force of Troupes de la Marines and 
Indians had infiltrated the New York backcountry and showed up unannounced at the Great 
Carrying Place, the portage from the Mohawk River to Wood Creek, along the present day 
Erie Canal between Rome, New York and Lake Oneida. This portage was being maintained 
to support Oswego and it was only barely accomplishing that task. After surprising a 
British supply train, the French force, led by Lieutenant Chaussegros de Léry, moved on to 
Fort Bull near the Mohawk River end of the portage and laid siege to it. Only a few of de 
Léry’s Indians took part in the siege while the rest set ambushes for any would-be rescue 
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party. The defenders reportedly sent a volley into a truce party sent by de Léry and held out 
long enough to enrage the Indians. After it fell, a bloodbath ensued when the Indians 
sacked the fort and killed the remaining defenders. The expected rescue party from Fort 
William on Wood Creek was ambushed by the remaining Indians. Along with the panic 
created by the small force seemingly appearing from thin air so close to Albany, Oswego 
had lost its already tenuous supply route. It would not stand a chance in the upcoming siege 
by Montcalm. This attack by de Léry’s force was the type of action that Vaudreuil felt 
would win the war for the French. It was also the very kind of indiscipline that Montcalm 
feared.247 
After the success against Braddock on the Monongahela, the Indians of the upper 
midwest, or pays d’en haut as the French called it, went back home with their booty, 
prisoners, and scalps. The word quickly circulated that the French were to be executing 
many more of these types of actions.  The opportunities seemed endless. Indians from far 
distant lands began arriving in French camps. The Indians from the Ohio knew that the 
French were the lesser of two evils at the moment and supported the French to help remove 
the aggressive British settlers in their area. The Indians from further afield had little to do 
with the French, beyond trading, and even less to do with the British whose threat to their 
land would only come later. Their goal was material and martial glory. New to the scene, 
Montcalm, much like Braddock, did not have much time for these allies, other than for 
scouting and guiding. However, the Canadian militia and the Troupes de la Marines that 
served under him appreciated the Indians and actively encouraged the Vaudreuil way of 
war. The first test for Montcalm being able to handle the Indians according to his European 
sense of duty and honour would take place at Oswego. 
After de Lery’s cutting off of Oswego’s supply line at Fort Bull, the next move for the 
French would be to take the fort located on the southeast corner of Lake Ontario. Montcalm 
was now in charge of forces in the field, but operating with forces recruited and developed 
by Vaudreuil and still having to operate with the strategy that Vaudreuil favoured. 
Montcalm was not keen on attacking Oswego as his first order of business. Montcalm 
preferred to amass enough French regulars to defeat the British in the field along the Lakes 
Champlain and George corridor. Montcalm felt this would threaten the British colonies 
enough to force them to sue for peace. However, Vaudreuil and his brother Rigaud cajoled 
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him into attacking Oswego to remove the threat to the French supply lines into the pays 
d’en haut, as the William Shirley objective had intended. An additional objective was to 
draw British forces away from the lakes corridor. This secondary objective was enough for 
Montcalm to accept the situation and he resigned himself to being able to conduct 
operations to his standard if not strategy.248 With a force of 1,500 Canadian militia, 1,300 
French Regulars, 137 Troupes de la Marines and 260 Indians, Montcalm began 
maneuvering against Oswego in early August 1756. The Indians had alarmed the post with 
some audacious daylight raids, so it was no surprise to the British commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Mercer, that the French began the siege of Oswego on 11 August 1756. Due to 
poor siting and even poorer ‘improvements’ directed by Shirley, who had been relieved of 
his American command and was not present, Montcalm was able to prepare his investment 
at close range, but out of direct sight of the fort. Once the bombardment began, Mercer had 
to begin evacuating the outlying posts. These captured posts gave Montcalm increasingly 
superior firing position through the 12th and 13th of August. On the 13th, a round 
decapitated Mercer. British command passed to Lieutenant Colonel Littlehales who was so 
unnerved that he surrendered almost immediately. Oswego and a secure line of 
communication to the pays d’en haut were French at little cost.249 
However, the situation was not perfect for Montcalm, the honour bound European 
officer that he was. The swift capitulation by Littlehales did not impress him and he felt the 
honours of war should not be extended to the British for such a light defence of their 
position. Montcalm had to take possessions over 1,600 soldiers and civilians. New France 
was already having a hard time feeding itself and an influx of French troops, so this large, 
unproductive and captive force would need housing and feeding. The poverty of New 
France extended to the Indians who were not paid, but attended the French requests in order 
to secure martial glory and plunder. Montcalm was faced with a threat to his honour. The 
British captives were his responsibility, but his Indian allies wanted satisfaction. He 
evacuated the captives to nearby fort under French guard, but the surrender scene 
degenerated almost immediately as the Indians rushed the main fort, killed and scalped the 
wounded that had been left, and began the plundering. Afterwards, the Indians, not satisfied 
with what they had taken so far rushed the French guarding the British captives. More 
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killings and captive taking of soldiers and civilians occurred. Montcalm was mortified, but 
could do little to stop the massacre. He had to satisfy himself by ransoming most of the 
Indian prisoners at a dear cost to the French Crown. By mid-August, all of Montcalm’s 
fears of North American warfare had come true. He found himself winning against the 
British, but not on terms he felt honourable.250 
Furthermore, Oswego had fallen so quickly that the British did not have time to react 
and send re-enforcements from the lakes corridor. The British commander along the 
Mohawk valley, General Daniel Webb, evacuated Fort Bull and assumed an entirely 
defensive posture. The French now felt that they needed to move the majority of their 
forces to the lakes corridor to counter any British attacks towards Quebec and Montreal. 
Unbeknownst to the French, the new British commander in North America, John Campbell, 
the 4th Earl of Loudon, also stopped offensive operations up the lakes corridor and began 
re-enforcing Fort William Henry and the base of Lake George. 
The news spread of the Oswego massacre, much to Montcalm’s chagrin. The Indians 
had their view re-enforced that it paid to support the French in this war. Of course, the news 
spread to the British as well. Montcalm would come to be known as an officer who 
deployed Indians and allowed them to use their traditional forms of warfare. The draw of 
the pays d’en haut Indians by the routs of the Monongahela, the Ohio frontier raids, and 
Fort Bull was complicated by Montcalm’s treatment of his Indian allies at Oswego in their 
desire for captives, plunder and scalps, although his ransoming of the British captives 
provided some consolation. Although the French had a decisive advantage in Indian allies 
at this point, the issues surrounding their use were the same for Montcalm as they were for 
British commanders. The Oswego campaign tarnished Montcalm’s honour, but the events 
in the lakes corridor a year later would forever stain it.251 
In the winter and spring of 1756-57, hundreds of Indians from as far as 1,500 miles 
away began to arrive in Montreal to serve the French. The logistical constraints alone in 
bivouacking and feeding the Indians and their dependents forced the French to begin their 
campaign against the British defence on Lake George. The western Indians began joining 
the more local Indians who had been scouting and raiding for Montcalm around Fort St. 
Frederic (known to the British as Crown Point) and Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) since the 
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autumn of 1756.  It is from this time that the most detailed descriptions of the European-
French view of the Indians can be found. Louis-Antoine de Bougainville was appointed as 
an aide-de-camp to Montcalm in 1756 and regularly wrote about the Indians in French 
service. Bougainville joined Montcalm in decrying these “mosquitoes” that he felt lounged 
around French camps ‘getting drunk’ and consuming enormous amounts of supplies. 
Bougainville wanted a “specified number” used in a rotation for very specific scouting and 
guiding tasks, but not in a great, uncontrollable number. Finally, he described them as ‘a 
necessary evil’ adding that ‘pride is the only wealth of every Indian.’252 
Reading Bougainville’s journals, one is struck by how close Montcalm’s and 
Bougainville’s views of the Indians were to Edward Braddock’s and his aides-de-camp. 
However, French success had brought far more into their camps than could be managed. 
The British, on the other hand, struggled to recruit even their most steadfast allies, 
Johnson’s Mohawks, back into their service. The loss of Hendrick and many others in 1755 
and the losses that followed discouraged the participation of the Iroquois. The fall of 
Oswego convinced the rest of the Iroquois that the British were disinterested, ignorant or 
both to Iroquois security concerns. Sir William Johnson, who had been given his baronetcy 
for his action at Lake George in 1755 in fighting off Dieskau, not only struggled to recruit 
Iroquois, but also had to actively attempt to keep the western Iroquois from joining the 
French cause. Rigaud had threatened the Seneca (the western-most Iroquois) with sacking 
by Canadian Indians if they supported the British. Due to the loss of Oswego near the 
Seneca settlements, they were justifiably fearful of this. The fear of the Seneca, who had 
strong ties to the Ohio Indians, changing sides later proved to be well-founded when British 
agents found British scalps in Seneca villages. When confronted, the Seneca openly joined 
the French. Johnson, surely humbled by his inability to gather the Iroquois to the British 
side, began to recruit and deploy backwoodsmen as scouts and raiders for the defence of the 
Lake George area. These ‘Rangers’ were a historical legacy of the New England colonies in 
their attempts to deal with the New England Indians since the late seventeenth century. 
Their success in ranging out of Fort William Henry in 1756-57 was spotty at best, but they 
were really the only eyes and ears Lord Loudon and Johnson had in the corridor. The only 
Indians to be relied upon were the ‘domesticated’ Indians, such as those from Stockbridge, 
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who were Rangers in all but name. How the British used Rangers in comparison to how 
they deployed Indians is discussed later in this chapter.253 
The well-documented lack of Indian support and the lackluster support of the few who 
did help the British began to create cynics among the British officers. Men like Thomas 
Gage and Jeffrey Amherst who would later lead British Forces in North America were 
watching closely and forming opinions about the Indians. Events of 1756-57, such as the 
Seneca defection and lack of Mohawk volunteers led to many British officers calling the 
Indians fickle, indolent and treacherous. Amherst seemed to have been especially affected, 
eventually referring to them as ‘perfidious savages’ and stating that they could ‘by no 
means be relied on’ among other things.254 These opinions and experiences would greatly 
affect their future decisions on the Indians’ use and trustworthiness. Therefore, it is 
important to understand that the decision to use Indians or not was not always a question of 
a fear of atrocity. Many times, British (and French) commanders feared using Indians due 
to the British perception of their unreliability. There was an art to using the Indians 
effectively without letting them get out of control. At other times, the Indians were 
employed, not because the British officers felt they were useful or reliable, but merely to 
keep them from actively supporting the French or away from the lure of frontier raiding. 
Lord Loudon was certainly not averse to using Indians if he could recruit them. Indeed he 
complained to London about the lack Indian allies of value. In the second half of 1756, he 
declared, ‘[f]rom the Indians, you see we have no support’, ‘really in effect we have no 
Indians’, ‘those at present are not useful’, and they were ‘no more than neutral’.255 These 
lessons were just as important to the British Army as learning frontier tactics. 
In light of the French use of the Indians on the frontier, and at Fort Bull and Oswego, 
the situation was so fraught for the British commanders that they seemed more than 
agreeable to using the Indians. The record certainly does not show the same dismissiveness 
that Braddock had shown in 1755. In the type of warfare being waged, the British 
leadership now knew that the Indians were more than a match for British regulars, 
American militia, Rangers, or anyone else the British could deploy. As an illustration that 
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Lord Loudon knew his limitations without Indians to reconnoitre west of Fort Bull and 
south of Ticonderoga in late 1756, he wrote to the Duke Cumberland that,  
I can give you no certain accounts of the road to Ticonderoga as it 
has never been reconnoitred properly, but by all accounts I have 
been able to get, it is not to be done with Troops whilst the Enemy 
are so superior in Irregulars, for in reality we have none but our 
Rangers.256 
The Duke also seemed to be ready to use Indians, even though he felt that, in a short 
space of time, the Rangers and volunteers would be able to perform just as well.257 In this 
Lord Loudon seemed to have a better understanding than did the Duke of Cumberland on 
the current usefulness of Indians. Lord Loudon recognised their ability to work with little 
support and to exercise superior skills in woodcraft, intelligence gathering and a lifetime of 
local knowledge of the geography that no Ranger or British soldier could replicate in a few 
short months. However, Loudon did not accord the Indians super-human status. In fact, he 
felt that the Rangers would one day be able to match the Indians, but it would require time 
to ‘breed them up’. On this point, Loudon was quite prophetic about how the American 
frontiersman would eventually be the equal of the Indian in many cases. However, like 
Gage and Amherst, Lord Loudon also was developing a low opinion of the Indians’ 
reliability in general calling them, ‘a loose-made indolent sett of People’ [sic] and saying 
they had not the ‘least degree of faith or honesty’.258 Nevertheless, regardless of what he 
thought of the Indians as human beings, he still had a need for them in the short term. 
As Lord Loudon lamented his lack of Indians and Bougainville and Montcalm 
lamented the curse of too many of them, the British began using the Rangers at their 
disposal. One Robert Rogers from the New Hampshire frontier would become the most 
famous. During the winter of 1757, ranging patrols were sent out regularly north of Fort 
William Henry. Many returned empty handed or were chased back to William Henry by the 
French Troupes de la Marines and Indians. Rogers made a name for himself by being more 
methodical with his Rangers. He developed patrolling techniques and procedures that are 
still used by modern armies of the twenty-first century.259 This reconnaissance war along 
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the lakes corridor could be brutal in many ways. In one encounter, Rogers initially took 
prisoners from a small French sleigh party in an ambush. However, more French arrived 
and the sleigh party revealed itself as much larger than Rogers’ force. The Rangers had to 
fight for their lives to escape. Involved in this French party was Charles Langlade who 
continued to surface on the frontier, usually whenever particularly nasty fighting was 
required. Heavily outnumbered, Rogers’ force killed its prisoners and began a running fight 
to get away from the larger force. From the British point of view, killing prisoners was 
unacceptable, but for a Ranger force being captured ensured your death rather than the 
prisoner’s. Although Loudon was not happy with the situation, Roger’s returning Rangers 
were given bounties for the prisoners they could not bring back alive.260 The British were 
starting to realise that the price of good intelligence on the frontier was to accede to some 
the ways of the frontier. However, Lord Loudon revealed that he was still worried about the 
tactics of the frontier by saying, ‘I am afraid, I shall be blamed for the Ranging Companies, 
but as really in Effect we have no Indians, it is impossible for an Army to Act in this 
country, without Rangers...’261 
Lord Loudon acknowledged that he could not help but use Rangers or suffer the 
consequence of being operationally blind to French plans. However, he did draw the line at 
sending them to raid civilian settlements as the French and Indians were doing along the 
Ohio frontier. Rangers were not only operating around the lakes corridor, but also along the 
Appalachian frontier. In fact, the Rangers commissioned by the House of Burgesses and 
Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie in Virginia in response to the Indians falling on the frontier 
had been issued a scalp bounty on Indians over the age of twelve. This resulted in the 
sacking of several Indian towns over the Appalachians by Virginian Rangers. These types 
of bounties were not unknown in the colonies and they were offered in one form or another 
by Lord Loudon, Dinwiddie, Shirley, Johnson, Amherst and Braddock. Eventually, 
however, Loudon and the British Army tried to steer clear of them when they could from 
1755-1757. If they were required to get the desired result, leaders like Amherst and Loudon 
tried to restrict them to adult, male Indians.262  
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As 1757 advanced, Vaudreuil was anxious to take advantage of French momentum and 
British disarray in the lakes corridor. A March attempt on Fort William Henry by Rigaud 
ultimately failed, but did cause some damage to transportation and outbuildings. Lord 
Loudon and Johnson took the news that Fort William Henry was able to withstand French 
assaults as heartening. Montcalm saw Rigaud’s failure to take William Henry as proof that 
siege warfare would require the discipline of French regulars. The French allied Indians 
were still very active for the French throughout the summer. They ambushed a large British 
water-born reconnaissance force in whaleboats at the northern end of Lake George in July 
1757, which provided invaluable intelligence for the upcoming French expedition from 150 
prisoners taken. The British Rangers were active, but were overwhelmed by the sheer 
number of Indians that the French fielded in the area. By July 1757, the French had 
approximately 2,000 Indians swarming around the area. The new British Army commander 
at Fort William Henry, Lieutenant Colonel George Monro, was virtually blind to French 
movements. However, it would not take long for him to find out what the French plans 
were. Montcalm launched a huge force of 8,000 down Lake George with impressive 
precision and control over French and Indians alike. By the end of July, the French forces 
were in place and by 3 August, the siege of Fort William Henry had begun. By the 9th, it 
was over and Montcalm extended the honours of war to Monro for a valiant defence of an 
appropriate length.263  
However, Montcalm was already struggling with his pays d’en haut Indian allies who 
had participated in the whaleboat ambush and had the 150 prisoners that they wanted to 
take home. This did not include the three who were killed and eaten in Indian camps prior 
to the Fort William Henry assault.264 Not only were much of their activities out of his 
control, Montcalm risked losing large chunks of his force as each group decided they had 
enough in the way of glory, scalps or prisoners. All of Montcalm’s fears were coming true, 
but the worst was yet to come. Montcalm, the consummate European officer, tried mightily 
to control his forces after the surrender of Fort William Henry and recover his reputation 
after the Oswego massacre. After capitulation, he immediately put the British under heavy 
guard and tried moving them away from the area under the cover of darkness, but could 
not, because the Indians camped just outside the fort. As the British marched out of the fort 
                                                
263 Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 313-317 
264 Ian K. Steele, Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the Massacre (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 89 
L i n z y  | 99 
 
on the morning of 10 August, the French Indians attacked the column. Montcalm and some 
of the French officers tried to stop them, but to little avail. When it became obvious to some 
Indians that their prisoners might be taken from them, they simply killed and scalped them 
instead.  
Montcalm and his aide, Bougainville, were at their wits end. Montcalm had not wanted 
so many Indians, nor had he wanted their style of warfare. Most historians have concluded 
that he felt the advantages that the Indians provided were being more than offset by the 
atrocity and ill-discipline that accompanied them. However, one exception is Francis 
Jennings who claimed that Montcalm and Bougainville concocted most of their outrage 
without much action to prevent it.265 With either explanation, it is generally agreed that 
Montcalm would use the Fort William Henry massacre to challenge Vaudreuil’s way of 
conducting the war. Montcalm would hold back precious supplies for his own forces at the 
expense of the Indians. Once the word got out that he would prevent plunder, captive and 
scalp taking while also withholding shot, powder and food, the Indians went home and 
stayed home for the most part. To aggravate the situation, an outbreak of small pox in 
French camps scared other Indians back to their homes as well. The western Indians were 
now beginning to suspect the French were taking advantage of them. With the defection of 
so many of his Indian allies and so few French regulars, Montcalm did not feel that the 
southern edge of Lake George was conducive to being held for long, so he pulled back to 
the more defendable and supportable Fort Carillon on the southern end of Lake Champlain 
near the portage to Lake George. British adaptation to wilderness tactics and the arrival of 
more troops and material from Britain would change the course of the war, but the lack of 
Indians in the French service would also play its part.266  
The massacre marked a turning point in the Indian relations between the two great 
powers.267 It also sealed the fate of Lord Loudon, the competent logistician, but poor field 
commander. The Duke of Cumberland also resigned in controversy. William Pitt, a fierce 
critic of the previous prosecution of the war, became the Secretary of State for the Southern 
Department in London and took direct control for the war effort. On 30 December 1757, 
Pitt assigned Major General James Abercromby as head of forces in North America. 
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Almost as important as Abercromby was Pitt’s assumption of direct participation of the 
planning and strategy in the war in North America. Part of this participation was the 
assignment of Brigadier General John Forbes and Major General Jeffrey Amherst to 
specific campaigns. Pitt’s orders for 1758 were clear, Abercromby would take Carillon, 
Amherst would take Louisbourg and Forbes would take Fort Duquesne at the forks of the 
Ohio. They were to make use of all their capabilities, but action was the most important 
factor. 268 Lord Loudon’s genius for logistics had set the campaigns on a strong support 
footing and the increasing wilderness warfare skills of the Rangers and British regulars 
gave the British better intelligence and movement security.  
The Ohio Indians, after having cleared the frontier of most British settlers, were still 
accommodating French forces at Fort Duquesne, but the French trade goods were drying up 
due to the effectiveness of the British Navy’s operations in the Atlantic. Several years of 
continual fighting meant the Indians were too dependent on the weakening French position 
and they knew their dependence would eventually cost them. Therefore, an increasing 
interest arose amongst the Ohio Indians for some kind of settlement with the British in an 
effort to restore a balance of power. Forbes would welcome the tentative contact with the 
Delaware, Shawnee and Mingo of the Ohio. He knew his mission to take Fort Duquesne, 
with all the same difficulties that Braddock faced, would be made immeasurably easier by 
coming to some agreement with them, but he also needed direct Indian support. The 
Cherokee were still in search of support against the powerful Creek and Choctaw in the 
south and from Iroquois raiders to the north, so they agreed to support Forbes’ campaign. 
The Iroquois, who wanted to remain relevant to the balance of power in the Ohio region, 
were alarmed by the changes and the direction of the war in the Ohio country. Forbes’ 
tenacity and insight into the strategic importance of the Ohio Indians, specifically, would 
have serious implications for the Iroquois and for Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the 
North, Sir William Johnson. Abercromby would get some help in his campaign on Fort 
Carillon from the Iroquois and Johnson, but it was not decisive and it had taken much 
browbeating by Johnson to obtain it. This may well have precipitated Abercromby granting 
Forbes permission to deal with the Ohio Indians directly. The lack of enthusiastic Iroquois 
support for the British since 1755 meant that both the Iroquois and Johnson were losing 
influence with the British leaders. However, even though the British could not secure 
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widespread and active Indian alliances, the lack of French trade goods and support meant 
British strength was growing in North America.269 
The 1758 campaigning season kicked off in June and July with Amherst securing 
Louisbourg with an amphibious landing and a long siege with the assistance of Major-
General James Wolfe. Geographically, Louisbourg falls outside the remit of this thesis. 
However, it is important to note that Amherst denied the honours of war to the defenders, 
despite an honourable defence. The massacre of Fort William Henry was fresh in the minds 
of Amherst, Wolfe and their men. French forces were taken prisoner, the civilians deported 
to France, and the Micmac and Abenaki Indians present were hunted down, killed and 
scalped by the Massachusetts Rangers. Amherst, as mentioned previously, was already 
hardening his feelings against the Indians. Wolfe, who was new to North America, was 
following suit, saying of the French allied Indians, ‘We cut them to pieces wherever we 
found them, in return for a thousand acts of cruelty and barbarity’.270 
Further south, Abercromby was not faring as well. Although not as well supported by 
Indians as he had been previously, Montcalm was making the most of his position outside 
of Fort Carillon by entrenching fortified lines and building an enormous, interlocking set of 
abatis. Abercromby used his Iroquois to scout ahead of his force and thereby avoided being 
surprised, but their late arrival had meant that he did not have the kind of intelligence that 
comes only from regular patrolling. By denying Abercromby accurate intelligence, in part 
by still using his small Indian force to patrol to his front, Montcalm was able to trick 
Abercromby into thinking he had twice the force he actually had and was not complete in 
his preparation of his static defences. Abercromby attacked without bombarding 
Montcalm’s position and did not take advantage of the nearby high ground. The French 
defended admirably and the British attacked valiantly in a battle that could have easily been 
recreated in Europe and conducted by European standards. Unfortunately for Abercromby, 
the attack failed and he lost 2,500 killed or wounded. Although Rangers and Indians were 
conducting reconnaissance for him, Abercromby, like the British leaders before him, still 
did not have the advantage of large scale and long term Indian patrolling and the 
intelligence that resulted from those patrols. For Montcalm’s part, he felt vindicated in not 
using Indians as heavily as he had in the past, but he still lost 750 killed, wounded or 
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captured. He hoped to continue the war in this European manner, in spite of his lack of 
French troops and Vaudreuil’s wishes. Feeling vindicated in their approach, aide-de-camp 
Bougainville exclaimed, ‘Now war is established here on the European basis. Projects for 
the campaign, for armies, for artillery, for sieges, for battles. It no longer is a matter of 
making a raid, but of conquering or being conquered. What a revolution!’271 
Montcalm and Bougainville were to finally prosecute the war they wanted, but were soon 
to face the consequences of the war Vaudreuil wanted. 
Abercromby, who had not yet learned of the eventual success of Amherst at 
Louisbourg, was devastated and knew that Pitt would not accept such losses without a 
renewed initiative. Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet, who had been the backbone of 
Loudon’s logistical improvements and commander of a force of incredibly resourceful 
bateaux men, proposed a secret mission to disrupt the French supply line to the Ohio. Not 
considering it likely to succeed, but at a loss as to what action to take next, Abercromby 
agreed. Sir William Johnson, under pressure to deliver anything from the Iroquois, 
managed to provide seventy Iroquois to support Bradstreet through the Iroquois lands under 
the guise of simply re-building Fort Bull and the portage nearby. Once at Fort Bull, 
Bradstreet declared his real plan to invest and capture Fort Frontenac on the north shore of 
Lake Ontario. It was to be a daring raid that would surely fail if the French leadership 
learned of it soon enough. One half of the Iroquois decided it was not to their liking and 
stayed behind. Bradstreet promised the right of first plunder to keep the other half.272 The 
French would learn of the expedition through the Iroquois, but not with enough time to take 
action. Bradstreet covered the distance to the former Fort Oswego quickly and set sail 
across Lake Ontario with a force of 3,100 made up largely of militia, a few regulars, and 
the remaining Iroquois. He found a lightly defended Fort Frontenac at the source of the St. 
Lawrence and laid siege to it on 26 August 1758. By 28 August, the French commander 
had had enough and surrendered his 110 soldiers and the civilians present. The fort was a 
veritable treasure trove of war material and trade goods destined for the French and Indians 
of the Ohio country. Bradstreet and his Indian allies took what they could with them and set 
fire to the rest. French operations in the midwest would never fully recover.273 Bradstreet 
kept his promise of plunder to his Iroquois, but also kept them in control to prevent atrocity 
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against the small military force, but larger civilian contingent. Bradstreet had seemingly 
managed the required secrecy and perfect ratio of Indian allies to militia and regulars. 
There were enough local Indians to navigate through their lands, but too few to overwhelm 
a chaos-filled fort capitulation. The Iroquois may have resented the lack of prisoners and 
scalps, but they had gained valuable goods and helped restore some of their credibility with 
the British. They would build upon that in the following twelve months.274 Even 
Bougainville was impressed with the control with which Bradstreet conducted the 
Frontenac expedition.275 
Further south, Forbes was trudging his forces through the Pennsylvania wilderness 
toward Fort Duquesne. In May, 700 Cherokee, recruited by the southern colonies for his 
use descended upon his camp, but he was not ready to use them. Forbes was trying to avoid 
the mistakes Braddock had made. He was moving deliberately while also beginning 
deliberations with the eastern Delaware who were in contact with the western Delaware, 
Shawnee and Mingo around Fort Duquesne. Forbes, like most British officers, wanted to 
maintain control of his allies, so he used the Cherokee sparingly by pairing them with 
Rangers and attaching British volunteers to their patrols. He had some success with this 
method, but he could not make use of the bulk of the Cherokee at his disposal. The 
Cherokee, like most Indians, wanted to either be on patrol for booty, prisoners and scalps or 
heading home to hunt and secure their homes. The standoff lasted for about a month when 
some Cherokee warriors began to leave in a very bad mood. Forbes, ill advisedly, detained 
some of the Cherokee and their leaders, including the influential Attakullakulla (Little 
Carpenter). The situation got worse and Forbes realised the diplomatic error and released 
his detainees and tried to make amends with gifts and promises of more. However, it was 
too late. By July, 500 Cherokee had left and the remainder would drift away in smaller 
groups throughout the rest of the summer. In this case, Forbes experienced much the same 
problem that Bougainville and Montcalm had complained of before the assault on Fort 
William Henry of too many Indian allies and too soon for the mission. The one saving 
grace was that they had not precipitated a massacre before leaving. They would, however, 
cause themselves more problems than they bargained for on their way home. The Cherokee 
felt under-appreciated after they had volunteered in such large numbers. As they traveled 
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back through the Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina backcountry, some relieved 
local British inhabitants of horses and other plunder. The whites, of course, retaliated and 
deaths on both sides ensued. Eventually, the Cherokee situation would turn into a full-scale 
conflict itself that will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.276 
In mid-September 1758, one of Forbes’ advance parties under Major James Grant was 
stopped from taking Fort Duquesne by a large French and Indian force. Grant and his 
immediate superior and Forbes second in command, Colonel Henry Bouquet, had thought 
they might surprise Fort Duquesne with a quick assault. Although Grant was captured 
along with a third of his force killed or captured, crucially, most of the force survived and 
retreated in an orderly fashion. Although Forbes was irate at the poor decision-making by 
his commanders, the Indians saw Grant’s push as part of a renewed and far stronger 
offensive by the British. Adding to this, Bradstreet’s destruction of Frontenac had severely 
restricted French trade goods reaching the Ohio country. The Ohio Indians began to rethink 
their French alliance. Forbes managed to make contact with the Ohio Indians and initiate a 
diplomatic conversation. After months of tentative discussions, Forbes managed to sideline 
many of the local Ohio Indians from French service with the Easton Treaty in October 
1758. By the time the bulk of Forbes’ force was close to fort Duquesne, the Ohio Indians 
had deserted the French. The French commander blew up the fort and dispersed his forces 
and supplies across the midwest.277 
The Brigadier-General John Forbes expedition is one of the most interesting campaigns 
in this thesis. Three key players emerge from it in relation to how the Indians were used and 
addressed. Forbes himself saw the full range of Indian engagement. At first he wanted 
Indian allies to forestall a repeat of the Braddock campaign. The southern colonial 
governors delivered to him what they had failed to deliver to Braddock. Forbes took on a 
huge Cherokee force that came too early and was unruly in terms of his plans and timings 
repeating Montcalm’s difficulties. He lost those warriors through inflexibility and 
diplomatic blunders. He fought with Sir William Johnson over the recruitment and 
influence of the Iroquois in the Ohio and southern regions. He had to negotiate a diplomatic 
minefield to reduce the power of the Ohio tribes allied with the French arrayed against him. 
He had to maintain provincial forces while also confronting the competing land interests of 
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the colonies. Through Major James Grant, Forbes almost lost a significant part of his force 
within miles of Fort Duquesne just like Braddock had. Grant would learn from these 
lessons and lead a successful campaign against the Cherokee in 1761, discussed in the next 
chapter. Forbes’ second in command, Colonel Henry Bouquet would later be the most 
eloquent writer on Indian tactics and played an important role in breaking the siege of Fort 
Pitt (Duquesne) in Pontiac’s rebellion, also discussed in the next chapter.278 Within the 
Forbes expedition, a way of dealing with the Indians of the midwest emerged. 
Unfortunately, these hard earned lessons would not be capitalised upon.  
Dying from a long illness in early 1759, Forbes would not live long enough to pass on 
his hard won wisdom in his dealings with the Indians in future campaigns, but he did write 
impassioned letters to Amherst about the Indians. Amherst was appointed to replace 
Abercromby in 1759 as commander of the British Army in North America. In an incredibly 
prescient voice, Forbes pleaded with Amherst to try to understand the strength of the Ohio 
Indians and their views of what was happening to their land. Forbes thought that the 
commercial interests of Virginia and Pennsylvania, as well as the personal interests of Sir 
William Johnson, were perverting the interest of the larger interest of the imperial project. 
In 1759, Forbes clearly saw the potential for the future Indian uprisings from 1759 through 
1764. The wildly successful campaign seasons of 1759 and 1760 against the French forces 
and Canadian cities would lull Amherst and others into thinking that the Indians and the 
French were one and the same in the French defeat. Forbes knew better, but would not be 
alive to counsel them further. One can only imagine how the British Army’s approach to 
dealing with the Indians over the next fifty-seven years might have improved had Forbes 
lived longer and commanded larger British forces.279 
From late 1756 to the end of 1758, British officers struggled with how to deal with 
Indian warriors and wilderness warfare. If one wanted to control one’s Indian allies, merely 
having them was not always the answer, as witnessed by Montcalm in 1757 and Forbes in 
1758, especially when the Indians arrived in great numbers. Indians were needed at specific 
times in varying numbers and for specific missions. However, though the Indians could 
endure extreme hardship, they seemingly would not entertain the discipline of a European 
Army in the field or boredom of Army camp life. The one way that Indians seemed most 
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effective was when they were provisioned abundantly and given wide-ranging latitude to 
conduct war as they saw fit. This was a strategy that Vaudreuil and Rigaud favoured, but 
Montcalm looked down upon.280 The strategy was employed by the southern colonies in 
sending out Rangers with small groups of Cherokee and Catawba warriors into the 
backcountry in 1756-57, but these patrols were not under the control of British Army 
officers.281 Even if the British Army officers were tempted by this strategy, and there is 
little evidence that they were, it was not an alternative for them due to the lack of any kind 
of substantial Indian support. If they had to be employed within a larger force, it seems it 
was best to use them in small groups in a reconnaissance war where their skills were 
deployed to the maximum benefit and their freedom of maneuvre was maintained. At other 
times it was more advantageous to deny them to one’s enemy, rather than have them serve 
directly as Forbes did in denying the French the help of the local Ohio Indians in 1758. 
The British Army had certainly improved since the performance of Braddock but it 
was not a linear progression nor was it entirely consistent. Between the Monongahela and 
the end of the 1758, the British improved its alliances with the Indians, improved its use of 
Rangers, and it improved its own military to adapt to the conditions. Although the British 
Army was improving against the French, it is questionable whether or not it was improving 
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‘There is no doubt that we are a very cruel people.’ 
-- Winston Churchill282 
5. The Undefeated 
Although 1758 had ended with Bradstreet effectively using and controlling a few 
Indians in his Fort Frontenac campaign and Forbes working through a way to effectively 
sideline the Indians from the calculation on Fort Duquesne, Pitt was still not happy with 
Abercromby. Pitt named Jeffrey Amherst commander of British forces in North America 
and charged him with an aggressive campaign season to strip the French of their power in 
North America. Amherst would launch the most ambitious campaign season yet in 1759 
that started with him immediately asking Sir William Johnson and Edmund Atkin to raise 
as many Indians as possible for the upcoming campaigns to ‘act with His Majesty’s 
Forces’.283 There would be a strong thrust up the New York lakes corridor to remove the 
thorns of Forts Carillon (renamed Ticonderoga) and St. Frederic (renamed Crown Point) 
led by Amherst himself. There would also be an amphibious assault on Quebec by an 
independent command led by Major General James Wolfe. Fort Niagara was to be attacked 
to further degrade the French influence and supply lines into the midwest. For Britain, 1759 
would come to be known as ‘Annus Mirabulus’ for victories in all of these campaigns and 
more at sea, in Europe, the west Indies and India.  
Indian allies would figure into some of these actions, but for the most part, they found 
they had waited a little too long in each case to be considered decisive. The year 1759 
would also be the year that the Indians began to recognize that they might have 
diplomatically over-played their hands against the British. Amidst this year of flux, the 
Iroquois tried to regain their value to the British to influence the Ohio country, the 
Delaware and Shawnee tried to cement their control of the Ohio, and the Cherokee tried to 
form an alliance with anyone who would help them resist the encroachments of South 
Carolinian settlers and challenges to their free travel in the Appalachian backcountry. As 
discussed earlier, Amherst already had a low opinion of the Indians, even the domesticated 
Stockbridge Indians, and strove not to use them. 284 The depredations of the backcountry 
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and the massacres at Oswego and William Henry were still fresh in the minds of the British 
Army and Americans. Amherst and Wolfe had served together at Louisbourg the previous 
year where British Rangers were allowed some discretion in taking revenge for these acts. 
By 1759, the British Army seemed to be led by men who were fed up with inaction and 
began to deploy the frontier way of warfare where required with Indians, Rangers and 
British regulars. The ethical considerations of military honour may have influenced the way 
the British Army conducted itself from 1755-1758. By 1759, however, victory supplanted 
all other considerations. To cap off 1759, Amherst would express this new ethos by 
unleashing the Rangers on a raid on the Abenaki village of St. Francis. The results of this 
raid were as horrific as anything that had happened to date. 
During the winter of 1758-59, the Seneca, the western-most of the five Iroquois tribes 
and previously the most French friendly, began to agitate for taking Fort Niagara from the 
French. Niagara was on the eastern side of the mouth of the Niagara River into Lake 
Ontario and provided the key point for goods into and out of the Ohio country. The Seneca 
could see how the Ohio Indians had withdrawn their support for the French at Fort 
Duquesne and feared ending up on the wrong end of the changing diplomatic scene. 
Needing no coaxing, Sir William Johnson jumped at the opening and presented the 
opportunity to Amherst. Amherst seized the opportunity and appointed Brigadier General 
John Prideaux to lead the expedition to rebuild Oswego and onward to take Niagara. The 
expedition would have probably occurred in the summer of 1759 anyway, but the addition 
of 1,000 Iroquois to his force meant he could rebuild Oswego whilst continuing onto 
Niagara before the French commander at Niagara had time to call forces back from their 
planned attempt to retake Fort Duquesne (Pitt). 285 
As Prideaux’s force approached Fort Niagara on 10 July 1759, they found that there 
were approximately 100 Seneca present at the fort who were surprised to find nearly 1,000 
of their Iroquois kinsmen with Prideaux. The French commander of Niagara, Captain Pierre 
Pouchot, was also surprised and immediately sent a messenger to Fort Machault, in western 
Pennsylvania, requesting a relief force to augment his 500 troops at Niagara. The leader of 
the French aligned Seneca, Kaendae, asked Pouchot to allow him to treat with Prideaux’s 
Iroquois. Seeing not much in the way of alternatives, Pouchot agreed in order to buy 
himself some time. Kaendae almost convinced Johnson’s Iroquois to abandon their plans to 
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help the British. However, the alert Johnson understood the danger and managed to avert 
the disaster by asking Prideaux to grant the Iroquois the right of first plunder when the fort 
fell. Understanding the precarious nature of the situation, Prideaux acceded to the plan. 
This was no minor issue as the Iroquois made up almost thirty-percent of his force. 
However, Prideaux had to know that with this number of Indians, it would be hard to 
control the bloodbath that was likely to occur when the walls of the fort fell. Prideaux 
might have known that the promise of first plunder had worked for Bradstreet at Frontenac, 
but Bradstreet had only 1/20th of the Indians and Frontenac was not Niagara. Niagara was a 
European style fortress that might well withstand a siege for weeks, enraging his Iroquois if 
they took too many casualties. This is the first sign of a senior British officer acquiescing 
under pressure to Iroquois demands and being willing to risk a Fort William Henry type 
massacre to gain a decisive edge in battle. Kaendae took his 100 Indians and retired to an 
area south of Niagara called La Belle Famille to avoid an Iroquois feud.286 
By 14 July, the British had begun the siege. On 20 July, Prideaux was accidentally 
killed by one of his own mortars. Johnson assumed command, but with the competent help 
of Lieutenant Colonel Eyre Massey. On 23 July, the relief force from Fort Machault arrived 
near La Belle Famille. It was led by Le Marchand de Lignery, Francois-Marie (Lignery) 
who had recently decamped from Fort Duquesne and was planning a return to the forks of 
the Ohio. Massey rushed to the area and set up a blocking position.287 Approximately one-
half of Johnson’s Iroquois set up nearby in a wood. More importantly, Johnson had sent 
word to Lignery’s Indians that they should sit the battle out. It worked and Lignery ended 
up attacking the British with just his regulars and militia. After the defection of the Ohio 
Indians prior to Forbes arrival at Duquesne, Lignery was again on the receiving end of the 
changing diplomatic landscape. The French force was repulsed with severe casualties and 
the fleeing survivors were hunted down by the Iroquois in the woods.288 
At Fort Niagara, Pouchot’s relief at the Fort Machault force’s arrival ebbed into despair 
as he realised it had failed. The British sent a surrender offer and he accepted on 25 July. 
Johnson’s Iroquois did not fall upon the surrendering French, as Johnson, Massey and 
Pouchot might have feared. It is possible that the scalps and captives from the battle near 
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La Belle Famille had satisfied them, along with the copious amount of goods they 
plundered at the fort. It is also possible that they were seeing the balance of power in the 
area decisively shifting towards the British. They may have understood that it would be 
better for their homeland and their influence in the Ohio to heed British requests to act in 
the British interest. Whatever the reason or combination of reasons, the British had 
conducted their second siege on a French fort within a year where they had managed to 
avoid an atrocity at the hands of their allied Indians. It stood in direct comparison to 
Montcalm’s inability to do the same.  
The loss of Fort Niagara was even more damaging to the French than the loss of Forts 
Frontenac and Duquesne in 1758. With the loss of Niagara, it was inconceivable that the 
French could support the Ohio or Great Lakes Indians effectively, nor could they 
orchestrate the kind of raiding that they had encouraged on the British frontier. The British 
Army controlled access to Lake Ontario and the British Navy largely controlled access to 
the St Lawrence. For all intents and purposes the French empire in Canada now began at 
Quebec ended slightly above Montreal. Furthermore, the French were beginning to realise 
that their long-standing Indian allies were no longer dependable.289  
The Iroquois were not only active on Lake Ontario, but had also visited Fort Duquesne 
to tell the British commander there to watch out for the Delaware’s intentions in the area. 
The Seneca who were very close to the Delaware had begun to see the emergence of a 
stronger and more viral form of independence based around a revival of Delaware 
traditions. This emergence of strength in the Ohio worried the Iroquois as it undermined 
their claim of suzerainty over the area. The Delaware with the support of the Shawnees, 
Mingoes and other tribes in the Ohio had turned against the French when the Treaty of 
Easton seemed to promise them freedom from further British encroachments. However, the 
capture and subsequent buildup of Fort Pitt (Duquesne) came with an ever more forceful 
British influence. The Iroquois had been able to secure their land in western New York by 
balancing European powers against each other. Part of that balance of power had been their 
ability to convince the Europeans that they actually controlled the Ohio. Delaware and 
Shawnee independence was starting to erode that diplomatic fiction. These machinations 
amongst the Indians went largely unnoticed by the British at the time. Forbes probably 
understood it best, but he had died in Philadelphia in March of 1759. Johnson may have 
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had an inkling of the turning of the midwestern tribes into a more cohesive alliance, but he 
was only really concerned about the Mohawks and his own well-being. Amherst and Wolfe 
were too concerned with their own campaigns to spend any time thinking about the trouble 
brewing in the Ohio while they were focused on the French in Quebec and Montreal. 
However, the French were not all-knowing either. Bougainville still believed the Iroquois 
were largely neutral and the Delaware were still happy to be considered ‘nephews’ to the 
Iroquois as late as the winter of 1759. 290The Indians of the North American midwest were 
giving signals to both the French and the British that favouring one side or the other or 
remaining neutral was a strategy for their best interests, not those of Britain or France. 
Britain and France were just too self-involved to notice. 
Simultaneous to the Fort Niagara campaign, Amherst moved cautiously north toward 
Ticonderoga. Amherst, probably out of preference, had no Indian allies to speak of in this 
campaign. Amherst had become more comfortable with his Rangers. Rangers came with 
their own problems of high cost and low discipline, but they were increasingly effective in 
securing British lines and obtaining intelligence on the French and their allied Indian’s 
movements. They also knew their way around the North American landscape, especially 
the lakes corridor. British Army Officers were often exasperated by their lack of decorum 
and adherence to military bearing, but knew their value on the march and on the screen line. 
They might be ill-disciplined and expensive, but they largely followed orders and could be 
depended upon to stay through a campaign. On 26 July, the day after Fort Niagara fell 
(unbeknownst yet to Amherst); the French commander of Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) 
Brigadier General Francois-Charles de Bourlamaque blew up the powder magazine and 
retreated north to Fort St. Frederic (Crown Point). Amherst sent his Rangers forward to 
track the French preparations St Fredric, but Bourlamaque had already blown it up as well. 
Amherst had gained control of the southern half of the lakes corridor with little effort and 
little need for Indian allies. Amherst received word of Niagara’s capitulation and the 
destruction of Lignery’s relief force at about the same time. Amherst seemed little 
concerned about the Iroquois’ actions at Niagara, but was worried about Wolfe’s assault on 
Quebec of which he had heard little since early July. This lack of information from Wolfe 
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led Amherst to be suspicious about French strategy above Crown Point. Amherst decided 
on a slower approach to Montreal until he heard more from the siege of Quebec.291 
Wolfe and his force had arrived at Quebec on 25 June and began his siege. However, 
Quebec was a far more formidable objective than anything else the British had tried to take 
from the French in North America. Duquesne was remote, Niagara formidable and 
Frontenac protected by water, but, surrounded by soaring cliffs, Quebec required a 
European style siege combined with a treacherous amphibious landing. Wolfe and his three 
Brigadier Generals, Robert Monckton, George Townshend, and James Murray were all 
experienced in modern European sieges. They were also somewhat experienced in partisan 
warfare from Flanders to Germany to Scotland.292 Wolfe had hoped that the Canadian 
population around Quebec would realise that French rule was inevitably doomed and turn 
favourably towards the British. He was to be rudely disabused of that notion as Montcalm 
had issued orders to a sympathetic public that they were to resist at every opportunity. 
Wolfe found himself harried by Canadian militia and French allied Indians throughout July 
and August. Montcalm, who had won the argument with Vaudreuil about how Canada was 
to be defended, kept his most disciplined regulars and Troupes de la Marines close to him 
and ready to defend Quebec in a close siege. He felt he had a strong position that was still 
well supplied from the west and even if he failed, it would be an honourable defence.293 
As the summer slipped away with little to show for it, Wolfe became desperate to find 
a way to engage Montcalm’s conventional forces. The sporadic and increasingly ruthless 
fighting around Quebec was keeping the French hopeful that they could last until winter 
when it would be difficult for Wolfe to maintain the siege. All of Wolfe’s brigadiers were 
turning against him in disgust for the way he was allowing the destruction of the civilian 
population that he was trying to terrorise into supporting the British. Wolfe admitted that it 
was ‘War of the worst shape’. Deathly sick from fever and fearing his chance of glory was 
passing him by, Wolfe sent out one of the most famous orders relevant to this thesis. ‘The 
Genl. strickly (sic) forbids the inhuman practice of scalping, except when the enemy are 
Indians, or Canads. dressed like Indians’. It is important to note that this was not an 
instruction to stop the brutalities and scalping altogether, but to only commit them against 
Indians and those dressed like Indians. As can be imagined, this instruction left wide 
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latitude for defining what constituted ‘dressed like an Indian’. For the first time since the 
British Army’s large-scale entry into North America, atrocities attributed to the British 
Army were wide-spread, including murder of women and children and scalping by Rangers 
and regulars alike. Wolfe admitted the wholesale destruction of the countryside to Pitt in a 
letter of 2 September 1759. It is telling that the portion that described the destruction and 
the reasons for it was deleted from the version that was published in the British press. 
Wolfe had provided two reasons for the savagery. First and foremost, Wolfe was trying to 
outrage Montcalm into an open battle. Second, Wolfe used the same reasoning he and 
Amherst had used at Louisbourg the year before; that it was revenge for the actions taken 
on the frontier.294 
It would be easy to attribute this second reason to any number of officers that had 
served in the interior of North America. Men like Gage, who had been at the Monongahela 
and in Ranger parties along the lakes corridor, Bouquet, or Rogers who had seen the severe 
consequences of Indian warfare could have used this reason with far more force than 
Wolfe. However, although an experienced soldier, Wolfe had only seen North American 
warfare at Louisbourg and Quebec. Wolfe was channeling what other officers had told him 
of combat on the frontier, what he heard his soldiers complain of (the majority of which 
were British regulars and new to North American warfare), and possibly, the sensational 
articles that had appeared in the British press. It is possible that Wolfe used the second 
reason as a qualifying reason for his real reason that he had to bring Montcalm to battle to 
avoid his expedition being deemed a failure. If this was the case, Wolfe’s need for glory 
harkened back to an earlier form of military honour where the search for glory could 
overcome other elements of honour. Seemingly, Wolfe would rather be known as a General 
who deployed brutalities on civilians than as the losing General in a battle for Empire. This 
is critical to understanding British Army officers’ intentions. When they could win without 
Indian assistance or frontier tactics, they would forego them and claim the moral high 
ground. Throughout the time-frame of 1755-1815, British Army officers began conflicts 
with the highest principles, mainly because they looked down on the capabilities of their 
foes, whether Indian, French, or American. When winning was essential and uncertain, the 
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standard of conduct was lowered. When they needed to use the Indians or their mode of 
warfare, they would begin using justification for their actions. One of the most common 
was retribution for Indian and French actions on the frontier. 
Although Wolfe could not tempt Montcalm out of his fortress to save the civilians of 
Quebec, his next action would. Gravely ill, convinced that he was dying, and fighting off a 
near mutiny from his Brigadiers, Wolfe went for broke and led an assault near the Quebec 
citadel along a small, steep track that led up to the Plains of Abraham. The action has gone 
down in history as one of the boldest amphibious landings of all time. The chance of failure 
was high, but Wolfe’s preoccupation with glory led him to risk his army to gain his victory. 
This gambit paid off as Montcalm came out of Quebec to meet Wolfe. Wolfe’s force 
displayed the superiority over the ragged French army that Wolfe knew he had. Both Wolfe 
and Montcalm would die in the battle, but the glory that Wolfe sought above everything 
else in life would be secured in his death and declaration of him as a hero of the Empire. On 
17 September 1759, Quebec capitulated.295 
Amherst received word of the fall of Quebec and Wolfe’s death on 18 October 1759. It 
was too late for Amherst to consider taking Montreal in 1759, so he decided to consolidate 
at Crown Point for the winter. He assumed Vaudreuil would pull back to reinforce 
Montreal, but he wanted to keep the pressure on the French.296 Without Indian Allies, 
Amherst had increasingly relied on his Rangers to pull in the information that he needed to 
plan the final push on Canada. The Rangers were experts in woodcraft and were capable of 
super human feats of endurance, but they were also expensive compared to regulars and 
quite often insubordinate to anyone other than their own Ranger officers. From 1756-1758, 
the British had tried to use the Rangers to train British troops their skills and to use these 
troops in support of larger, more conventional forces. Colonel Thomas Gage had worked 
with the Rangers regularly and had become sure that he could replicate their success. He 
created the 80th Regiment under the approval of Lord Loudon. This force was trained by 
Robert Rogers, the pre-eminent Ranger leader in the Colonial Northeast. However, the need 
for Ranger skills by the British Army was not easily remedied by merely training its troops 
to operate only as Rangers. Once they had made their way through the wilderness, fought 
off ambushes, and arrived at their objective, they often had to re-form as European 
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conventional forces to fight a force of French regulars. Therefore, the British Army had to 
transform itself somewhat, but not completely. The task was no easy one. The Redcoat had 
to be taught to move and think independently on a screen line or patrol, but revert to being 
an automaton in formation when ranked on a pitched battlefield.297 With these difficulties, 
it was not surprising that Rogers’ and other Ranger units were still in heavy use at the end 
of the decade. 
By early September, Amherst was still largely ignorant of Wolfe’s position and was 
still nervous of the progress there. In August, Amherst had sent a small party to deliver 
orders and receive word on Wolfe’s progress. This party had been captured by French 
allied Abenaki warriors from St. Francis on the St Lawrence in between Montreal and 
Quebec and rumour had it that they had been roughly treated. The notification of their 
capture that came under a flag of truce from Montcalm seemed to rattle Amherst 
excessively. Angry at his own caution, the lateness of the season, and ignorance of Wolfe’s 
situation, Amherst broke with his cautious use of Rangers close to his formations. He 
determined that he had to have more information and that he needed to strike a blow against 
the French of his own, even if he could not risk moving on Montreal yet. Robert Rogers 
had presented Amherst with a plan months earlier that detailed a way to discourage 
Montcalm’s allies. Rogers wanted to make the French allied Indians, namely the fierce 
Abenaki who had terrorised the northeastern frontier for years, feel the insecurity that the 
British frontier settlers had known. Amherst had not been convinced previously, but much 
like Abercromby the year before, Amherst feared the war was not going his way. He 
needed a way to declare a substantial success in thwarting the French initiative. Amherst 
gave Rogers the authorisation to conduct a raid on the Abenaki settlement of St. Francis. 
Amherst, who had little time for Indians or their ways of warfare, was still trying to appear 
to be acting honourably, but he wanted some level of revenge. Amherst gave his orders to 
attack St. Francis, but with the following rider, ‘don’t forget that tho’ those villains have 
dastardly and promiscuously murdered the women or children of all ages, it is my orders 
that no women and children are killed or hurt.’298 
Amherst may well have meant what he told Rogers not to do to women and children, 
but he was not naive either. He had been around the frontier since 1756 and knew that, once 
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launched, raids such as Rogers’ did not stand on the laws of war when push came to shove. 
Amherst had heard the reports of prisoners killed when the lives of the Rangers were in 
peril. He knew the ferocity with which the lakes reconnaissance wars were fought. Amherst 
was trying to change the strategic calculation as his original plan of taking Quebec and 
Montreal was becoming more uncertain. To accomplish this, he was permitting his cultural 
norms to change slightly in terms of taking vengeance, but qualifying the action by making 
a clear statement of his intent that no women and children were to be hurt. Amherst may 
have hoped for no bloodshed of innocents, but he knew attacking an unsuspecting village 
would inevitably cause the deaths of women, elderly and children. On 13 September 1759, 
Rogers’ force of two hundred left Crown Point in route to St. Francis. After an incredibly 
arduous march, Rogers fell upon St. Francis in the early morning of 4 October, killing 
many in their sleep and burning the town. Rogers did take some prisoners with him, but 
many others died in the conflagration, including women, children and elderly.299 The raid 
was not successful in killing many Abenaki warriors, who were not present in large 
numbers, but it did send a message to the French allied Indians that they were no longer 
safe from the British. One can only speculate as to whether Amherst would have launched 
the St. Francis raid if he had known that the British had taken Quebec, but undoubtedly a 
corner had been turned. When Amherst was faced with failure, real or imagined, he was 
willing to employ rhetoric and designations to justify actions deemed previously 
unacceptable. Whether surprised by the fact or not, Amherst held fast to the belief that 
Rogers’ force did not kill women and children when presented this fact by a captured 
Frenchman.300 
With Quebec, Niagara, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point in British hands and St. Francis 
chastised, Amherst could have allowed himself to feel somewhat satisfied with his first 
campaign season as Commander-in-Chief. However, things were not perfect. Montreal had 
not been threatened by Thomas Gage coming down the St. Lawrence from Niagara as 
Amherst had wished. Amherst would need to plan a full-blown campaign in 1760 to 
dislodge the French from Montreal. To add to his problems, the Cherokee in the south were 
attacking frontier settlements and stopping the South Carolina militia cold in their tracks. 
Governor Lyttleton requested a regular force to put down the rebellion against the recent 
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allies of John Forbes. Less known to Amherst, but far more serious was that the Seneca 
living nearest the Ohio region were busy floating a plan to other tribes to attack the British 
around the Great Lakes and Ohio. Even though this plan was not taken up, the seeds of 
discontent had been sown. Amherst’s hatred of the Indians grew with these events. Amherst 
determined to end the war with the French and all of the Indians in 1760. 
In the Spring, Amherst sent Archibald Montgomery to quell the troubles in South 
Carolina. Montgomery took 1,300 of his own Highlanders and Royal Scots, a small force of 
Mohawk and Stockbridge Indians, and fifty Catawba warriors into the Lower Cherokee 
towns. Amherst made clear to Montgomery what his mission was to be, 
I am not in the least doubt but you will effectually protect the Colony 
and punish the Indians for this infamous breach of the peace they had 
so lately made, in such a manner that His Majesty’s subjects may 
hereafter enjoy their possessions without any dread of those 
barbarous and inhumane savages.301  
And  
act against them offensively by destroying their towns and cutting up 
their settlements (as shall occur best to you for the future protections 
of the Colony, the lives and properties of the subjects, and the present 
punishment of those barbarian savages for their inhuman acts of 
cruelty).302 
Amherst issued these orders with none of the caveats that he had given Rogers on the St. 
Francis raid, although he might have assumed that Montgomery and he shared an 
understanding that he had to make explicit to Rogers. There is also no discussion of 
whether to use the Catawba Indians or how they were to be employed or controlled. The 
message is clear. This was to be a punishment and Montgomery was to destroy Cherokee 
livelihoods to keep the situation from arising again, at least until the French could be forced 
to totally capitulate. There was no need to instruct Montgomery about how to control his 
Indian allies, because the British troops were to destroy the Cherokee towns with little 
restraint. Far from the previous British position of treating the Indian nations and North 
American warfare as an extension of European norms, Amherst is speaking like a colonial. 
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To resemble a colonial governor, the only thing missing from Amherst’s instructions was a 
scalp bounty. These instructions follow the frontier ethic of causing such destruction that 
the enemy will think twice of attacking again. 
On 1 June, Montgomery marched into the lower towns. They fought running battles 
with the Cherokee and burned five villages. Montgomery’s report to Amherst on these 
attacks was reminiscent of Rogers St. Francis raid, ‘Some of them who had concealed 
themselves were burnt in the town, which we left in ashes’. However, Montgomery’s 
destruction did not stop with one village. He states further, ‘and then proceeded to their 
other towns which all shared the same fate’. As for non-combatants, Montgomery reported 
‘a good many women and children were made prisoners, some could not be saved’.303 The 
British stopped to parley, but the Cherokee were unresponsive. On 24 June, Montgomery 
headed for the middle towns, but was harassed the whole way by the Cherokee. He stopped 
on 27 June after taking Etchoe, the leading middle town, but encountered stiff resistance. 
The battle took its toll on both sides, but Montgomery realised that if he went further his 
casualties would only get more onerous on his logistical capabilities to transport them 
safely.304 By 1 July, Montgomery was back at Fort Prince George and preparing to leave 
the frontier. By the middle of August, Montgomery and his troops were sailing back to 
New York. Montgomery may have been just anxious to return to what he felt was the real 
battlefield of Canada or he may have thought that he really had chastised the Cherokee into 
submission. However, unbeknownst to him or Amherst at this point, Fort Loudoun, the 
colonial post in the Cherokee upper towns, had surrendered to the Cherokee on 7 August 
1760 after a rare Indian siege. The Cherokee headmen agreed the garrison could march out 
to safety with Cherokee escorts on 8 August 1760. However, by 10 August, in a situation 
eerily reminiscent of the massacre at Fort William Henry, the protective escorts had melted 
away and the colonial column was left exposed. A group of Cherokee attacked the column 
killing twenty-nine and taking 120 hostages. If Amherst and Montgomery felt that burning 
the lower towns would be enough to get the Cherokee to give up hostilities, they were 
plainly wrong. However, the Cherokee also seemed to hold the view that taking Fort 
Loudoun and repelling Montgomery’s force would convince the British of the same. Both 
sides seemed blind to the reasoning of the other in their actions.305 
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The Cherokee concerns were very specific to their land and their security. Being 
insulted at new white settlements in their lands and having their lower settlements 
destroyed drove the Cherokee to revenge. However, what had made Amherst so aggravated 
with the Cherokee was that they were supposed to be British allies. First, in Amherst’s 
view, they showed themselves to be poor allies in Forbes’ march to Fort Duquesne. Second, 
they then caused trouble on the southern frontier. With the Montreal campaign on his mind, 
the need to send seasoned regulars to South Carolina to deal with the ‘perfidious savages’ 
was a distraction. Unknown to the Cherokee, they had committed the ultimate sin against 
Amherst. They risked Amherst’s reputation by forcing him to lower his odds of ending the 
war for Canada. Amherst’s descriptions of the Indians now took on a harsher tone with the 
uses of words like ‘inhuman’, ‘barbarians’, ‘perfidious’, ‘and inhumane.’306 Dr. Wayne Lee 
has made clear that these designations alone do not explain all situations where one side 
deems the other to be less than them culturally and deserving of the punishment. However, 
the instructions to Rogers in the St. Francis raid for vengeance and the instructions to 
Montgomery to punish the ‘perfidious’ ‘barbarians’ changed the cultural norms, because 
the calculation of what was required to win the war had changed. In other words, the British 
could not spare a huge force with the required logistical requirements in the mountainous 
terrain of South Carolina or into remote Indian villages of Canada. In Amherst’s view, the 
only way to handle the situation was to send a small force, but have them act so violently 
that the Cherokee would have no choice but to capitulate, or at least refrain from further 
attacks. Once this line was crossed, the use of Indians against certain opponents, including 
the French, became far more acceptable.  
While Montgomery was sent to deal with the Cherokee, Amherst engaged with what he 
viewed as his main work, to reduce French Canada to total surrender. Amherst’s plan to 
take Montreal involved a three-pronged attack. One would originate from British held 
Quebec up the St. Lawrence River. The second would originate from Crown Point on Lake 
Champlain from the south. Amherst would lead the third from Fort Oswego across Lake 
Ontario and down the St. Lawrence. As he was passing through Iroquois lands, Sir William 
Johnson enlisted 706 Iroquois warriors to join them on 23 July 1760. As large as this force 
was, it was not an overwhelming percentage of his 11,000 regulars. Amherst showed no 
reticence in using the Iroquois and deployed them with British officers and Rangers on 
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reconnaissance as his large force moved. Amherst did make a few veiled comments on his 
feelings about his allies in his journals. On 25 August, having taken a French island post 
upriver from Montreal, Amherst sent in some of his forces to take the surrender, but stated 
flatly, ‘I did not permit an Indian to go in’.307 On 4 September, after the surrender of the 
Isle of Perrot, Amherst reported that the residents ran and hid, but returned in small groups 
and ‘not a Soul was killed by our Savages’. 308Of course, he could only enforce this dictates 
by having many more forces than the Indians. These actions precipitated the Iroquois 
leaving in droves. By the time Amherst took Montreal, only a quarter of the Iroquois were 
still with him. However, the Iroquois’ real value was just being with Amherst in such large 
numbers in the march up to Montreal. As they passed through Indian villages that had 
traditionally supplied warriors to the French, the Iroquois spoke to the inhabitants and 
convinced them that the British were to inevitably win the war and it would behoove them 
to at least remain neutral in the coming siege of Montreal. On the French side, a conference 
had been called by the French commander of Montreal, Francois-Gaston, the Chevalier de 
Levis with the local Indians. Levis felt he had little chance against the British juggernaut, 
but thought that if he could just recruit a few hundred Indians, he might be able to hold out 
for another season. However, this was not to be as his conference was interrupted by an 
Indian messenger from up river who declared that the Indians were making their peace with 
Amherst and his Indian allies. The remaining Indians left immediately. Meanwhile, 
Amherst’s three prongs arrived almost simultaneously at Montreal. Levis had not much 
choice, but to surrender Montreal and advised Vaudreuil as such on 8 August 1760. 
Amherst denied the French the honours of war for having excited ‘the savages to perpetrate 
the most horrid and unheard of barbarities in the whole progress of the war’.309 A European 
officer to the end, Amherst left little doubt that the use of Indians and the type of warfare 
that resulted over the previous five years disgusted him. Even if, perhaps especially if, 
Amherst had begun to accept the use of Indians and Indian tactics himself, he was going to 
punish those that he felt had forced this decision on him and the British Army by denying 
them the European honours of war. Francis Jennings says much of Amherst’s vitriol 
towards the French was insincere. He said that the British and French both committed 
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atrocities with and without Indians; the French just did it more and were better at it. 310 On 
22 September 1760, Amherst ordered Johnson to outfit the remaining Indians as needed 
and send them home. Amherst may have felt that he had finally rid himself of Indian 
problems at last. 
However, by mid-November Amherst received news that Fort Loudoun had fallen. The 
news took Amherst to new levels of aggravation, because he would have to send more 
troops to the southern sector. Since he no longer had the problem of securing the 
capitulation of the French, Amherst’s language about the Indians could have softened, but it 
seemed to have hardened. In dispatching Montgomery’s second-in-command in the first 
Cherokee campaign, Lieutenant Colonel James Grant, to handle the Cherokee problem 
conclusively, Amherst stated of the Cherokee, 
... notwithstanding the most solemn engagements to protect the 
garrison [Fort Loudoun’s defenders], and to conduct them in safety to 
Ft. Prince George, they, on their march, inhumanely butchered the 
commanding officer with several others, dragging the remainder into 
captivity; & and all this whilst the barbarians were actually suing for 
peace... These repeated outrages ... calling aloud for the most 
exemplary vengeance.311 
Added to Amherst’s previous list of grievances are terms of butchery and accusations of 
bad faith in peace negotiations and failing to honour the rules of capitulation after the siege. 
Critically, although subtle to this analysis, is Amherst’s language in repeating his 
accusations of perfidy, barbarism, and inhumanity when his strategic calculation had 
changed. He no longer feared loss or delay of victory against France, but still believed the 
Cherokee deserved not only chastisement of the severest form, but ‘to reduce them to the 
absolute necessity of suing for pardon, & effectually to put them out of their power of 
interrupting the peace.’312 These directions indicate that Amherst now feels he is dealing 
with barbarians for certain and his instructions to decimate and deliver vengeance are 
justified, even if he now had the available force to conduct a more humane campaign. 
Grant arrived at Charleston on 6 Jan 1761 with Mohawk and Stockbridge scouts as part 
of his force although we know little of their missions. Grant, who had also served with 
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Forbes and Bouquet in their 1758 expedition with Cherokee warriors as allies as well as 
with Montgomery against the Cherokee in 1760, was wary of the small size of his force, the 
mountainous terrain and the remaining strength of the Cherokee. He took from January to 
mid-May to get to the lower towns. He was building and training his force that included 
Indians and militia and preparing his supply train. Simultaneously, he was sending out 
feelers to the more peaceable Cherokees led by Attakullakulla to try to reach a settlement 
before he had to march into the middle towns. This last effort was against Amherst’s 
orders, but Grant was convinced that the Cherokee could be brought around to save their 
homes. Far more than Amherst, Grant knew the magnitude of the venture. However, on 7 
June, he marched towards middle towns with a force of 2,800, including Catawba and 
Chickasaw warriors, but without any promise of bringing the Cherokee to peace. Grant’s 
Indian allies provided an invaluable service on the flanks in protecting his large column.313 
On 10 June, he met the Cherokee at Etchoe and fierce battle began. The Indians made a 
stand similar to the one against Montgomery a year earlier, but Grant’s force was larger and 
better prepared and provisioned. The fight was a draw, but eventually the Cherokee had to 
withdraw due to lack of ammunition. Over the next month, the Cherokee could only harass 
Grant while he proceeded to destroy all fifteen middle towns. As the British casualties and 
hardships grew and Grant could not force a decisive encounter with the Cherokee warriors, 
he seemed to have become enraged and took on a demeanour much closer to Amherst’s. 
Grant finally issued the order to ‘put every soul to death’ that was found in the middle 
towns. The devastation of the towns and all of the crops increased in ferocity.314 Among 
historians, there is some debate if this meant only warriors or also women, children and the 
elderly, but it is not denied that he gave the order to a force that would have been incredibly 
frustrated at the toil and guerilla harassment of their force. Regardless of its whole intent, 
Grant’s order ratcheted up the violence against the Indians not seen until this point. Grant’s 
Catawba and Chickasaw warriors scalped two old women as well as a few Cherokee they 
had captured, but not much more. In Rogers’ raid on St. Francis and Montgomery’s 
Cherokee campaign, the leaders at least tried not to harm non-combatants and prisoners. 
Fortunately, the order did not have a huge impact, because the towns and fields were all 
deserted, much to Grant’s frustration. Grant finally had to return to Fort Prince George due 
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to his troops’ destructive exhaustion, but the destruction of the middle towns had its 
intended effect. They had destroyed 800 houses and destroyed 1500 acres of crops and 
driven 5,000 refugees to the upper towns. Approximately one-third of the Cherokee had 
been killed by violence or disease since 1760. By August 1761, the Cherokee began to seek 
peace. 315 
With total French capitulation and the Cherokees under control, Amherst was eager to 
get British relations with the Indians onto a peacetime footing. All of his experience with 
Indians to date had led Amherst to a very dim view of their reliability as allies. Like many 
senior British officials, except possibly John Forbes and Sir William Johnson, Amherst did 
not really even consider any Indian tribe’s reasons for fighting, much less the various 
reasons for conflict each tribe had from Quebec to South Carolina. Amherst wanted the 
Indians and the whites to have limited contact and serve their King in the ways required by 
the Crown. Unlike the frontier settlers that Amherst and many British officers saw as little 
better than the Indians, Amherst did not seek to deprive the Indians of their lands. However, 
he did want to get trade and security in hand while also drastically reducing frontier costs to 
the incredibly stretched British finances. Amherst declared to Sir William Johnson that he 
wanted to stop the custom of gift giving and supplying more ammunition than was needed 
to hunt. Amherst’s goal was twofold. First, he wanted to wean the Indians off of British 
subsidies to encourage them to work to produce trade goods and support themselves. 
Second, keeping them busy with supplying goods and providing for themselves would also 
drastically reduce their time available to conduct treachery against the British.316 To prove 
his point that the Indians needed a firm hand from the British, Amherst took Grant’s 
violence on the Cherokee as his proof to Johnson that, ‘From this Example the Indians may 
be Convinced that We have it in our power to Reduce them to Reason, and You will 
accordingly make use of this’. 317With these actions, even in peace, Amherst was making 
clear that if the Indians did not like the new regime, they would suffer the same fate as the 
Cherokee.  
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By early 1762, the British Army in North America had finished its large-scale 
operations and was monitoring the course of the remainder of the war against France in 
Europe. Amherst felt he had the situation under control and Indian allies were not needed in 
Britain’s active service. Amherst did of course want to keep the Indians peaceful. However, 
the orders to severely restrict gift giving providing supplies of food, alcohol and 
ammunition were making it hard for those in British service to keep the Indians placated. 
Throughout 1762, the Indians began to send envoys between their communities extending 
war belts to those that would listen. The precipitation of this situation came from three 
main causes. First, the Indians of the Ohio Valley were becoming more suspicious that the 
British did have designs on their land. An influx of traders, hunters and settlers in the 
backwoods of Pennsylvania and Virginia looked to most Indians just like the dispossession 
the Delaware had seen in eastern Pennsylvania. Additionally, the army began 
reconditioning old forts and building new ones in the heart of the Ohio country. Second, the 
paucity of goods and supplies was seen by the Indians as a way of keeping them weak and 
subjugated. Finally, a series of ‘prophets’ had emerged, most notably a Delaware named 
Neolin, who advised the natives that they should reject the white man’s ways and return to 
their traditional way of life. Amherst seemed unconcerned at the intelligence he was 
sporadically receiving of the Indian threat. He seemed to genuinely believe that the Indians 
feared destruction by the British and had only to be reminded of British strength to be 
brought back into line. As if the preceding eight years had never happened, Amherst 
entered 1763, much like Braddock had in 1755, entirely dismissive of the Indians capability 
to defend the midwest.318 
By the summer of 1763, the Indian rebellion known as Pontiac’s War was underway. 
By the autumn, the Indians of many different midwestern tribes had taken all of the British 
forts west of Fort Pitt, except Detroit. The war would drag on for a year as the army put 
together relief expeditions to each of the forts, some of which ended in disaster. Others 
were successful, but at a high cost and were close run endeavours. The Indian sieges 
eventually ended, as they could not be held by warriors that needed to hunt and defend their 
own villages. The Indians were not successful in driving the British out of the midwest, but 
they did drive Amherst out of command in 1763 and the British authorities out of their 
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misapprehension that they could merely control the midwest by diktat. By mid-1764, there 
was an uneasy truce that slowly eased the tension. There are few battles or campaign 
particulars to discuss that are pertinent to this paper, except for the extremes Amherst was 
willing to go to stop the rebellion. British Army Officers distributed blankets from the 
small pox hospital to Indians who were besieging Fort Pitt in the summer of 1763. 
Although the action did not originate from Amherst’s direct orders, he did suggest it as a 
course of action subsequently; not knowing it had already been implemented. To Colonel 
Henry Bouquet, Amherst wrote ‘[y]ou will Do well to try to Innoculate the Indians by 
means of Blanketts, [sic] as well as to try Every other method that can serve to Extirpate 
this Execrable Race’. Small pox did indeed rage through the Ohio communities in 1763 – 
1764 and took a huge toll on Indian society for disease took out not only warriors, but the 
wise old chiefs and women.319 It did not extirpate the Indians, but that result was not from a 
lack of trying.  
For the next decade, Britain would make decisions about the Indians without really 
understanding if they wanted to be allied with the Indians. The Indians were subjects of the 
British King, but were they worthy of being considered British subjects, with all of the 
rights and responsibilities, by the British leadership? Much was written about war time 
service with and against the Indians. Some of it was written for titillation of base fears, but 
some of it was a serious attempt by individuals in the British Army who were trying to help 
the British leadership understand what they were dealing with. A treatise by Captain Gavin 
Cochrane stated,  
The Indians have one great advantage over us. They ly [sic] 
concealed, count our numbers, & see all of our movements, whilst it 
is impossible for us to know, very often, that any enemy is near; this 
enables them to attack us to the greatest advantage, if they think it 
convenient to do it; & we are ignorant to every thing relating to them. 
by making constant alarms, night, & day, they can fatigue our Troops 
beyond measure, & when we come not to mind them, attack us when 
we least expect it. Their meeting with the most shocking deaths with 
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indifference shows they don’t want for courage, tho’ it is their maxim 
in war to act in Stratagem. The worst is, whilst we endeavour to 
punish them their insolence and treachery they retaliate without 
mercy on the poor inhabitants. It corrupts our morals: people of good 
Character talk of such way of revenge, as were always till now held 
in the utmost abhorance. [sic]320 
Cochrane was a junior officer, but was writing to a senior British minister and was making 
it clear how hard it was to engage the Indians and keep one’s military honour. After a 
decade of fighting with and against the Indians in North America, the British Army still had 
no idea what its position was on using the Indians as allies. 
Starting with Braddock’s campaign, the British had tried to fight the war with 
European military honour in both ethics and technique. They had to make many 
adjustments in organisation and tactics, largely without the help of the Indians. In 
increments, they had made concessions to their way of making war by integrating Indians 
(and colonists) and their way of war, but had tried mightily to retain their ideals. Only after 
four years and near exhaustion at the task did the British find Generals that were capable of 
adapting their concept of honour to meet the task. The break with those ideals was complete 
by 1763 due mainly to Wolfe’s and Amherst’s leadership, although the reasoning had been 
carefully constructed in turning the Indians into ‘inhuman barbarians’ that deserved no 
better than they gave. With Pontiac’s War, Amherst and the leaders of the British Army had 
come to engage in a type of warfare that no gentleman would have accepted on a European 
battlefield. They were no longer inhibited by notions of honour in using Indians or fighting 
them.  
In terms of being able to recruit large bodies of Indian allies, the English were at a 
decisive disadvantage against the French at the beginning of the Seven Years’ War. With 
some notable exceptions, they would remain at a disadvantage throughout the next fifty 
years due to their mishandling of Indian allies and their pretensions of invincibility. The 
British Army seemed incapable of understanding Indian motives and needs, even as they 
sought their help. The English would force the French to leave the American midwest, but 
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the English would never truly control it themselves and would eventually lose it altogether. 
In 1764, owning the American midwest was only a reality on a piece of paper in Europe.321 
                                                
321 Ward, Backcountry,  255 - 261 and in Mark H. Danley and Patrick J. Speelman, The Seven Years’ War: 
Global Views (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012), 47 - 71 
L i n z y  | 128 
 
‘A soldier is a Gentleman 
His honour is his Life 
And he that Wont Stand by his Post 
Will not Stand by his Wife’ 
-- Popular continental Army soldier’s song322 
6. Indians in a Civil War  
The American Revolutionary War is the most fertile area to see many of the variations 
of British Army officer behavior with respect to honour and Indian ally use. The record is 
voluminous and well kept, if under explored in terms of military honour as a driving force 
in decision making. Especially important to this paper is the knowledge we have of the 
senior British Army officers’ lives and views. By 1775, through years of reporting on both 
sides of the Atlantic, the British public, the army, the political establishment and the press 
were fully aware of the Indian way of warfare and had firm opinions about its use. No one 
could credibly claim to have been surprised by what Indian allies would do if employed, 
although some still thought they could control them. 
The Revolution was certainly not exclusively about control of the midwest, but the 
attempt to exact taxes for the costs of its security and to restrict its free access by the 
American colonists were two leading causes of the war.323 In 1775, the line of settlement 
was still on the margins of the midwest, but trans-Appalachian settlements in the 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Virginia backcountries were causing great pain for the 
Indians and British Army alike. Therefore, the campaigns on the midwestern periphery 
during the Revolution were very important to the Indians who viewed it as a war to control 
the midwest rather than a colonial independence movement. Furthermore, much as they had 
in the Seven Years’ War, midwestern Indians most often chose neutrality, a British alliance, 
or a colonial-American alliance depending on which option would most likely improve the 
Indians’ chances to control their portion of the midwest in the manner they chose.  
The British Army generally chose their Indian allies as a matter of specific need, while 
trying to control their use with white officers attending them. The British Army was 
working with the expectations of a very vocal honour group of Britain’s popular press, 
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some politicians, and the general population. This group made clear to their forces and their 
civilian ministers that they did not approve of indiscriminate Indian attacks on their 
American cousins.324 Therefore, during the period of 1775 to 1783, the British Army 
certainly did hinder its effectiveness, because of a reluctance of some officers to make full 
use of the capabilities of Indian allies. Where Indians were deployed fully, well-supplied, 
and allowed to make the most of their skills, they were incredibly effective. This was 
especially true when Indian and British objectives aligned. When the British wanted to 
force a diversion of American manpower to the backcountry, the Indians were enthusiastic 
to help, because it meant striking areas that they felt were inappropriately settled by the 
Americans. One of the interesting situations of this era was the half-hearted use of Indians, 
especially Indians recruited from far-away lands who had no ties to the area of battle. 
Specifically, the Burgoyne campaign threatened their full use, but did not allow them to 
operate effectively. Much as the French General Montcalm experienced in 1755 to 1757, 
this created the disadvantage of a propaganda disaster and Indian alienation without the 
advantages of the Indian effectiveness. It was becoming clear that European armies could 
choose to ally with Indians or not according to their principles, but the idea that they could 
be used effectively under the total control of those armies was proving an illusion. 
The midwestern Indians, in general, were more disposed to align themselves with the 
British or remain aggressively neutral against the American colonists. Therefore, the British 
Army potentially had many opportunities to recruit Indians as allies or auxiliaries. To 
establish why this was the case, one must understand what had happened in the Midwest 
from 1763 to 1775. Following the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763, the British 
government was deep in debt and wanted to reach a peace where trade could flourish in 
North America to help pay off the debt. The Indians of the Midwest did not think the peace 
terms included their lands. The British government certainly believed the midwest to be 
part of its conquests, but did not feel it needed immediate development to reignite 
commerce in North America. In the short term, Britain was willing to trade commercial 
expansion for security in the midwest. The American colonists, on the other hand, felt they 
had fought the war almost exclusively for the right to develop the midwest. These facts 
were to inflame the region for the next fifty years beginning with the Indian rebellion 
known as Pontiac’s War in 1763-1764. In an attempt to establish order, the British declared 
                                                
324 Bickham, Savages 243-271 & Bickham, Headlines, 206-233 
L i n z y  | 130 
 
the ridge of the Appalachian mountain range as the dividing line between Indian and 
colonist in his Proclamation of 1763. Of course, there were already white colonists living 
west of this line, especially the area leading to the Forks of the Ohio River, but these were 
individual settlers rather than land speculators. To partially appease the speculators and 
open up the area to large-scale settlement and trade, Indian Superintendent of the northern 
Indians Sir William Johnson negotiated the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 with the 
Iroquois which opened up the area around Fort Pitt, most of modern day eastern Kentucky, 
and West Virginia to white settlement. The Iroquois conducted these negotiations on behalf 
of the tribes that lived in the area as the Iroquois still claimed suzerainty over them and the 
area through historical conquest.325 In the south, Superintendent for the southern Indians, 
John Stuart, negotiated the Treaties of Hard Labor (1768) and Lochaber (1770) with the 
Cherokee who also conceded large tracts of land in modern day eastern Tennessee, 
Kentucky and southern West Virginia, some of which overlapped with claims in the Treaty 
of Fort Stanwix.326 The Shawnees and Mingoes (Ohio area Seneca), as well as some 
renegade western Cherokee, known as the Chickamauga, who lived and hunted in the 
conceded area had not been consulted or had their views ignored. This situation set the 
scene for further conflict over settlements with raids and reprisals almost continuously from 
1765 to 1774.327 Along with these grievances was a nascent Indian solidarity movement 
building in the midwest. Rumours of this movement made their way to London and caused 
the British government to enforce the Proclamation of 1763 more strictly. British officials 
were trying to ward off another costly Indian rebellion, but the speculators kept looking for 
ways to open the trans-Appalachian frontier.328 By 1774, Indian raids on colonial 
settlements in Kentucky (then part of Virginia) reached a point where the Virginia 
Governor, John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore, a supporter of the speculators in Virginia, 
was able to justify action in launching a militia campaign to chastise the Shawnee and 
Delaware in particular. The result was Lord Dunmore’s War where the Indians were 
defeated near modern day Point Pleasant, West Virginia (also then part of Virginia). The 
resulting Treaty of Camp Charlotte, concluded with only a grudging acceptance by the 
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Shawnee and Mingo, produced more land concessions in the Ohio. The British government 
in London took a dim view of the treaty, but had more pressing matters building with the 
colonial rebellion. As Britain and the American colonists headed towards war, the 
midwestern Indians along the American frontier from Pennsylvania to Georgia were not at 
all happy with American incursions since 1763.329 The Shawnee leader Cornstalk expressed 
this feeling directly in the Autumn of 1776,  
… all our lands are covered by white people, & we are jealous that 
you still intend to make larger strides – We never sold you our 
Lands which you now possess on the Ohio between the Great 
Kenhawa & the Cherokee, & which you are settling without ever 
asking our leave, or obtaining our consent… That was our hunting 
Country and you have taken it from us.330 
Fear of the colonists’ continuing pressure on the frontiers in both the north and the 
south meant the Indians of the midwest were most likely to side with the British. Therefore, 
the help of a large portion of Indians seemed certain for the British Army, if they chose to 
engage them in ways that would enhance the Indians’ local security. However, this did not 
mean that the British jumped at the chance. The decision to use the Indians as allies against 
the French in the Seven Years’ War had been a tortured one as demonstrated previously in 
this paper. The decision to use them in large numbers only came near the end of the war, 
when the British Army leadership had become disgusted with the French and their Indian 
allies. The British largely adopted Indian tactics, but only attempted to use Indian customs 
when fighting Indians or French acting in concert with Indians. As previously 
demonstrated, to allow themselves to do this required labeling the Indians barbarous and 
inhumane. This gave the British Army officer corps some philosophical cover for 
conducting operations that normally would have caused dishonour had they occurred in 
Europe. Unconsidered, or perhaps not having the luxury of being considered, were the 
consequences of these epithets. They would begin to build a picture of the Indians as cruel 
and inhumane in the British consciousness.  
Conducting operations against the rebellious Americans would be a different matter. At 
the beginning of hostilities in America, the British leadership was hesitant to enlist the help 
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of the Indians for all of the traditional reasons explored previously in this paper. The British 
and the Americans preferred sympathetic neutrality from the Indians, but both the 
Americans and the British feared that if they did not appeal to the Indians to stay friendly to 
them that the other side would actively recruit them. The British did prepare for the 
possibility of having to use the Indians. Lieutenant General Thomas Gage, the commander-
in-chief in North America, had been almost exclusively in America since 1755 and had as 
much experience in North American warfare as any British leader. Gage wrote to several 
Indian agents as early as December 1774 to direct them to keep the local Indians friendly to 
the King’s interest and ignore entreaties to side with the colonists.331 In early 1775, the 
Americans also began to try to keep the Iroquois friendly with Congressional speeches sent 
via a missionary. However, they also went further and recruited Stockbridge, 
Passamaquoddy, St. John’s, and Penobscot Indians. These Indians were known as 
‘domiciled’ Indians as they lived in villages near American settlements and were often 
integrated with American colonial society. 332 It has been argued that these Indians did not 
qualify as ‘real’ Indians, because they lived lives similar to the American colonists. 
However, when it came to warfare, their methods were still more Indian than European 
culturally. One of the Stockbridge Indian leaders, Captain Solomon Uhhaunauwaunmut, 
reported to the Americans on 11 April 1775 that he would fight for them, but  
One thing I ask of you if you send me to fight, that you will let me 
fight in my own Indian way. I am not used to fight [sic] English 
fashion, therefore you must not expect I can train like your men. 
Only to point out to me where your enemies keep, and that is all I 
shall want to know.333 
The Stockbridge Indians did join the American forces besieging Boston and it seems 
that the Americans did allow them to fight in their ‘own Indian way’. Thomas Gage 
received intelligence on 30 April that ‘A company of Indians are [sic] come down from 
Stockbridge [&] more are to be provided if they are wanted’.334 Gage later wrote to John 
Stuart that ‘…they have brought down all the Savages they could against us here [Boston], 
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who with their Rifle men are continually Firing on our Sentries’.335 This report is 
corroborated by diary accounts of those present at the siege of Boston. In the early modern 
era of European warfare standards, firing on sentries was considered a dishonourable and 
ungentlemanly way to conduct warfare. 336 These are critical facts that help provide a frame 
of reference for what Gage was thinking when he began distributing orders to actively 
recruit Indians into the British cause. 
Prior to hostilities, Gage had requested more British troops to quell the rebellion and 
had been refused by London.337 As John Shy has pointed out, the British leadership in 
London, showing a dangerous misunderstanding of British capability, focused too much on 
what should be done, rather than what could be done with the British Army in America. 338 
They felt any British Army force could deal with the colonial militia. This often led them to 
calculate that they did not need more troops or the help of Indian allies. One experienced 
officer, Major General Frederick Haldimand, was under no illusion of the strength of the 
colonial militia, stating, ‘The Americans would be less dangerous if they had a regular 
army’. 339 Haldimand would make his mark authorizing and managing Indian use in Canada 
later in the war. Proving Haldimand correct, the fights at Lexington and Concorde 19 April 
1775 and the siege around Boston were to show the British that the American forces were 
going to be harder to defeat than they originally thought. It is worth quoting General John 
Burgoyne at length to make this point explicit,  
I believe in most states of the world as well as our own, the respect, 
and control, and subordination of government … depends in a great 
measure upon the idea that trained troops are invincible against any 
numbers or any position of undisciplined rabble; and this idea was a 
little in suspense since the 19th of April.340 
Two days after Lexington and Concord, Gage wrote to Guy Carleton, Captain-General 
and Governor in Chief of Quebec, that a body of Canadians and Indians would be ‘of great 
use’, but he makes clear that they should be ‘Under the Command of a judicious person’.341 
To add to Gage’s problems, Ethan Allen of the ‘Green Mountain Boys’, a Ranger-like 
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militia from the Vermont region of Connecticut had captured the British garrison at Fort 
Ticonderoga on 10 May 1775. Allen had then issued a letter to the Canadian Indians 
encouraging them to join his force and attack the British.342 Not only had the Americans 
recruited and deployed Indians to Boston, but they were allowing them to fight in the 
Indian manner. The prospect of Indians working in conjunction with New England Rangers 
would have been especially vexing for Gage. Probably better than anyone, he knew from 
experience how effective these two groups could be together. Thereafter, Gage informed 
William Legge, the Second Earl of Dartmouth and the minister responsible for the colonies, 
of these facts on 12 June 1775 and suggested that the British should not fear bringing the 
Indians since the Americans had done it first. Although he did state that the Stockbridge 
Indians were not ‘distant Indians’ and ‘not of great worth’.343 This remark is interesting and 
unexplained. Whether Gage was trying to keep Lord Dartmouth from worrying too much 
about the Indians or whether sniping at sentries had not yet had great effect is unknown. 
Regardless of his reasoning, Gage had begun to instruct his subordinates, specifically Guy 
Carleton in the North and John Stuart in the South to begin recruiting and deploying 
Indians. 
Not only did Gage instruct Carleton and Stuart to recruit Indians for defence, but 
specifically to have them attack the frontiers. He directed Carleton to have the Canadians 
and Indians ‘fall upon the Frontiers of this Province [Massachusetts] and that of 
Connecticut, in order to make a Diversion of their force’.344 Carleton could construe his 
mission as he wished, and he did, because he had other forces at this disposal. For instance, 
he had enough white officers to send with the Indians, to maintain control and limit the 
worst behavior, in the way that had always been favoured by the British. This would have 
allowed Carleton to make the case that the Indians were not dishonourably ‘unleashed’ on 
the population. However, Gage directed Stuart to have the Indians ‘distress them all 
[colonials] in their Power’ and Stuart did not have many white officers at his disposal 
which Gage knew.345 Therefore, it can be asserted that Gage was not erring towards 
escorted Indian missions at this point. The only mitigating event that had occurred between 
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Gage’s letter to Carleton on 3 June 1775 and his 12 September letter to Stuart was the 
Battle of Bunker (and Breed’s) Hill on 17 June 1775. The British under General Howe had 
taken the hill, but with severe losses. It could be that Gage was more open to any use of 
Indian forces after Bunker Hill. His subsequent chain of letters to Carleton asking for a 
diversion on the Massachusetts and Connecticut frontiers could be an indicator of his panic 
over the weakening of his Boston situation.346 Gage’s delay in directing Stuart until 
September seems to be due to the fact that he did not know where to write to Stuart. He 
knew that Stuart had decamped from Charleston under pressure, but was unsure to where 
he had moved.347  
Gage had written to all of the western post commanders that communications would be 
very hard, due to the rebel action in the Northeast, so they should take their orders from 
Carleton.348 Although Gage would continue to write to Carleton and urge him to use the 
Indians he had in his service, the tactical decisions to use the Indians in the north shifted to 
Carleton sometime in June.349 This was a critical juncture as most of the western 
commanders were more than willing to undertake action against the colonial frontiers. Up 
to this point, Gage had only asked the commanders of the western posts to prepare to 
recruit the Indians and to make sure they were not siding with the colonists. Guy Johnson, 
the Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the North (since his uncle Sir William Johnson had 
died in 1774), had readied two separate forces of 1,500 and 1,700 at Montreal. Johnson had 
not released his recruits onto the frontier but had used the traditional language and 
ceremony in the process of inviting them “To feast on a Bostonian and drink his blood”.350 
However, Gage was now inserting Carleton as the decision maker on how they would be 
used. Gage’s assumption that he would not be able to communicate regularly with his 
western post commanders may have cost him dearly in the North.  
Carleton was very hesitant to use the Indians at his disposal. Contrary to Gage and 
Stuart, Carleton’s career had mostly been spent in Europe. He had accompanied his mentor, 
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James Wolfe, at Quebec in 1759, but had returned to England wounded in that same year. 
The remainder of his service in the Seven Years’ War was in Europe. Being close to Wolfe, 
he would have sensed all of the frustration of dealing with the Canadian population and the 
swarms of Indians that pounced on any weakness from the shadows. His opinion of the 
Canadian populace and their reluctance to volunteer for the militia secured his opinion of 
the population as feckless and probably seditious. On the subject of the Indians, he seemed 
to have had a very strong view that the atrocities they would inevitably commit were not 
worth the price. If the rebels wanted to invade Canada and corrupt the Canadians into 
revolt, he would certainly use the Indians in defence. However, if Canada could be secured, 
Carleton seemed to be in the camp of British officials that viewed the best way to end the 
rebellion was to show mercy and humanity towards the Americans while simultaneously 
rebuffing their violent actions.351 
Therefore, unlike Guy Johnson, Carleton did not trust the Indians being recruited. 
Carleton was trying to assemble a force to create a diversion, but one that was controlled by 
him, even though he was struggling to assemble a Canadian militia and he had sent most of 
his regulars to support Gage. He felt it was most prudent to keep the Indians close and in 
defence for fear that they would only cut off ‘a few unfortunate Families, whose 
Destruction will be but of little Avail towards a Decision of the present Contest’. 352 This 
made the Indians in his service very impatient. Fall and winter were coming and they 
needed to hunt to support their families. They were roused to fight by Guy Johnson with 
their traditional cultural norms and being held in check by a cautious leader was not in their 
plans. A few participated in the defence of Montreal modestly, but were kept within the 
bounds of Canada. Even though he was very careful in using his Indian allies, the 
Americans accused him of using them indiscriminately. He defended himself to Lord 
Dartmouth, ‘I would not even suffer a Savage to pass the Frontier, though often urged to let 
them loose on the rebel Provinces. Least cruelties might have been committed, & for fear 
the innocent might have suffered with the guilty’. 353 Never one to embrace anyone with 
close confidence, Carleton was especially cool to Johnson and Daniel Claus. Johnson 
pushed Carleton to use the Indians more widely and free them to do what they did best. 
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Carleton would have none of it and relieved Johnson and his deputy, Claus of their duties in 
Canada. By October 1755, unbeknownst to Gage, Carleton had not done anything to relieve 
the pressure on Boston. Although Johnson and Claus had brought a huge force of Indians to 
the British cause in 1775 as Gage requested, they were not to play a decisive role in the 
years’ events. Exasperated with Carleton’s lack of using the huge Indian force at his 
disposal, the Indians went home and Guy Johnson and Daniel Claus, along with a Mohawk 
warrior named Joseph Brant, went to London to plead their case.354 By the end of 1775, 
Carleton had lost Montreal and was under siege in Quebec.  
Unlike the north, Gage really could provide very little direct influence in the south due 
to the distance and poor communications and might never have been able to significantly 
influence the Indians use there. However, his orders to have the Indians fall on the southern 
frontier were not implemented immediately by the southern Indian Superintendent John 
Stuart either. Stuart was a man thoroughly out of step with most of the coastal southerners, 
although he had lived in the colonies since 1748. Stuart, his family, and close friends, 
mostly from Scotland, could not identify with the independence movement and they made 
that plain in colonial Charleston. Stuart was a loyalist who felt that London knew best on 
colonial matters. In his view, the only mistake London had made was to be too lenient with 
the colonists. This fact, along with his insistence on a fair deal for the Indians under his 
charge, made him powerful enemies of the land owners and speculators of the colonies of 
Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. When rumours of Stuart agitating the Indians 
to attack the frontier surfaced, they were taken as fact. In these colonies where slaves 
outnumbered whites significantly, rumours of slave revolts and Indian attacks were taken 
very seriously. Stuart tried to explain that the rumours had been started by his political 
rivals, but to no avail. Stuart had to leave Charleston in a hurry at the end of May 1775. 
Stuart had not tried to instigate an Indian war, but his correspondence pertaining to Gage’s 
1774 instructions to make sure the Indians were well disposed to support the King if needed 
were taken as confirmation of the rumours. Stuart decamped to St. Augustine, Florida and 
re-started correspondence with Gage from there in July 1775. When Gage finally learned 
where Stuart had established himself, he issued the orders of 12 September 1775 mentioned 
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above.355 Stuart wrote two letters to Gage upon receipt of Gage’s 12 September letter. In 
the first Stuart agreed with Gage stating, ‘I shall pay the strictest attention to your 
commands contained in it’. The second states that the ‘great majority’ of the backcountry 
was strongly in support of the King and Stuart did not believe it was advisable to let the 
Indians loose unsupervised. As Carlton had worried about the Indians falling on scattered 
families in the north, both rebel and Tory alike, Stuart was very worried about the Indians 
falling on the Tories of the Carolina backcountry. It is unclear if this was new intelligence, 
but it marked a distinct change from the previous letter to Gage on the same day. 356 It 
seems that John Stuart interpreted that Gage’s orders were not clear to send the Indians 
immediately and without white attendance. There is little in the record from October to 
December that explains how Stuart came to interpret his orders so leniently. However, to 
his deputies, he took to stating that they should encourage the Indians to attack only in 
concert with other forces, whether that was with loyalists or British forces. He sent letters 
to the southern colonial governors telling them he would bring the Indians to any official 
plans they had. However, it took until March 15, 1776 in a letter to Lieutenant General 
Henry Clinton that he explained that he had taken his orders from Gage to mean not 
sending the Indians indiscriminately onto the southern frontier.357 Therefore, the southern 
Indians were being prepared to strike, but they would not be put into action until the 
following year. Again, how Stuart came to this reasoning is left untold. Why he did not 
make it clear to Gage that without any ‘concerted’ plans in 1775 there would be no Indian 
offensive on the southern frontier in 1775 is also not clear from the record. 
Until June 1775, the decision to use Indians seems to have resided wholly with Thomas 
Gage. In his spring and summer correspondence, he directed preparation and use and the 
record does not indicate him asking for permission, nor extended discussion on the merits 
of using them. If he had any reservations in using them, he showed little of it in his 
correspondence. 358Although Gage has been somewhat rescued from the early historical 
literature as having been solely responsible for unleashing the Savages onto the American 
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populace, it is clear from his directions to Carleton and Stuart that he meant for them to 
unleash the Indians on the American populace. It is only from restraint on the part of 
Carleton and Stuart that they were not sent early in the war.359 Unlike the rest of the British 
leadership, Gage had never really been separated from the effects of Indian War and war in 
North America. He had seen it and its results from virtually every angle from 1755 through 
1774. He also knew the capabilities and shortcomings of the British Army in North 
America better than anyone. Gage has been painted as a good administrator, but poor field 
commander and this may be true. 360 However, he has rarely been given credit for seeing 
what few others in the British leadership saw in the summer of 1775, that the British Army 
needed help if it was to quell the rebellion. It became conventional wisdom in the British 
leadership that the British Army’s problem in 1775 was due to the geography of Boston and 
the ardor of the independence movement in Massachusetts. However, had the large forces 
of Indians recruited by Guy Johnson been released onto the northeastern frontier, as Gage 
had directed, it is not outlandish to suspect that the rebel siege of Boston would have been 
greatly diminished. 
London eventually lost confidence in Gage and recalled him to London in late 
September 1775 and Lieutenant General William Howe, the pyrrhic victor of Bunker Hill, 
became the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in North America. In November of 
1775, Lord George Germain, First Viscount Sackville, became the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies and took over from Lord Dartmouth. Even though Gage and Dartmouth had both 
ordered the use of Indians on the frontier, it had not taken place by November 1775. Howe 
had far larger conventional plans for 1776 and the use of Indians was put onto the back 
burner. Lord Germain was adamant about using whatever force necessary to put down the 
rebellion, but he was still very cautious of the effect of using Indians would have on the 
British public. He stated to the Governor of East Florida that the Indians ‘perhaps ought not 
be pressed forward, but in proportion as it may be necessary to counteract any Steps of the 
like tendency, which may be taken by the rebels’. 361 By the end of 1775, Carleton and 
Stuart were seemingly vindicated in their interpretation of Gage’s orders not to deploy 
Indians onto the frontiers without escort.  
                                                
359 Sosin, Use of Indians, 101-104 and p. 121 
360 Shy, ‘Gage, in Billias, Opponents, Volume II,  29-33 
361 Bickham, Savages, 249 
L i n z y  | 140 
 
In December 1775, Guy Johnson reached London between Christmas and New Year. 
Johnson had taken his voyage to Britain seriously and had created a detailed argument to 
present to Germain. He immediately sought a meeting with Lord Germain. Johnson 
explained how unleashing the Indians onto the frontiers would be the best way to use them. 
Over the next month, Johnson would formalize his proposals in a document. Lord Germain 
was impressed, but still cautious in committing to the full use of Indians as independent 
actors. Since he had taken office, Lord Germain and his Generals had committed to a plan 
for 1776. Lieutenant General William Howe would leave Boston and take New York City 
and use it as a base. Lieutenant General Henry Clinton would take Wilmington, North 
Carolina as a point of entry in the south. Finally, Lieutenant John Burgoyne would join 
Governor-General Carleton in the retaking of Montreal and driving down the Lake 
Champlain corridor towards Albany. The intention was to link up the forces of Howe and 
Carlton in New York and cut off the northeast from the rest of the colonies. Johnson had 
been thanked for his input, but Lord Germain was sure the British could win the war in the 
conventional manner and with conventional forces. The Indians should be held on side to 
prevent the Americans from tempting them, but they were to be used only in conjunction 
with troops or loyalists and their main benefit would be in scaring the colonists. Johnson 
did have his position confirmed which gave him the authority to work with the Iroquois 
again. Johnson and his party sailed back to New York in June 1776. Johnson and Brant 
would sail back to America in the spring. 362 
With the spring of 1776 also came re-enforcements for Canada, led by Lieutenant 
General John Burgoyne as second-in-command to Sir Guy Carleton (a Knighthood having 
been bestowed on him for his defence of Quebec). The mission was to relieve the siege of 
Quebec, retake Montreal and chase the fleeing Americans to Albany. The American siege 
of Quebec collapsed immediately upon seeing the British re-enforcements. As the re-
enforcements grew throughout May and June, Carleton moved on Montreal which also fell. 
However, Carleton was slow to pursue the Americans and they managed to retreat south 
along the Richelieu River. Carleton did use Indians and 160 of them were in the van at 
Montreal in May 1776. Furthermore, some were released to harry the American retreat. 
However, even as tight a leash as Carleton meant to keep, there were scalping incidents 
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around Montreal and the Richelieu River.363 When Carleton found out about the Indians 
displaying the scalps in Montreal in June 1776, he scolded them and offered to purchase the 
freedom of any other prisoners they held. Predictably, this caused consternation in the 
Indian camps and most of them deserted Carleton again. At the time Carleton was happy 
with this as he needed to spend time constructing a naval capability to continue his pursuit 
of the Americans.364 During this time, Carleton continued his tight grasp of his Indian 
auxiliaries, much to the disgust of Lieutenant Colonel John Johnson who was leading a 
band of loyalists and Indian from the Mohawk Valley. However, there were still instances 
of scalping that Carleton was very angry about when he found out about them. These 
stories made their way back to the tribes and made it harder to recruit them when needed 
and probably inclined some of the Iroquois to the American side. 365  
In the south in 1776, John Stuart had held his ground against American attempts to 
recruit the Indians. He also tried to keep the Indians from taking on the Americans in a 
frontier war. However, Governor Tonyn, who was adamantly for unleashing the Indians, 
had met a frontier loyalist named Thomas Brown. Brown was a large landowner in the 
Augusta backcountry who had run afoul of the rebels in his area. He had been tarred and 
feathered and held an enormous grudge against the rebels. Tonyn commissioned Brown as 
a leader of loyalist Rangers and immediately sent him to the Cherokee towns. News of 
Lieutenant General Henry Clinton’s initiative against North Carolina was welcomed by 
both Tonyn and Stuart. Clinton was going to land at Wilmington and meet a loyalist force 
coming down from the backcountry. However, the loyalists, made up largely of recent 
Scottish highlander immigrants, were ambushed by rebels at Moore’s Creek Bridge in 
February 1776. The force lost over half killed, wounded or captured. With the rebels so un-
expectantly strong, Clinton decided to land his force at Charleston instead. This setback 
delayed the initiative until June. Stuart seemed happy to wait for very specific orders to use 
the Indians. He had interpreted Gage’s orders as to only send out Indians in concert with 
British forces. He was helped along with his inaction by Howe and Lord Germain who had 
written less than rousing letters to him to keep the Indians on side, but to keep them from 
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committing depredations.366 Stuart, knowing Indian warfare from the Cherokee wars of 
1759-1761, did not take any chances. However, Governor Tonyn was anxious to unleash 
the Indians in any capacity at all writing to Clinton in May 1776, ‘nothing would have been 
more easy than to have the Indians in action’. Responding to Stuart’s worry that the Indians 
would fall on loyalist and rebels alike in the backcountry, Tonyn argued, ‘the King’s Loyal 
Subjects could be easily separated from the rebels, and the attack, which would doubtless 
be cruel and wrong, but there are ways to do it distinguishably. It is cruel to continue doing 
nothing. It is always a losing game’.367 
Tonyn was not just the Governor of East Florida, but also a Colonel of the 6th 
Dragoons with a distinguished record in the Seven Years’ War. He also had strong 
relationships with the Floridian tribes. He might have been bombastic, but he was not naïve 
about Indian warfare.368 Seemingly discounting Tonyn, Clinton added more to Stuart’s 
desire to keep the Indians idle by writing to him in May 1776 and ordering him to keep the 
Indians friendly, but inactive. Tonyn was furious and wrote to Clinton again, ‘The 
Americans are a thousand times more in dread of the Savages than of European troops. 
Why not avail of their help.’369 This is probably the strongest case made by a British 
official, with the possible exception of Lord Dunmore of Virginia, to have the Indians fall 
on the frontier. However, Tonyn was surrounded by Indian Agents who had seen Indian 
war and knew how brutal it could be and British officials who thought that they could win 
the war without using Indians. The British leadership of the war effort may have believed 
that the Americans feared the Indians more, but that was because the Americans had not 
experienced the disciplined British bayonet yet. That was to begin to change as Clinton 
found that he could not invade Charleston either. He returned north to rejoin forces with 
Howe in New York. 
However, there was an Indian war in the south in 1776. Although Stuart was against 
the Indians attacking the frontier, but he and Tonyn’s loyalist Ranger commander, Thomas 
Brown, had been supplying them with goods, powder and ball to keep them friendly to the 
British cause. Still, the Indians had their own motives and encroachment from settlers was 
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their main concern.370 The supplies provided the Cherokee, led by the militant Dragging 
Canoe, what they needed to take revenge on the settlers that had been encroaching on their 
lands, especially the settlements around Fort Watauga. Possibly spurred on by a visit from 
Shawnee, Delaware and Mohawk warriors from the north in May 1776 asking for concerted 
action against the frontiers, the Cherokees decided it was time to attack the settlements.371 
Not understanding that the loyalist had lost North Carolina and Clinton had been repulsed 
in Charleston, the Cherokees launched raids across the backcountry. There would be no 
British help to speak of to help them in the summer of 1776. The supply route from 
Pensacola in West Florida was too long to provide anything other than material support. 
These attacks were not directed by British agents, but Tonyn was right that the Americans 
feared the Indians more than the British. In a rare case of co-operation, the southern 
colonies quickly raised over 5,000 militiamen and marched into the Cherokee towns from 
multiple approaches. The Americans released devastation worse than even the British 
campaigns of 1760-1761. The peace faction of the Cherokees re-asserted themselves and 
agreed to the patriots’ demands of peace and more land concessions. Once again, Indians 
found themselves having their expectations raised by the British, but found that action was 
not forthcoming when they were in trouble. The lack of British help and the swift 
retribution doled out by the Americans made the Creek think twice. They too had unwanted 
settlers on their land, but they calculated that there might be a better time to solve those 
problems. There would be sporadic attacks by militant factions of the Cherokee and Creeks 
throughout the rest of the war, but they would never rise to the potential that was present in 
1775 and 1776. 372 
By July 1776, Guy Johnson and Joseph Brant returned to New York from England. 
Brant had fought with the British in New York, but was anxious to return to his Iroquois 
homeland. He made his way through American lines in November and up the Mohawk 
Valley to find that the rebels had rid the valley of most of the loyalists. He was told that 
John Johnson had moved his family and associates to Montreal to help the British there. 
Brant continued to Fort Niagara and did meet loyalist John Butler. The two would begin the 
long process of trying to get the Iroquois to come to the aid of Britain. However, there were 
some disagreements. Butler was following Carleton’s orders to keep the Indians warm, but 
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not active. Having spoken to Lord Germain, Burgoyne, Howe, and the King during his time 
away, Brant had other ideas. He and Guy Johnson had formulated a plan to assist British. 
Brant now heard what he did not know when he was with Howe, Carleton had let the rebels 
escape and the British forces were defending Canada and not threatening the New York 
frontier. Brant was not impressed and made the case to Butler that they should not be 
following Carleton’s orders. In a recruitment letter to a village of Mohawks, Brant wrote,  
…you may depend on having your own way of making war. I do 
not think it right to let my brothers go to war under the command of 
General Carleton as General Carleton expects & trys to have the 
Indians under the same command as the regular Troops, but it will 
be the best method for us to make war our own way.   
Carleton got wind of this letter and wrote to Butler and Captain Lernoult that their orders 
remained the same. Brant would continue to recruit, but with limited success. It would take 
more time and a lessening of Carleton’s influence for him to become a major force for the 
British.373 
Guy Johnson stayed with General Howe in New York and New Jersey, but would not 
make it back to lead his Iroquois for another year. Howe led a very conventional campaign 
against Washington in New York and New Jersey with solid results until Christmas when 
Washington struck back at Trenton, New Jersey. The rest of 1776 passed quietly on the 
frontier, except for independent raids in Kentucky from both the north and the south. The 
settlers, most famously Daniel Boone, were sure that John Stuart in the south and 
Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton of Detroit were to blame. Much like Stuart, Hamilton 
would claim that he had only supplied the Indians around Detroit and the Ohio Valley, but 
had expressly asked them not to strike the frontier. 374 
By the end of 1776, the British had rarely used Indians in any way except to defend 
Canada and East Florida, even though Gage and Tonyn would have had a full scale Indian 
frontier war if they had had their way. The more reflective minds of Carleton, Stuart, 
Howe, Clinton, and Germain had urged caution. They had made great strides in keeping the 
Indians friendly and mostly away from active service with the Americans. Of course, the 
Americans did not see it that way. Every time they approached the Indians, they heard that 
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a British officer or agent had just been there and promised them much more. The American 
paranoia was understandable if not justified by facts. The Americans formally declared 
independence in July 1776 with the following statement forming one of the grievances 
against King George III, ‘He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has 
endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, 
whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and 
conditions’.375 The Americans had few hard facts to substantiate this claim against the 
King, but it certainly was not from a lack of trying by his Commander-in-Chief in the first 
year of the war. The Americans might have been struggling in the field, but they were 
beginning to win the propaganda war in both America and Britain. 
Therefore, the British government began 1777 in much the same position it had started 
1776. The London government was not happy and neither was the King. Lord Germain had 
been kept out of the loop from Sir Guy Carleton’s operations in Canada and New York. 
What he had heard and would hear in the coming months would not please him given the 
Governor-General’s request for troops and supplies had been amply met. The lack of 
progress into New York from Canada in 1776 had meant that fewer American troops were 
needed to defend the area. Those extra troops were sent against Howe’s force in New 
Jersey and caused great problems. The loyalists in the south were not as strong as the 
government had been led to believe either. Thus, Clinton’s southern adventure had been 
called back. John Burgoyne was worried about being associated with Carleton’s pace in 
pursuing the Americans or in his limited use of Indians. He travelled back to London over 
the winter and reported his feelings to Lord Germain. Germain would take the information 
to heart and began devising a plan to cut Carleton out of the military operations for the 
coming year. Carleton and Germain were not on good terms and their relationship would 
get only worse with the planning for how to run the Canadian side of the war going on in 
London without the input of Sir Guy Carleton.376 These operations and the supplanting of 
Carleton from the decisions in the north were to cause a dramatic change in the use of 
Indians in the war. Not only would Indians who were closely associated with American 
settlements, but many from much further away would be summoned. This would have a 
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lasting effect on how the Indians would and could be used. Carleton’s tight control of 
Indian war customs and his on-again-off-again approach to using the Canadian and New 
York area Indians had made them less willing to come forward to which Brant’s and Old 
Abraham’s comments mentioned above have alluded. Certainly, many still participated, but 
more Indians were to be brought from much further afield. These Indians from the far west 
did not have axes to grind with the American settlers (yet), so they came for the traditional 
reasons warriors had always gone on the warpath, personal glory and plunder. The British 
officers’ lack of understanding on this issue would become a serious problem for 
Burgoyne. In this most important of years, Burgoyne and Henry Hamilton would come to 
be closely associated with the Indians operations on the American frontier. 
John Burgoyne was a talented, but grandiose officer who had entered the Army in 
1747, sold his commission shortly thereafter when needing money, and re-entered in 1756 
when his fortunes had improved. An anonymous essayist remarking on London’s high 
society stated, ‘No man is more tender of his reputation’.377  He had been successful in the 
Seven Years’ War with a history of innovation in light cavalry and leadership. He had 
served with considerable success in France and Portugal and had gained Royal favour for 
his Sixteenth Light Dragoons. In 1761, he was elected to Parliament and in 1774 published 
a play that would later be performed to popular success in London. A love of good drink, 
gaming, and the high life were characteristics of his life when Burgoyne began service in 
the Revolution. In Boston in 1775, he witnessed Bunker Hill, but without significant 
command. He traveled back to London in 1775 where he spent his time lightly, but 
effectively criticising Thomas Gage, the North American British Commander of forces, and 
unsuccessfully seeking an independent command. He returned to North America in 1776 
with troops for Governor Guy Carleton to protect Quebec from the Americans who were 
threatening along Lake Chaplain. Whilst in England in early 1777, Burgoyne detailed a 
plan to attack the rebels down the Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson River corridor to 
Albany where he would meet Lieutenant General Sir William Howe to cut off the northeast 
from the rest of the colonies. There would also be a diversionary force of regulars, loyalists 
and Indians led by Lieutenant Colonel Barrimore St. Leger from Lake Ontario up the 
Mohawk Valley.378 The plan was accepted by Whitehall and Burgoyne was sent back to 
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Quebec in 1777 to put it into action. He had accomplished his wishes through confidence, 
energy, and sheer will. In short, ‘Gentleman Johnny’ Burgoyne was a bon vivant who 
translated his personal success, his good luck, and his connections into an independent 
command of forces in the Revolution.379  
Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton was commissioned in the British Army in 1755 
and served in the Seven Years’ War in continental North America and the Caribbean. He 
served in Britain from 1768 to 1775, but was sent back to Quebec in 1775. There, he sold 
his Army commission, but accepted the quasi-military post of Lieutenant Governor of 
Detroit in 1775. There were two other governorships in the upper midwest at Kaskaskia and 
Vincennes as well. Although civilian in name, the governorships became militarised by the 
locations of the forts at the onset of the Revolution and had some British Army troops 
under their control if not official command. The midwest was of strategic concern as the 
Americans had been settling in Kentucky since the early 1770s. This door to the rear of 
British Canada was of great concern to Hamilton, even if it was not a pressing concern to 
his superiors yet. In 1775 and early 1776, Hamilton sought guidance from his direct 
superior, Guy Carleton, and London, but his instructions were vague when they existed at 
all. Added to the lack of communication and Detroit’s remote location was the fact that 
Hamilton became a pawn in the escalating war of words between Sir Guy Carleton and 
Lord Germain. 380 
Mainly on his own initiative, Hamilton took the action he deemed necessary to protect 
Detroit and used the resources available to him, namely local militia, mainly of French 
ancestry, and Indians. The Indians of the midwest used Detroit as a supply and trading post 
in 1775-1776, but operated throughout the Ohio valley. Hamilton equipped them with 
British supplies and instructed them not to attack frontier settlements, but he knew his 
control of them once they left the Detroit area would be virtually non-existent.381 The 
Indians looked after their own strategic requirements of ridding the Kentucky hunting 
grounds of settlers. The outcome of Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774 had not been satisfactory 
to the Shawnees and Mingoes of the area and they had sworn vengeance at first 
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opportunity. The resulting sporadic raids on Kentucky and other backcountry settlements in 
1776 accomplished the Indian purpose of revenge and hindering the settlement of the area. 
Although not yet fully understood by the British, the actions also had the desired effect for 
the British as well when it caused the rebels to assemble forces to try to stop the raids. Each 
soldier needed to protect the frontier was one that could not serve against the British Army 
in the more conventional war on the east coast. As Virginia (Kentucky’s parent colony) 
began to fund forces from the frontier to put a stop to the raids, Hamilton’s nemesis 
emerged in the form of a Virginia surveyor named George Rogers Clark who would lead 
one of these forces and label Hamilton the ‘hair buyer’ General.382 
In many ways, Burgoyne and Hamilton were quite dissimilar. Burgoyne’s letters to 
government ministers were to people he viewed as peers or less. His writing style and 
oratory were often extravagant, but exacting at other times. Burgoyne’s careful criticisms of 
Gage and Carleton were meant to inflate his importance and they worked.383 Burgoyne did 
not seek guidance from ministers, he sought influence over them.384 In contrast, Hamilton’s 
letters are cloying and in search of guidance to Carleton and the Earl of Dartmouth.385 
Hamilton is hesitant and his declarations that the Indians will do as they choose, even when 
he has instructed them not to, is an obvious escape clause for the offenses that are sure to 
follow. Burgoyne lays down the law to the Indians that are to serve under him with either 
the highest cynicism or naiveté, depending on one’s view of him. Burgoyne was a bold 
social climber with multiple illegitimate children and a hint of scandal in his own birth that 
seemed to haunt him. Hamilton was a family man with a love of art and the natural 
world.386 
However, Hamilton was no lightweight and Burgoyne was not untouchable. Hamilton 
would later become the Lieutenant Governor of Quebec and the Governor of both Bermuda 
and Dominica. He was also to be demonised by the Quebecois for his attempts at reform of 
the political system in the 1780s. Hamilton’s success in Bermuda earned him the capital 
being named after him.387 Burgoyne was to go back to Britain and defend in Parliament his 
campaign that resulted in the loss of his army at Saratoga. Both men showed a remarkable 
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resiliency in their character to keep acting toward their internal compass and attempted to 
defend their honour. Finally, the importance to this paper is that they both felt they were 
justified in using Indians in their missions, had tried to control the Indians by instructing 
them not to commit atrocities, and were accused of not doing enough to prevent the 
atrocities that were committed on their watch.388  
With short biographies of Hamilton and Burgoyne, an analysis of their use of Indians 
will follow. However, one more individual that was summoned by both needs an 
introduction. Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade was omnipresent in the commercial and 
warfare worlds of the upper midwest from 1750 to 1800. Langlade was the product of a 
prominent French trader and the sister of a respected Ottawa Indian chief. Having hit the 
warpath with his Ottawa uncle, Nissowaquet, at the tender age of ten, Langlade was a living 
emblem of the middle ground. Not content with operating in one culture, Langlade joined 
the French Troupes de la Marines, or French colonial regulars, in 1750. Langlade led a 
force of Indians into the Miami Indian area of modern day Ohio in 1752 to chastise a 
British leaning chief known as Memeskia or ‘Old Briton’. Although the war between 
Britain and France would not begin for another three years, the declaration of loyalties had 
already begun. When Memeskia refused to give up his allegiance to the British, Langlade 
performed what was probably the most infamous atrocity of the era. Langlade had him 
publicly killed and cannibalised on the spot. When no help from the British or American 
colonists followed, the Indians in the area decided on a French alliance. Langlade would 
later serve with Montcalm at Fort William Henry in 1757 as well. Montcalm had depended 
on Langlade to cool the Indian temper after the honourable capitulation of the British fort. 
He failed miserably, if he tried at all, when the British were attacked mercilessly by the 
Indians as they marched away under nominal French protection. In 1759, Langlade was 
with the Indians at the Plains of Abraham, reputedly serving with the Indians who killed 
Wolfe from the flanking woods of the British position. Langlade retired to his home area of 
Michilimackinac and eventually surrendered the French fort to the British in 1761. 
However, Langlade adjusted to his new Imperial masters and even gave them some idea 
that the rebellion named after the Ottawa chief Pontiac was about to happen in 1763. From 
1763 to 1775, Langlade concentrated on commercial work in La Baye (Green Bay) and 
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became a founding father of modern day Wisconsin.389 In summary, through twenty years 
of contact and reputation, Langlade was well known to the British Army. If a British Army 
officer or official wanted a ‘proper leader’ to help stop Indian atrocities in battle, Langlade 
was likely the last person they would have chosen. However, desperate times invoke 
desperate measures. Years had dimmed Langlade’s dubious exploits and he became, if not 
a reputable, at least a qualified Indian guide and interpreter for the British. Even Carleton 
had sung his praises. 390 As the Revolution progressed and the need for Indian allies 
increased, Langlade became an Indian coordinator for the British, but with predictable 
results. 
By early 1777, Lord Germain had provided instructions for Hamilton and Burgoyne. 
Burgoyne’s instruction had practically been written by himself, but Hamilton’s passed 
through Guy Carleton. Carleton and Hamilton were instructed to use the Indians to the best 
effect on offense as well as defensively, but to ensure that the Indians would be led by 
‘proper leaders’ to avoid atrocities on the frontier inhabitants. Germain goes on to make it 
clear that the King himself has spoken on the matter.391 These instructions were not much 
different than Carleton’s position of not using Indians unless they could be properly 
commanded by a reliable British force. The thorny question had always been what 
constituted a ‘proper leader’ of Indians. Burgoyne got his independent command and the 
right to attack from Canada without Carleton and was also given instructions to use the 
Indians in a similar manner. Although, Burgoyne would later say that he used the Indians 
only at the behest of Germain, it is likely that Burgoyne’s conversation with Germain had 
led the Secretary to believe Carleton had been too tentative in their use. This insult over the 
use of the Indians and Burgoyne’s independent command so infuriated Carleton that he 
began agitating Germain until he was relieved of command and replaced by Frederick 
Haldimand in 1777. However, Haldimand could not reach Quebec in 1778. Carleton 
continued in his role throughout 1777, but increasingly only participated in matters that he 
thought were his to decide alone. 
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Burgoyne traveled to Quebec in the spring of 1777 and assembled his force to invade 
along the Lake Champlain-Lake George-Hudson River corridor. In June, Burgoyne met 
400 Indian auxiliaries with great fanfare. He gave them a speech, which the Americans 
ridiculed for its pompousness, to hold the British King’s wishes to heart and never commit 
atrocities upon the civilians. Burgoyne also took the opportunity of his campaign launch to 
send a missive to the rebels in the area threatening to unleash the Indians upon the frontier 
if they impeded his campaign. The flyer, sent throughout the frontier, announced ‘… I have 
but to give stretch to the Indian forces under my direction, and they amount to thousands, to 
overtake the hardened enemies of Great-Britain and America, I consider them the same, 
wherever they may lurk’.392 Burgoyne would later dismiss this threat as a ploy, but it 
provided plenty of propaganda for the American forces. One who did not think of it as a 
ploy was a French Canadian named St. Luc de la Corne, who was a slightly more 
respectable, eastern version of Charles Langlade. La Corne was Burgoyne’s Indian leader 
and had been with Langlade at Fort William Henry in 1757 and the Plains of Abraham in 
1759. Interestingly, as a member of the Legislative Council of Canada, La Corne would 
later become the bane of Hamilton’s reform battles of Quebec in the early 1780s. La Corne 
was a hard liner against the rebels after his harsh treatment as a prisoner at their hands 
earlier in the war. More than anyone else in Burgoyne’s army, he wanted to unleash the 
Indians in full force against them.393    
At the onset of the campaign, Burgoyne quickly moved down Lake Chaplain and took 
Crown Point and Ticonderoga with much less than anticipated effort. However, as he 
approached the Hudson River, the terrain closed in and his force was running low on 
critical supplies. The need for scouting and foraging parties in this slow moving part of his 
campaign was his undoing. Along with la Corne’s Indians, who were chafing at having to 
work with Captain Alexander Fraser’s provincial troops in Brigadier Simon Fraser’s Corps, 
Charles Langlade showed up with a force of 150 western Indians intent on gaining plunder 
for their efforts. It did not take long for the inevitable to happen, an Indian raiding party had 
butchered a farm family in the Camden valley and another who had been evacuated further 
south. Although under Fraser’s nominal control, the killings had happened anyway. Indians 
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who were upset with the lack of action and opportunity had been deserting steadily along 
the route, but Langlade’s Indians had stayed. Langlade was to once again be implicated in 
an atrocity. A young loyalist lady by the name Jane McCrea had been captured by 
Langlade’s Indians with her aunt. At some point during her captivity, she was killed and 
scalped. The news hit the frontier like wildfire. The news that McCrea was a loyalist 
seemed to vindicate both Carleton and Stuart who felt it was impossible to protect loyalists 
on the frontier. Not only were people friendly to the British being killed and mutilated, but 
also the majority, who were neither actively patriot or actively loyalist, was beginning to 
believe the British did not care about their protection. Burgoyne was mortified. He knew he 
could not execute the Indians responsible with his force so fragile, but his verbal rebuke 
was enough to chase La Corne, Langlade, and most of the remaining Indians away. The 
western Indians had come for glory and plunder. Their goals were not at all aligned with 
Burgoyne’s.394 
At approximately the same time of the Jane McCrea murder, Lieutenant Colonel St. 
Leger was leading a combined force of 300 British regulars, 500 loyalists and 
approximately 700 Indians on their way from Fort Oswego to Fort Stanwix near the Great 
Carrying Place in the Mohawk valley. John Johnson, Daniel Claus, Joseph Brant and a 
loyalist named John Butler led the loyalist and Indian forces. The strategic goal was to 
divert American troops to keep them from re-enforcing the American forces along the 
Hudson River valley. They were traveling light and had expected Fort Stanwix to be 
unfinished, lightly manned and to fall unceremoniously. Upon arriving, they found it 
finished, well-constructed, and manned with 700 Americans. St. Leger, in a stroke of 
extreme over-confidence issued an offer of immediate surrender to avoid an Indian 
massacre. The Americans refused. When the fort did not fall quickly, they had to conduct a 
siege that they were unprepared for and the Indians did not want. The patriot militia in the 
area assembled a force of 1,000 to relieve the siege. St. Leger could not afford to send his 
regulars who were the only members of his force that could continue the siege. Therefore, 
he sent John Butler and twenty Rangers along with John Johnson, Brant, and 400 of the 
Indians, mostly Mohawk and Seneca, to meet the patriots. The force moved quickly to the 
area near the Indian settlement of Oriska and set up an ambush. The patriot force, led by 
General Nicholas Herkimer, also had sixty Oneida Indians from Oriska with him. This 
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would be the first time that individual tribes from the Iroquois six nations would meet when 
aligned on opposing sides of the war. The British force sprung the trap too early and only 
caught about half of Herkimer’s force. The rest retreated and some Indians took chase. 
However, with the numbers much more even, the battle of Oriskany commenced. It was a 
brutal fight that was punctuated by a heavy rain and hand to hand fighting. The Seneca 
chased many of Herkimer’s wounded and scalped them alive. The fighting also pitted 
Iroquois against Iroquois in a fight that would rupture that nation forever. The British force 
took the field, but with significant casualties to its force of Seneca, which left that tribe 
traumatized. In the meantime, an American force from Fort Stanwix had raided the British 
Indian camps and plundered their possessions. The Indians were enraged and were hard to 
reconcile once the magnitude of their situation settled upon them. The Seneca and Mohawk 
had taken some American prisoners during and after the battle. St. Leger tried to get control 
of the American prisoners, but the Seneca in particular were too enraged by their losses. As 
part of their mourning rituals, they forced their American prisoners to run a gauntlet where 
they were clubbed to death. The battle was one of the bloodiest of the war and would 
change Iroquois calculations of serving with the British and further feed the American 
propaganda operation.395 
When the Indians returned to Fort Stanwix, they were in no mood to continue the 
siege. John Butler tried to keep them by promising that the fort would soon fall and they 
could expect their revenge and plunder then. Butler did issue a threat to the fort saying that 
if they did not surrender quickly, he would unleash the Indians on the rebels of the valley 
and on the remains of the fort once capitulated. However, the American fort stood firm. A 
force led by American General Benedict Arnold was sent to relieve Fort Stanwix. Rumors 
of the size of the force from local Oneidas convinced the British Indians that they did not 
want another bloody internecine battle, so they began leaving. St. Leger decided that he 
could no longer continue the siege without the Indians and retreated back to Oswego. As 
the movement began, panic set in and many of the loyalists began to run and separate. To 
add insult to injury, some of their Indian allies began to assault the British forces. The 
Oriskany diversion ended as a costly fiasco. Although it had initially helped draw 
Americans away from Burgoyne’s thrust, St. Leger’s retreat freed them again. Upon 
securing Fort Stanwix, Arnold took his force to the Hudson River valley to help repel 
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Burgoyne. Arnold would later prove to be a large factor in the coming battle. On 11 August 
1777, St. Leger wrote to Burgoyne of his failure and blamed it on the Indians. 396 
In the Hudson valley, Burgoyne would not have welcomed the news, but he had far 
more problems. The killing of McCrea did not bring in the hordes of new American recruits 
as has often been reported. However, the American General that he was facing, Horatio 
Gates, did take considerable glee in goading Burgoyne about the incident. The American 
press and government used it to prove their cause was just and the colonies should have no 
more doubt about who the enemies were. As one historian has said, ‘[w]ords won the 
Revolutionary War as much as cannonballs and bayonets’. Along with a costly defeat at 
Bennington at the hands of militia on 16 August 1777, the killing of McCrea did foretell the 
end of Burgoyne’s luck. The Indians had provided little along the route, cost him 
considerably, and now he was going into a major battle without their help. The Continental 
Army did have Indian scouts who were already harassing his regulars’ reconnaissance. The 
Americans had amassed a formidable force in a solid position near the Hudson River and 
Burgoyne was effectively blind to its position. The calamitous battles of Freeman’s Farm 
on 19 September and Bemis Heights on 7 October sealed Burgoyne’s fate. At Saratoga on 
17 October 1777, Burgoyne surrendered his entire surrounded army.397  
In the west, the British allied Indians were just getting started. After supplying Indians 
throughout 1776, but discouraging them from attacking the frontier, Henry Hamilton began 
sending war parties from Detroit in 1777 with the new instructions from Germain to strike 
terror on the frontier, but to ‘restrain them from committing violence on the well affected 
and inoffensive, inhabitants...’ of the Virginian and Pennsylvanian frontiers. At this point 
Carleton had washed his hands of all responsibility for the use of Indians. He forwarded 
Lord Germain’s instructions without further guidance. 398 Predictably, the Indians fought 
the only way they knew how and Hamilton’s name drew curses on the Kentucky frontier 
for the devastation that ensued. By September of 1777, Hamilton claimed that there were 
1,150 Indians on the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontier conducting raids. Hamilton was not 
a man to be limited only by local considerations either. He contacted John Stuart and tried 
to arrange a summit between the Ohio Indians and the Cherokee and Creek to co-ordinate 
their attacks on the settlers. Hamilton always claimed that he exhorted the Indians to 
                                                
396 Graymont, Iroquois, 143- 147 and Luzader, Saratoga, 133-135 
397 Higginbotham, Independence, 188-198 
398 Germain to Carleton 26 March 1777, NA, CO 42/36, 69-72 & BL, Haldimand Papers, Add MS 21781, 4 
L i n z y  | 155 
 
operate by British standards of combat, but the scalps being brought back were telling a 
different story. He was attracted and repelled by the Indians he knew. His journals detailed 
a man at odds with what he was doing, but doing it anyway. There also seems to be little 
evidence that he sent British officers or loyalists to conduct all of the war parties with the 
Indians. Whether he paid cash for scalps or whether he merely supplied the Indians with 
goods in return for proof of their grim duty, Hamilton was named ‘The Hair-Buyer’ by the 
frontier settlers. Regardless of the names he was called and how gruesome the outcome, it 
is clear that Hamilton was very effective at the task that he had been given.399 
By early 1778, the Kentucky frontier was rapidly losing settlers. The memories were 
fresh from the Indian frontier destruction of the 1750s and early 1760s, so the rebel 
governments of Virginian and Pennsylvania knew that the next stage for the Indians would 
be the older Virginia settlements. The British induced Indian attacks had to be stopped and 
Virginia chose George Rogers Clark to do it. Armed with the news that France had entered 
the war on the American side after Burgoyne’s defeat at Saratoga, Clark took a small force 
to capture Kaskaskia and Vincennes in the Illinois country in June of 1778. At Kaskaskia, 
Clark surprised the French residents and captured the fort easily. Far from the British 
stronghold of Detroit, Clark interrogated the French inhabitants and found that many were 
sympathetic to the American cause. Clark convinced them that with the British loss at 
Saratoga and France on the rebel side, the place for this frontier outpost was with the 
Americans. The nearby towns of Cahokia, Prairie du Rocher, and Saint Phillips also fell in 
short order. The Indians in the Illinois country had not felt the pressure of the American 
settlers the way the Ohio and Pennsylvania Indians had, so were far less pro-British. When 
the Indians heard that the French were on the American side, the whole area became more 
malleable to Clark. With the residents of Kaskaskia on side, Clark sent emissaries to 
Vincennes which surrendered quickly, as the British Governor there had already left for 
Detroit. Clark spent the time he had in the Illinois country well by building up a reputation 
for even-handed justice in the towns and signing treaties with the tribes in the area. Indeed, 
Clark’s greatest achievement was not defeating the British, but in diplomatically disarming 
the Indians of the area.400 
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After the American capture of Vincennes, Hamilton was very worried that Clark’s next 
move would be on Detroit and that was what Clark wanted to do. However, as with most 
issues affecting the frontier for both sides, money was short, manpower was shorter and 
leaders back east thought they knew better. With his small force spread wide and severely 
limited by its supply chain, Clark decided to settle in for the winter and plan for bigger 
things in 1779. In contrast, Hamilton did not feel he could leave Vincennes in American 
hands through the winter. He put together a small force of thirty-three British Army 
regulars, one-hundred and forty-two Canadian militia and seventy Indians. To improve his 
Indian numbers, Hamilton sent to the Michilimackinac fort for more who would be led by 
Charles Langlade. Hamilton tried to move fast, but was limited by his Indian allies 
demanding that strict war party custom be observed. Picking up more Indians along the 
way, Hamilton eventually reached Vincennes in December 1778. Hamilton’s force was still 
small, but larger than the American defenders. The American commander of the ragged fort 
at Vincennes saw immediately that he could not defend it with his paltry force. The 
surrender completed a successful campaign for Hamilton, but he would not be satisfied 
until the area had been rid of Clark and his American forces in the Illinois country. 
However, the river-laced area was heavily swollen with floodwaters, so Hamilton decided 
to wait for a Spring offensive.401 
Switching roles, Clark now felt he could not wait for the inevitable and decided to take 
a small group of Americans and French militia, but notably no Indians, on an arduous 
march across the extremely wet country in winter conditions with little support. Clark kept 
the element of surprise by showing up in Vincennes completely unannounced in March 
1779 with his Kentucky sharpshooters. They began picking off the British in the fort and 
getting the French residents to side with them, until Hamilton had no choice but to seek 
terms. Clark personally kept busy by executing several captured Indians in the middle of 
Vincennes in a gruesome manner to make his point. Shocked and worried for his party’s 
lives if they continued to resist, Hamilton finally surrendered the fort. Hamilton had 
become the nervous frontiersman and Clark the savage.402 Hamilton was sent back to 
Virginia and kept in chains for by Virginia Governor Thomas Jefferson who held very firm 
views between ‘civilised’ and ‘savage’ warfare. Jefferson treated many captured British 
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officers very well, but viewed Hamilton as dishonourable for having supported the Indians 
on the Virginia frontier. Hamilton would not be paroled until 1780.403 
With these short histories of Hamilton’s and Burgoyne’s American campaigns, one can 
begin to ask specific questions, make observations, and analyse the effectiveness of their 
use of Indians. Both Burgoyne and Hamilton were dealing with known entities in La Corne 
St. Luc, Charles Langlade, and less notorious Indian agents like Daniel Claus, John 
Johnson, John Butler, and Guy Johnson. These were men who had fought the French and 
Indian War with incredible ferocity. There is little possibility that either Hamilton or 
Burgoyne did not know at least some of the backgrounds of these men. Both La Corne and 
Langlade were well known in Canadian commercial, military, social and political circles. 
Hamilton fought in the French and Indian War, spent many years on the frontier, and was 
surrounded by the French-Canadians of the frontier in Detroit. There is simply no question 
that Hamilton knew what the Indians he was supplying were doing on the frontier. 
Hamilton admits as much in his 29 August - 2 September, 1776 letter to the Earl of 
Dartmouth.404  
On the face of it, Burgoyne might have had a stronger claim to be ignorant of the 
Indians’ proclivities. His Army career prior to 1775 had been exclusively in Europe with 
conventional units. Burgoyne’s life had certainly been more urbane than Hamilton’s to 
date. A noted historian has stated, ‘One would find it difficult to conceive of a character 
less likely to gain insight into Indian culture or less likely to succeed in changing the native 
way of making war’.405 However, the instructions from Lord Germain and Burgoyne’s 
previous service with Indians in Carleton’s 1976 campaign would have been enough to 
alert him to the risks. There is a chance that a man of Burgoyne’s ego merely believed that 
other commanders simply did not command their Indians well enough. Certainly, no one 
ever declared John Burgoyne of being under-confident. The bombast of his 
pronouncements to the Americans and the Indians in June 1777 can only be explained by 
two extremes. Either Burgoyne was cynically making over-the-top pronouncements to 
provide future cover when the inevitable atrocities came to light or he truly believed his 
own presence and direction could tame the Indians. If cynical, Burgoyne could have been 
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hoping that the atrocities would be of the routine variety and he could reap the benefits of 
the Indians without the repercussions to his external honour. If naive, it would not have 
been his only gross miscalculation of the campaign. Burgoyne did hold some rather modern 
ideas of the humanity and value of his troops that endeared him to them compared to other 
officers.406 He might have thought that a similar method and actions could do the same for 
the Indians. Either way, a case can be made that the murder and scalping of the beautiful 
fiancé (McCrea) of a loyalist officer in his campaign would have shocked an officer who 
was operating under either approach. 
Both Burgoyne and Hamilton began their operations by using the Indians effectively.  
In the Burgoyne campaign, the Indians were deployed in the vanguard as scouts and 
skirmishers. Their performance in moving the large British force down the Champlain 
valley with the reconnaissance element in an expeditious manner by keeping the 
commander informed and the path clear helped secure Ticonderoga and Crown Point 
easily.  However, when the campaign slowed east of Lake George, Burgoyne began to lose 
control of the Indians. The lack of pace frustrated the Indians who wanted to attack, 
plunder, and go home. If Burgoyne had either stayed on the water by using Lake George or 
designed hunting and raiding missions for the Indians to keep them busy, he might have 
made more effective use of them. When the Indians began devising and conducting their 
own parties the atrocities began. The chastisements and restrictions that followed the 
McCrea murder drove away those Indians that were still present, leaving Burgoyne 
virtually blind when he needed the Indians the most as he sought the American positions 
near Saratoga.  
Although not wanting them to conduct missions on behalf of the British initially, 
Hamilton still supplied the Indians in 1776, knowing they would use the supplies to fall on 
the outposts that most aggrieved them. These attacks laid the foundation for his ‘hair buyer’ 
sobriquet, deserving or not, but also helped keep the American settlements in the midwest 
from actively supporting the war effort in the east. Hamilton certainly kept track of the 
number of scalps brought to him as shown by his correspondence. When Hamilton, by 
Germain’s orders, actually began sanctioning Indian attacks in 1777, albeit with 
instructions not to harass or kill innocents, Virginians were outraged enough to take action 
against British interests in the midwest. To this point, the British had been able to maintain 
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their forts and keep the rebels at bay in the midwest with virtually no troops, so one would 
have to describe this as effective use of the Indians. The raids accomplished the goals of 
keeping the flank secure, keeping frontier militia members at home in defence, and creating 
calls for help from the frontiers to the Continental Army. However, once Clark succeeded 
in capturing and subverting British control in the Illinois country, Hamilton found his 
means limited to respond.  By trying to use the Indians as a conventional force to march on, 
take, and hold Vincennes in 1778, Hamilton expected the Indians to perform the duties of a 
British Army unit. He gained no great strategic advantage and lost much respect from the 
Indians. His inability to prove to the western Indians and eventually the Ohio Indians that 
the British were going to defeat the rebels meant the Indians would be less likely to 
continue their active operations in the midwest.407 
Hamilton and Burgoyne shared the same language of military honour, but had different 
honour groups. Hamilton knew the Indian capabilities very well and had a deeper 
relationship with the Indians in his area than Burgoyne did. Hamilton’s drawings of Indians 
and notes on their culture show that he had at least a passing admiration for their culture 
and their plight. Hamilton knew the advantages of using the Indians in raiding frontier 
settlements. The fear and panic caused on the frontier by the Indian raiding parties were the 
intermediate goals of the military mission. Hamilton’s use of Indians for frontier raiding 
missions, though needing to be couched in appropriate language and qualifying 
instructions, were effectively sanctioning the Indian style of warfare. The qualifying 
instructions served as a kind of plausible deniability, to use modern terminology. The 
ability to plausibly deny any direct participation in the raids is telling as it showed that 
Hamilton did care about how the missions would be viewed by his peers and society. 
However, when Hamilton used the Indians directly, he had to establish far more control 
over them and this undoubtedly reduced their effectiveness. However, this fact cannot be 
held too strongly against Hamilton as he had very few other choices for troops either. 
Contrasted to Hamilton, Burgoyne did restrict his options on how to use the Indians 
from the very start of his campaign. Although the Indians were useful early in the 
campaign, the direct control that he sought over their actions offended them. Therefore, 
when the going became more difficult, they were far less amenable to adapting. The 
proclamations of June 1777 are telling of Burgoyne’s mindset. The proclamation to the 
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rebels threatens to unleash the Indians upon the frontiers with bloody consequences, but his 
proclamations to the Indians show direct prohibition of the very behaviour he has 
threatened. In a very neat package, Burgoyne was explicitly acknowledging that he 
believed that the rebels would fear British backed Indians on the rampage, but he held the 
Indians back to maintain the decorum that an officer and gentleman was expected to keep. 
Burgoyne and Hamilton both were concerned over Indian action in their commands, but 
only Hamilton did not let this affect his decisions on how to best use them to accomplish 
his mission. Burgoyne restricted the Indian use from the start and caused a collapse in their 
support when the inevitable atrocities came to light. This hindered his operations 
dramatically. Hamilton continued to use the Indians as best he could until his capture. 
Although their mission and capabilities were different, it is hard to see how Hamilton could 
have used them any more effectively and hard to see how Burgoyne could have used them 
less effectively. 
From 1774 to the end of 1777, the British had prepared Indians to help them win their 
war against the American rebels. Scarce attention had been paid to why the Indians would 
want to fight with the British. The British assumption seemed to be that the Indians would 
want to fight for the British regardless of whether it served their interests or not. When the 
British received Indian allies who were only present for the glory and plunder, like the 
western Indians with Burgoyne, it cost them dearly in the propaganda war. When the 
British allied with Indians that had disputes with settlers over land, they got a far more 
balanced type of action, but the British still seemed surprised that the Indians would use the 
chance to fall on settlers who were squatting on land the Indians claimed, regardless if they 
were rebel or loyalist.408  
As to the question of a stain against their military honour, all British Army officers 
surveyed in this chapter, except Thomas Gage, seemed concerned about the use of Indians 
to some degree. Gage and Lord Dartmouth were willing to unleash the Indians in the 
offense with the slightest of excuses, but disregard for their orders ensured that the 
ramifications of their decisions did not haunt them as it did with others. Henry Hamilton 
was the most effective and the most vilified in his treatment, although it did not impinge on 
his future career in the British Empire. John Burgoyne is the most interesting for his use 
within a larger campaign, his high profile personality in London, and the catastrophic 
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failure of his use of Indians. His defence of his honour in Parliament will form part of the 
next chapter’s examination of the debate on Indian use in Britain. Sir Guy Carleton’s 
principled stand on the use of the Indians and his view of them will also be brought out in 
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‘What is honor?... ile none of it.’ 
- Falstaff409 
7. Capitulation. 
After the catastrophe of the Burgoyne campaign in 1777, the British took a hard look at 
their operations. Large scale operations that tried to treat the Indians like the Hessian 
mercenaries were not working. The Indians had no desire for British Army discipline and 
they shared none of the European martial culture with them as the Hessians had. Compared 
to Burgoyne’s fiasco, Hamilton’s operations were a success. His coterie of midwestern 
Indians had drawn away resources from the east at very little cost by forcing the Americans 
to re-enforce the backcountry settlements of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas. 
However, those operations were not without criticism either. The British Governor of 
Vincennes, Edward Abbot, wrote to Sir Guy Carleton in June 1778 stating that the 
inhabitants of the backcountry would have, 
put them themselves under His Majesty’s protection were there a 
possibility: that not being the case, these poor unhappy people are 
forced to take up arms against their Sovereign, or be pillaged & left 
to starve; cruel alternative. This is too shocking a subject to dwell 
upon. Your Excellency’s known humanity will certainly put a stop 
if possible to such proceedings, as it is not the people in arms that 
Indians will ever daringly attack; but the poor inoffensive family 
that fly to the deserts to be out of trouble, and are inhumanely 
butchered sparing neither women or children.410 
This impassioned plea would echo conversations in London, but Carleton had long 
since washed his hands of a policy that he had scorned from its inception. However, there 
was also not much choice if Britain were not to give up on the whole enterprise of keeping 
the colonies in the Empire. With the minutemen of the northeast, the Continental Army in 
the mid-Atlantic, and the rebel militia in the south being harder to conquer than expected, 
the British became less concerned about the prospect of Indians committing atrocities on 
the frontier than they were of losing the war. This period was ushered in by the French and 
the Spanish entering the war on the American side and the Dutch financing it, so, once 
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again, European circumstances were driving British decision making. Additionally, the fear 
of the Indians attacking loyalists began to fade as the British establishment realised that the 
number of loyalists was much smaller than they originally had hoped. The British 
continued to try to control the actions of the allied Indians with loyalist officers and some 
lower ranking British Army officers. However, from 1778 to the end of the war, the British 
Army forsook using large bodies of Indians in major campaigns. These new operations 
were far more focused and took advantage of the Great Lakes forts that the British could 
communicate with more reliably. Unsurprisingly, these operations were more successful as 
they were much better aligned with the various tribes’ objectives of clearing out the frontier 
settlements.411 
However, their own officials were not the only ones lamenting the damage being done 
by the Indians on the frontier. The reports, of sober truth and hysterical rumour, continued 
to fuel the American propaganda fire. The accusation of massacres and atrocities filled 
American and British newspapers. Interestingly, as the British allied Indians stepped up 
their frontier operations against the Americans from 1778 to 1782, the conversation about 
their use was reaching a fever pitch in London. Edmund Burke stood up in Parliament to 
denounce the practice of employing Indians against the Americans as did the aging William 
Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, stating that Britain had set  
the savages of America loose upon their innocent inoffending [sic] 
brethren; loose upon the weak, the aged, the defenceless; on old 
men, women, and children; upon the very babes upon the breast to 
be cut, mangled, sacrificed, broiled, roasted, nay, to be liberally 
eaten.412 
With eminent statesmen and frontier officials abhorring the use of Indians, it is hard to 
imagine their use any further, but there were supporters as well. The Earl of Suffolk stated 
that using the Indians was necessary to win and the rebels had brought the scourge upon 
themselves due to their rebellion against lawful obedience to the King.413 John Burgoyne 
was brought before Parliament in the spring of 1778 to explain his use of Indians in 1777. 
He promptly blamed it on Germain’s orders and claimed that he did not really mean to 
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implement the Indian threat he had issued to the Americans. Germain went so far as to 
challenge another Member of Parliament to a duel over the question of his honour on the 
issue. The opposition to Lord North’s government took every opportunity to beat them with 
his administration’s alleged inhumanity in using the Indians against the Americans.414 With 
such a fractious political situation in Britain, there was also a fair amount of hypocrisy. The 
Earl of Chatham was accused of using Indians when he was leading government, but 
condemning it when in opposition. The Earl of Chatham claimed that he knew they were 
used, because the French General Montcalm had used them first and left Britain with no 
choice. However the Earl contended that he had never issued orders to British Officers to 
use the Indians. He sought Lord Amherst’s support on the issue, but was rebuffed when 
Amherst declared he could prove that he had been instructed to use Indians and could 
produce correspondence to prove it.415 Upon hearing of the Earl of Chatham’s assertions, 
Lord Bute was incredulous and claimed to have documentation that showed how willingly 
the Indians were used in the Seven Years’ War.416 In short, there was no coherent 
government plan in London to prosecute the war with Indian allies, nor an agreement on the 
morality or efficacy of the use of Indians.  
It would be going too far to state that the atrocities committed by the Indians in the 
Saratoga campaign or the midwest frontier were the sole cause that added an old enemy to 
the war against Britain. France had many reasons to side with the Americans after 1777, but 
Benjamin Franklin, working as American Ambassador to France, regaled the Parisian 
salons with the stories of Indian atrocities. Once the French recognized the new country and 
joined in its defence in the spring of 1778, Benjamin Franklin and the Marquis de Lafayette 
began brainstorming ideas on the types of propaganda that would be most effective against 
the British. These included prints that depicted ‘Savages killing and scalping the Frontier 
Farmers and their Families, Women and Children, English Officers mix'd with the Savages, 
& giving them Orders & encouraging them’ and ‘The King of England, giving Audience to 
his Secretary at War, who presents him a Schedule intitled [sic] Acct. of Scalps. which he 
receives very graciously’ among others.417 The introduction of France, and soon thereafter 
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Spain, into the war meant the British now had far more to worry about than securing the 
American midwest. 
The setbacks of 1777 had not been expected, so London had not designed a new 
strategy by the spring of 1778. As it had in the Seven Years’ War in North America, 
necessity drove the British to consider their options and they were few. The previously 
successful operations around Philadelphia were now being strained. Lieutenant General 
Howe had resigned at the end of 1777. Lieutenant General Henry Clinton took command of 
His Majesty’s forces in North America. The new threat to Britain from France meant that 
more forces from Britain would be extremely unlikely. Clinton and the civilians in London 
came to the conclusion that the only option left was to attack Georgia with the bulk of the 
remaining forces and make their way north while gaining loyalist forces. The Indians would 
be unleashed on the frontiers to keep the patriot ranks on the coast from swelling. However, 
Clinton’s plan had little direction for the commanders in the interior, so they had to 
improvise answers to the problems they faced locally. With few British regulars in Canada 
and Burgoyne vanquished, Quebec looked weak again. It would be even harder to defend a 
renewed American attack. One way to slow the Americans down would be to destroy the 
Anglo towns and crops in the bread basket of the Mohawk valley. The panic caused and the 
destruction of food could affect the operations of the Continental Army. This plan also had 
the advantage of allowing the British allied Iroquois and loyalists to take revenge for their 
losses and secure their villages in the valley. However, Sir Guy Carleton was still holding 
his view that the Indians should be used in defence only and he resumed the use of the 
Canadian Indians after Burgoyne’s defeat. Therefore, the first half of 1778 was relatively 
quiet on the northern frontier. If the leaders in western New York wanted different 
guidance, Carleton directed their attention to his replacement, Major General Frederick 
Haldimand.418 
Haldimand was a Swiss officer who had served the British Army in the Seven Years’ 
War in North America, as well as several European armies previously. He later served in 
East Florida. He had seen Indian combat up close and had no illusions about being able to 
control them once in the field.419 The only senior officers who had arguably seen more 
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Indian combat in North America were Thomas Gage and Henry Bouquet, though Gage had 
returned to Britain and Bouquet had died in West Florida in 1765. Haldimand took 
command in June 1778. He was immediately worried about Quebec and the possibility of a 
new combined threat from the Americans and the French. Since he could spare no regulars 
himself, he was sympathetic to those proposing loyalist and Indian operations out of Fort 
Niagara. Initially, these operations were not directed from London, nor did they have senior 
British officials in attendance. As Hamilton was doing, the officers at Fort Niagara were 
facing up to the fact that if they did not attack, their homes and those of the Indians might 
be overrun by Americans. This new way of operating also involved men who the Indians 
trusted and who understood their motivations, like Lieutenant Colonel John Butler, his son 
Captain Walter Butler, Guy Johnson, John Johnson, and Joseph Brant. The area of 
operations also tended to be places that the Indians cared about as well. They rarely were 
conducted in direct co-ordination with British forces. However, they did have the desired 
effect of drawing off American forces from the eastern campaigns. For the most part, the 
British officers leading these forces were loyalists who attained military rank through their 
merit or connections, but had little in common with regular British Army officers. Their 
honour groups, namely their friends and family, resided on the frontier and their interests 
and opinions were what they measured themselves against. These operations would form 
the organization that would define British operations in America until 1794.420 
Lieutenant Colonel John Butler had been authorized to form a battalion of loyalist 
rangers after the collapse of St. Leger’s campaign against Fort Stanwix in 1777. He 
employed his son as senior Captain in command of one of the companies. Captain William 
Caldwell was another, as well as the Mohawk Joseph Brant. By May 1778, Brant was 
active in the Cherry valley and Butler’s Indian allies were active in the Susquehanna 
valley.421 On 30 May 1778, he and his company struck Cobleskill where he defeated the 
local militia and secured livestock for his force. By June, John Butler’s force was ready to 
take to the field with Indian allies. The first target was the Wyoming Valley on the north 
fork of the Susquehanna River. The area had known Indian raids for years and was 
prepared with militia and blockhouses for each of the small settlements. Butler’s force 
consisted of 110 rangers and 500 Seneca and Cayuga. Butler worked from settlement to 
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settlement picking off unwitting logging or hunting parties. Eventually, the local militia 
decided to sally forth to meet Butler. His force received word that the patriots were 
marching, so they laid an ambush. Butler’s force routed the Americans, killing 302 and 
leaving a trail of butchery, but seemingly only against combatants. Some of the American 
force escaped to another fort, but Butler followed and issued the ultimatum that they should 
surrender or face the wrath of his Indian allies. The American commanders complied and 
the entire community became refugees flowing east. The Indians had been held in check 
and did not molest the fleeing civilians, but they did destroy hundreds of houses and forts. 
The refugees told tales of a massacre which, of course, fanned the propaganda flames 
again. When Butler’s Indian allies heard the tales, they became enraged that their humanity 
had not been acknowledged, but flagrantly manipulated. They would seek their revenge 
later in the year. In September, Brant and his Mohawks joined Captain William Caldwell’s 
Rangers to attack German Flats along the Mohawk River. The human toll was not as large 
as the Wyoming raid, because the settlers managed to cram into a few well defended forts. 
However, the destruction of property and the stealing of livestock devastated the area.422 
The Americans tried to strike back to stem the tide, but most of their raids were 
ineffective. However, at the Indian village of Oquaga, they managed to destroy a large store 
of corn, burn the village and kill the wife of an Oneida chief. The most notorious event 
happened on 11 November 1778 when a force led by Captain Walter Butler and Joseph 
Brant attacked the Cherry valley. Butler and Brant caught the settlers by surprise and killed 
most of them. The carnage inflicted by the Indians on surrendering civilians got so bad that 
Butler actually protected a party of Americans and escorted them to safety. Brant also tried 
actively to curtail the atrocities by leaving his war paint on young girls to signify his 
protection of them. Cherry valley was merely the largest toll. Butler’s and Brant’s forces 
conducted smaller raids throughout the area in the second half of 1778. Some of these 
occurred to villages so far east that they had not experienced Indian attacks in living 
memory.423 Word of the Cherry valley ‘massacre’ reached Haldimand by December of 
1778 and he was quick to let Major John Butler and his son know that they needed to re-
double their efforts at restraining the Indians.  
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I have also received your letters of the 1st of December enclosing 
Captain Butler’s relation of his operations at Cherry Valley, the 
success of which would have afforded great satisfaction if his 
endeavors to prevent the excess to which the Indians in their fury 
are so apt to run, had proved effectual; it is however very much to 
his credit that he gave proofs of his own disapprobation of such 
proceeding; and I hope that you and every Officer serving with the 
Savages, will never cease your Exhortations to them, till you shall 
at length convince them, that such indiscriminate vengeance, taken 
even upon the treacherous and Cruel Enemy they are engaged 
against, is as useless and disreputable to themselves, as it is contrary 
to the disposition and maxims of their King whose cause they are 
fighting.424 
By early 1779, the mass evacuation of the Susquehanna valley was causing 
consternation in the American government. Pressure was swelling for Congress and 
General George Washington to do something. Lord Germain, having survived the criticism 
in Parliament for using Indians, began 1779 more committed to the endeavour than ever. In 
a letter to Haldimand, he states, ‘The astonishing Activity & Success of Joseph Brant's 
Enterprises, and the important Consequences with which they have been attended, give him 
a Claim to every Mark of Our Regard, and which you think would be pleasing to him.' 
This is Lord Germain talking about a Mohawk Indian who has been accused of routine 
atrocities in New York throughout 1778. Not only is Lord Germain not discussing 
curtailing the activities, but he is considering offering him a ‘Commission signed by His 
Majesty, appointing him a Colonel of Indians’.425 And it was not just Brant. Lord Germain 
mentions the Butlers in high regard, but counsels Haldimand, 'you will acquaint them that 
their Care to prevent the Indians from molesting the unarmed Inhabitants, is much approved 
by the King'. Lord Germain continued to inform Haldimand of Sir Henry Clinton’s plan for 
the south in the coming season and that he had informed John Stuart to support the 
backcountry Indians to participate where they could. With the level of acrimony and 
recrimination in Parliament and the British press in 1778, this letter is the best evidence that 
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the British government had decided that there was no other choice but to use the Indians 
whole-heartedly.426 However, this decision to use Indians does not mean that everyone 
agreed on the frontier. Buried in a long letter that was mainly concerned with supply issues, 
Lieutenant Colonel Mason Bolton shared concerns that  
I am really of opinion that to keep the Indians in good temper (as 
it’s called) has cost old England much more than all the Posts are 
worth, & as to their Scalping Women Children & Prisoners I find 
it’s not impossible to prevent them, such cruelties must make an 
Expedition very disagreeable to the King’s troops when needed on 
Service with them.427 
Although concerns such as Bolton’s were not uncommon, the need to use Indians 
overcame the risks. To prove that Lord Germain was correct in his assumption that the 
Indian operations were having the desired effects, the Susquehanna valley was not the only 
problem facing Washington. The raids in the Ohio had never let up and Washington was 
forced to send a force, in addition to George Rogers Clark’s, to the Pittsburgh area to help 
relieve the suffering of the frontier settlements. The British southern sector was active, but 
limited in its success. Stuart had tried to rally the Creeks and a few Cherokee to support 
Clinton’s operations in the south. However, each time the backcountry rebels got word of 
an Indian offensive, they sent parties to cut them off. The southern Indians, especially the 
Cherokee who were already short on food, became despondent and were not much help. To 
add to their misery, their long-time friend and supporter, John Stuart, died in March 1779. 
However, even these small parties of Indians raised and supported by Stuart managed to 
draw off American forces that were sorely needed in the south.428 
For the Mohawk valley, Washington would need something much larger. This area was 
a strategic reserve for his Continental Army. He was trying to limit the major operations to 
the seaboard and use areas like the Susquehanna valley as safe havens in times of trouble. 
However, the attacks from Niagara had put all of that at risk. For the summer of 1779, 
Washington planned an operation against the Indians that would rival any that the British 
had conducted in the Seven Years’ War or Pontiac’s rebellion. He ordered Major General 
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John Sullivan to march through the heart of Iroquoia and destroy all of the villages and 
farmland in his path. Unlike the Continental Army of the early war, Sullivan’s Expedition 
had clear objectives, routes, and alternative plans for what they might encounter. They were 
also as well supplied as any American force could be and led by competent leaders in 
Sullivan, Brigadier General James Clinton and Colonel Daniel Brodhead. The expedition 
took three different routes into the Iroquois lands with Sullivan and Clinton eventually 
joining forces. From July to September of 1779, Sullivan’s forces devastated the Iroquois 
homeland. He was in search of decisive battle to reduce the ranks of Iroquois warriors 
available to the British, but all he found was deserted towns with houses and farmland, 
which American soldiers marveled were similar to their own. Sullivan’s troops did not let 
the lack of battle slow their work as they burned houses, uprooted fruit trees and levelled 
crops. On 29 August, Sullivan got as close to decisive battle as he would ever get. The 
Butlers and Brant had set up breastworks near Newtown with approximately 800 Indians, 
loyalists, and Rangers. Sullivan arrayed his forces in a conventional manner and assaulted 
the breastwork with artillery and maneuver. The British force melted away almost 
immediately. Sullivan continued his devastation until early October, but met with few 
Indians or British forces. In the end, the expedition destroyed forty Indian villages and their 
means of subsistence.429  
Although Sullivan was not able to take Fort Niagara as Washington had hoped, he did 
force 3,700 Iroquois refugees to descend on it. The clearance of the Iroquois homeland was 
also badly timed, because it came right after news of Governor Henry Hamilton’s capture 
by George Rogers Clark. Haldimand wrote to Lord Germain in September of 1779 that he 
had concern that ‘our Indian allies have it in contemplation to desert us’.430 The loss of the 
Detroit-supplied Indians would have been a major loss to the British. Luckily for 
Haldimand, the resolve of the Iroquois, especially the Seneca, helped restore the faith in the 
British cause, mainly because both sides saw that continuing was in their own interests. The 
winter of 1779-1780 was particularly harsh on everyone at Niagara, but the refugees were 
especially hard hit. By the summer and fall of 1780, Niagara was once again sending out 
war parties, but the logistical strain would mean that Fort Niagara would never be able to 
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operate as effectively as it had in 1778.431 Throughout the period of Sullivan’s Expedition, 
Haldimand continued to encourage and supply the Indians of Niagara and Detroit. In an 
unusual display, for a senior British officer, he not only encouraged the Indians around 
Niagara to fight for the King, but to fight for their own lands. Haldimand understood that 
the strength of the Indian alliance was built on mutual benefit. Brant continued his raiding 
of the American settlements as far east as the Delaware River even while Sullivan was 
destroying his homeland. In Haldimand, Brant, and the Butlers, the British alliance had 
found a way to accomplish much with very little. The episode was a disaster for the 
Iroquois people, but it would continue to occupy American forces that were needed 
elsewhere.432  
From 1780, the Indian raids continued to be effective and encouraged by the British 
officials and officers. Guy Johnson, who eventually made it back to his Iroquois charges in 
1779, wrote to Haldimand that a force of 220 Indians under Brant had been harassing the 
‘Wioming’ [sic], but was careful to point out their humanity by stating that Brant had 
‘liberated above twenty women and Children’ who had fallen into the Indians hands.433 
Continuing his campaign to secure more support for his Indian operations, Johnson later 
wrote to Lord Germain in July of 1780 from Niagara that  
The partys [sic] have ranged along the rear of New York, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia, and although (unaccompanied with 
troops) their mode of Warfare does not admit of any thing capital, it 
is still of much importance to His Majestys [sic] service in keeping 
the rebels in a continued state of Alarm and apprehension, and 
destroying their resources.434 
In Kentucky, George Rogers Clark had to arrange a new expedition into the Ohio 
country to stymie the multitude of attacks south of the Ohio River. The raids were mostly 
conducted from Forts Niagara and Detroit by Indians with or without rangers, but there 
were also smaller attacks and sometimes even larger campaigns coordinated with British 
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regular forces. Major Arent De Peyster, who had replaced Hamilton at Detroit, 
implemented the most complex Indian plan to date with attacks down the Mississippi by 
Langlade, on the falls of the Ohio (modern day Louisville, Kentucky) by Captain Henry 
Bird, and, if possible, to secure Vincennes again. All of these operations had been planned 
and communicated by Lord Germain. Captain Henry Bird’s force was comprised of 150-
200 British Army regulars and 500 Indians.435 Leading the Indians were British Indian 
Department agents, Matthew Elliott, Alexander McKee, and Simon Girty. These three men 
played a significant role for the British in recruiting and managing the midwest Indians 
from 1780 to the end of the war. They were often successful in their aims of supporting the 
British war effort, but were often unable to control their Indian charges. On the Bird 
expedition, from May to July of 1780, the Indians refused to attack Clark’s fort at the falls 
of the Ohio even with the support of British artillery. Bird had to re-direct his force to 
softer targets near the Licking River in central Kentucky to please the Indians. When the 
British and Indian force came to Ruddell’s and Martin’s stations, Bird warned the 
settlements that if they chose to resist that he could not guarantee their safety from the 
Indians. Seeing the British artillery, the settlers knew they would eventually succumb and 
decided to surrender without a protracted siege. Unfortunately, Bird’s promise of safety 
was not entirely secured. At Ruddell’s station, the Indians slaughtered some of the 
defenders anyway. At both Ruddell’s and Martin’s stations, the Indians destroyed all of the 
cattle and food that they could not carry. Now having to support nearly 300 prisoners as 
well as his force and low on supplies, Bird determined to turn back to Detroit where he 
arrived on 4 August, 1780. Although the campaign had been devastating where it struck, it 
had to forego the further missions of trying to reclaim Vincennes and strike Clark’s force 
due to a lack of supplies.436 This situation perturbed General Haldimand. In August Major 
DePeyster passed along a request from the midwest Indians for Haldimand to send more 
British Army units to conduct joint raids into the American held frontier. Haldimand stated 
that he would not send further troops and it was the Indians fault, because they had 
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prematurely curtailed Bird’s mission with their indiscriminate slaughter of cattle that could 
have extended Bird’s campaign by months.437 
That these operations affected the New York, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky frontiers is 
clear, but it is harder to prove how much they assisted the overall British war effort. 
However, the raids on the New York frontier in the summer were no doubt meant to assist 
the seaboard operations. In an unaddressed letter from General Haldimand marked ‘Secret 
& Confidential’, he stated that the operations on the frontier were spreading general alarm 
and ‘it is to be hoped something will transpire from the Neighbourhood of New York, as it 
is reported that General Clinton has returned there.’438 This note provides some evidence 
that Haldimand’s Indian and ranger operations had the support of the major British Army 
operations on the seaboard in mind. They were not envisioned as operations purely for their 
own purposes. 
The year 1780 had been a huge success for Lord Cornwallis in the south. The rebels 
were reeling and the constant harassment of the backcountry settlements were a large part 
of the problem for the rebels. The argument over Indians had not died down in London. In 
1780, Burgoyne published his journals of the Saratoga Campaign and, in a twist of fate, 
began supporting the opposition on the American question.439 Many still condemned the 
use of Indians, especially unescorted, but after 1777 the British understood that the Indians 
were no longer just a possibility, but a requirement to defeat the rebels. It had taken five 
years, but the British had found a way to vex the American backcountry and conduct 
coherent operations on the seaboard simultaneously. Lord Cornwallis was one of the British 
officers who had promulgated the idea of treating the rebels humanely to encourage them to 
reconsider their rebellion.440 However, by late 1780, even he used Indians to relieve 
pressure on his seaboard forces. In December of 1780, Lord Cornwallis wrote to Sir Henry 
Clinton, when backcountry rebels were causing trouble for British forces, that he should 
engage Thomas Brown to 'encourage the Indians to attack the settlement of Watoga, 
Holstein, Caentuck, and Notachuckie, [sic] all which are new encroachments on Indian 
territories. The good effects of this have already appeared'.441  
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If even Lord Cornwallis was coming around to the idea of using Indians more liberally, 
it stands to reason that worries about atrocities were lower, even in the north where Indians 
were be used heavily. In May 1780, General Haldimand wrote to Daniel Claus, an Indian 
agent at Niagara, in response to a request from him for guidance, stating that he should send 
whites with the Indians who know the loyalists in the areas being raided. General 
Haldimand added, ‘Which I hope will in a great measure lessen an Evil, which in the 
present Situation of Affairs, cannot intirely [sic] be prevented.’442 Further, he addressed the 
topic of Indian prisoner taking that makes explicit that he believed the Indians and the 
rebels were both subject to the King’s authority. Haldimand states, 
The idea of Adoption must be totally discouraged, and you will 
inform them [Mohawks] that the present war, being different from a 
Foreign one, all the King’s undutiful Children who are taken in it 
Whether by White Men or Indians, must be Delivered up, to be 
corrected by their father, as he shall think fit.443 
In 1781, the operations continued across the frontier. In the north, the Mohawk valley 
was deserted, so Guy Johnson looked further afield. He sent a force of 1,200 regulars and 
Indians, led by British Army Major John Ross, on an attack on Schenectady, New York, 
but they were thwarted and chased back to Niagara. In the retreat, Captain Walter Butler 
was captured and executed.444 However, the Ohio Indians were as deadly as ever as they 
continued to pound the Pennsylvania backcountry and the Kentucky settlements. Joseph 
Brant had even moved his forces into the Ohio region due to a lack of opportunities in the 
Mohawk valley.445 Throughout this period, General Haldimand can be found writing letters 
to the British officers dealing with the Indians and giving directions as well as cautioning 
them about Indian tactics and targets. To Brigadier Powell at Niagara in April 1781, he 
advised, ‘Keep intelligent Scouts Constantly abroad, in all Quarters, not Composed Entirely 
of Indians & these should have positive directions not to Discover themselves by taking 
Scalps, but to endeavour to bring off Prisoners & learn what is doing in the Country.’446 
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On 24 April, he said much the same to Guy Johnson.447 These types of operations 
continued throughout the summer of 1781, even though General Haldimand seemed to wish 
for a more substantial campaign, possibly in support of Lord Cornwallis who had recently 
returned to Virginia after Pyrrhic victories in North Carolina.  
However, by the autumn of 1781, he had resigned himself to keeping the frontier in 
flames and destroying as much of the rebel support network as possible. In a letter to 
Brigadier General Powell, he gave his normal orders to send out rangers and Indians and 
cautioned,  
You will give these Parties orders effectually to Destroy all kinds of 
Grains & Forrage - Mils & Cattle, and all Articles which Can 
contribute to the Support of the Enemy. They will as usual, have the 
strongest Injunctions to avoid the destruction of Women and 
Children, and every Species of Cruelty.448 
However, in this letter he added something that makes clear that Haldimand did not 
feel these restrictions applied to other Indians. ‘to extirpate the remaining unfriendly 
Oneidas, who much impede our Scouts and Recruiting Parties…’449 At this point in the 
war, the northern Indians were very effective at keeping the rebels off guard. General 
Haldimand conducted the war in the way it had to be conducted in the midwest to ensure 
British opportunities on the seaboard. However, by late 1781, the old warrior had resigned 
himself to Indian warfare, but was becoming cynical about the Indians’ motives. 
It is difficult to alter their System of war, and rendered so by a 
Succession of Presents which they claim upon every trifling 
Excursion – the Petite guerre is now become a Lucrative Profession, 
their ease and [unreadable] is gratified by it, and a total defeat of the 
Enemy or a sudden peace would be equally unacceptable to them.450 
The Indian and ranger activities in the north continued their effectiveness throughout 
1781. However, the Cherokees and the Creeks in the south were losing their will. The 
Cherokee had had their homes invaded many times by the Americans and they were living 
as refugees. The Creeks were struggling with disease. At the same time, American General 
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Nathaniel Greene had turned a series of tactical defeats into strategic victories in the south. 
Lord Cornwallis had found himself chasing ghosts and eventually ran out of luck. In 
October 1781, Lord Cornwallis found himself trapped near Yorktown and surrendered his 
forces.451 
The defeat at Yorktown ended major British operations on the east coast and serious 
peace negotiations got underway in Paris, but frontier operations continued for nearly a 
year afterwards. In March of 1782, the Indians of the Moravian mission at Gnadenhütten in 
western Pennsylvania were murdered by a band of Pennsylvania militia dead set on taking 
revenge on the Indians, even if they were not the Indians causing the problems. The Indians 
of the Ohio region were incensed. When another force of Pennsylvania militia led by 
Colonel William Crawford attacked the Ohio Indian villages in June 1782, the Indians and 
British rangers, led by Captain William Caldwell and Matthew Elliott, met them and 
annihilated the force. Many of the wounded prisoners were killed and Colonel Crawford 
was grievously tortured to death in retaliation for Gnadenhütten.452 In August 1782, a large 
British force led by Captain Caldwell, loyalists Simon Girty, and Indian agents Alexander 
McKee and Matthew Elliott attacked the Kentucky settlement of Bryan’s Station with 
several hundred Ohio warriors. The fort was alerted to the British force and managed to 
hold it off until Kentucky militia arrived. The British and Indian force retreated and the 
militia followed in hot pursuit unaware that the Indians had set a trap for them. At the 
Battle of Blue Licks, on 19 August 1782, the militia lost sixty-six dead and many more 
wounded. There would be more raids throughout the 1780s, especially in the Ohio region, 
but for all intents and purposes, the British Indian alliance had ended. The Kentuckians 
called on George Rogers Clark again to retaliate against the perpetrators of the Battle of 
Blue Licks. The invasion of the Ohio country fizzled out as the Indians deserted their 
homes and the Americans had to content themselves again with destroying empty 
villages.453	  
The last five years of the American Revolution saw the coming of age of a new way of 
warfare for the British. Specifically, medium sized parties of Indians with rangers and led 
by British officers had proven themselves incredibly effective against the Americans. It was 
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the culmination of all the experience since Edward Braddock’s defeat in 1755. Those skills 
would be very useful for the Indians who would try to retain their homelands over the next 
twelve years with and without the British. Although sporadically used and poorly managed, 
they would also be useful for the British who were trying to retain their influence in the 
American midwest from 1783-1815. By 1782, there certainly seemed to be little reluctance 
on the part of British officials at any level to engage Indian allies against the Americans. 
There were often admonishments to act humanely to prisoners, the elderly, women and 
children, but these were often words with good intentions, but little credible meaning. 
Benjamin Franklin, playing his role of chief overseas propaganda officer, continued to play 
to the French proclivity of seeing the British as hypocrites on the issue of Indian atrocities. 
He had a New England newspaper print a manufactured report from Indians to King 
George III about a fictitious parcel of scalps ‘cured, dried, hooped, and painted’ and 
separated into packs. Among the packs in the report were, ‘Farmers killed in their houses’, 
‘Women; hair long… to shew they were Mothers’, Girls’ Scalps, big and little’, and 
‘Infants’ Scalps of various Sizes’.454 When atrocities were in evidence, they made headlines 
on both sides of the Atlantic, but they did not materially affect deployments. The sheer 
volume of the reports, both true and manufactured, seemed to desensitize the British public.  
However, the presence of Sir Guy Carleton and John Stuart had delayed the use of 
Indians for the two critical years of 1775-1776. No other senior British officials seemed as 
committed to the solely defensive use of Indians as Carleton and Stuart. Their clearly stated 
reasons for not using the Indians in the offense from 1775 to 1776 showed that their 
concern for humanity, especially towards innocents, was their overarching goal. Carleton’s 
and Stuart’s honour groups were slightly different, but the call upon them came from the 
same tradition. Whether internal honour drove their decisions or a desire to protect their 
external reputations is not clear, but it is also not required to make the point. This late start 
may not have lost the war for the British, but it most certainly grossly hindered the British 
effort. Their later use was largely successful in distracting the Americans and keeping the 
full force of their arms from being deployed on the coast. Of course, Indian atrocities drew 
criticism on both sides of the Atlantic and the Whigs (Americans and British) certainly won 
the propaganda war on the issue. There is little evidence that the condemnation in Britain or 
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America would have been more strenuous had the British unleashed the Indians offensively 
in 1775-1776 rather than 1777-1782. It is possible, however, that starting earlier might have 
changed the course, if not the very result, of the war.  
In September 1783, the British and the Americans signed the Treaty of Paris ending the 
Revolutionary War without a single mention of the Indians of the midwest. The Americans 
were granted the land to the Mississippi River from the Great Lakes to Florida. East and 
West Florida reverted to Spanish control. The Indians were shocked that once again their 
lands had been signed away without their consent just as they had been in 1763. The 
Iroquois land was devastated, but the Ohio and southern Indians felt that they still had not 
been defeated. The idea that they had lost their land to the Americans seemed laughable, 
since they still directly controlled the overwhelming majority of the midwest. The 
American officials took an uncompromising line towards the Indians. They felt that the 
British allied Indians had chosen sides poorly and must suffer the consequences of those 
choices. The Indians were just as dismissive of the Americans. They told the Americans 
they had been swindled by being ‘sold’ something that the seller did not own. It seemed 
nothing had changed in the midwest. The warfare had been a series of revenge attacks on 
both sides that had not really changed anything materially and the enmity was still there, 
peace or no peace. Anything that could be burned or torn down could be re-built or 
replaced. The settlers kept coming and so did the Indians. Each would have to back up their 
assertions with force. If the Indians were deluded that Britain would consult them over 
peace terms, the Americans were also deluded that they had won a peace with the 
midwestern Indians. From the perspective of the midwestern Indians, the end of the 
American Revolution was only the end of another chapter in their struggle to hold onto 
their lands.455 
The British officials in Canada and the midwestern forts had a different kind of honour 
to defend now. They had to try to convince the Indians that their interests had not entirely 
been sold for nothing. For the men who had asked the Indians to support them again and 
again in the war against the Americans, the Indians were brothers in arms and deserved 
better. However, they were as powerless as the Indians to influence European proceedings, 
at least initially. The primary inconsistency in the British position was that the new 
government in Britain had been in opposition for the course of the war and knew little of 
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the detail of North American operations and geography. There is some evidence that they 
were even working with a faulty map of the western lands to the Mississippi River, but 
after berating Lord North’s administration over its use of Indians for five years, it would 
hardly care what happened to the Indian allies afterwards.456  
The new British government would slowly change its mind as highly regarded men 
like Governor Frederick Haldimand explained the volatile situation they had created. 
London began to realize they had given away too much for the peace. Haldimand felt that 
the best way to stabilize the situation was to keep the midwestern forts and to continue 
supplying the Indians with British trade goods. Joseph Brant, Daniel Claus, and John Butler 
went to England to explain the Indian position as well. The British worried about a repeat 
of the circumstances that led to Pontiac’s rebellion which would put Canada at risk again as 
well as destroy the British dominated fur trade. It was within this context that British 
officials made the fateful decision to keep the midwestern posts as trading and diplomatic 
posts contrary to the Treaty of Paris. Various excuses were used to delay the handover of 
the forts at first, including waiting for the final signed treaty. The British finally settled on 
the Americans disregard for certain treaty provisions. At first, the British claimed that the 
Americans were persecuting the loyalists. Later, war debts became the stalling issue and 
some Americans even gave credence to this point. The ongoing benefit was the fur trade 
and keeping the Indians amenable to future alliances if the defence of Canada required it. 
Unspoken was that the British were also trying to make amends for their treatment of the 
Indians. There certainly were other issues that led to the decision to hold the forts 
throughout the 1780s. Vermont and Kentucky settlers were thinking aloud about 
separatism, the roles of Spain and France in America looked somewhat threatening, the 
navigation rights of the Mississippi River needed settling, and there was the ever present 
possibility that the new American nation might break up under a pile of debt and bickering 
assemblies. To British authorities and the Indians, the best way to monitor this situation and 
take advantage of it was to quietly stay in place.457 
Through these actions, the British were able to claw back some of their credibility with 
the Indians. The British began to recommend that the midwestern Indians form cooperative 
bodies to make themselves stronger against the American demands. Old rivalries were hard 
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to suppress, but over time regional Indian alliances did emerge, especially in the Ohio. Of 
course, the situation in the south was more difficult. In the Treaty of Paris, Britain had 
given Florida back to the Spanish, so their ability to supply and influence the southern 
Indians was curtailed, but not totally extinguished. British traders supplied out of the 
Bahamas still carried some authority in Florida. The Cherokee had been so weakened by 
the war that they had to give up much of their remaining land to live in peace with the 
Americans. There was still the Chickamauga band that was militant, but it too had lost most 
of its power. The Creeks resumed their long term policy of dealing with multiple parties to 
gain the best advantage, but they too were now being pressed into land concessions in 
Georgia. British Indian agents like Joseph Brant, John Butler, Thomas Brown, Alexander 
McGillivray, Simon Girty, Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliott and Sir John Johnson eased 
this transition along. The fact that these men had been demonised by the backcountry 
settlers from 1777-1783 for their part in Indian atrocities meant that they cast a shadow on 
American views of British operations in the midwest. With every stolen horse, butchered 
cow or ambushed flatboat came the damnation of an Indian and an accusation against a 
perfidious British Indian agent like the ‘White Savage’ Simon Girty.458  
In late 1786, Guy Carleton, now Lord Dorchester, returned as Governor of Canada, 
relieving Frederick Haldimand. On the ship that brought him back was Joseph Brant. 
Daniel Claus and Guy Johnson, both ill, stayed in Britain and each would die there within 
two years. Brant had managed to secure recompense for some of the losses the Indians had 
suffered in the war, but the new Home Secretary, Thomas Townshend, First Viscount 
Sydney, prevaricated on whether the British would support the Indians in holding firm to 
previous treaties like Fort Stanwix (1768) against new American claims. Long sea voyages 
were contemplative endeavours and passengers obviously talked. One can only wonder if 
Brant and Lord Dorchester spoke at any length about the North American situation. Lord 
Dorchester had previously left Canada in 1778, partially because he would not deploy the 
Indians the way Lord Germain had demanded. Brant had spent the war conducting some of 
the most brutal actions of the war. Both men were now older and in different situations. 
Brant came back with a more conciliatory mindset and the events of the next eight years 
suggest that Lord Dorchester may have become more comfortable with Indians and learned 
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to understand their predicament better. Did one or the other change the ideas or perceptions 
of the other? The record makes no clear statement, but one can surmise that two old 
warriors had at least a few words together. 
As the 1780s wore on and the sting of the Peace of 1783 faded, old rivalries and insults 
surfaced again. Indian raids on outlying settlements resumed as did the retribution from the 
settlers, including another foray into the Ohio country by George Rogers Clark in 1786. 
Brant knew that the evasive answer he received from Lord Sydney meant that the Indians 
were alone in their struggles against the Americans. The instructions Lord Sydney sent to 
Canada confirmed it, but it was not well known to the Indians. However, the British Indian 
agents and traders who worked and lived with the Indians every day were less forthcoming 
or, more cynically, self-serving in assuring the Indians that the British would come to their 
aid if the Americans became too aggressive. Whether the Indian Agents believed it or 
whether they thought that making the Indians expect it would encourage the British 
government to follow suit is unclear. However, the words meant something to the 
American settlers, even if they were spoken cynically. As the Americans demanded more 
land in the Ohio, beyond the Stanwix line, the Indians became more agitated and active. 
The American settlers became more confrontational and viewed the continued presence of 
the British as a sign that they would support the Indians. Indians and Kentucky settlers, 
alike, viewed a low level agent like Matthew Elliott or Alexander McKee as a 
representative of the British government, regardless of Lord Sydney’s guidance.459 
The Americans’ hard line in forcing the Indians to give up new lands in treaties 
throughout the 1780s and early 1790s began to take its toll. From 1788-1794, there were 
outbreaks of violence between aggressive settlers and militant Indians. In the Chickamauga 
Cherokee territory, the members of the newly independent ‘state’ of Franklin (modern day 
eastern Tennessee) fought for six years over the settlement rights of the Tennessee and 
Cumberland River valleys. In Creek areas of Georgia, even though the Creeks had signed a 
treaty with the Americans in 1790, the same happened in 1792-1793. The new American 
government had as much trouble controlling its frontier settlers as the British had had. This 
situation contributed to the British interest in the area, because it was not clear at all that 
some of these areas would remain American. As always, there were accusations of British 
traders and adventurers in the south who were stirring up trouble and there was some truth 
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to the accusations, even if it was not driven by British paid agents.460 However, it was with 
respect to the newly created (1787) American Northwest Territory that the accusations had 
the most relevance.  
The Northwest Territory was created out of the territory bordering the Great lakes in 
the midwest. It would eventually contain the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, 
and Michigan. Of course, there were very few Americans in this area and almost all of it 
was controlled by Indians, but the Americans began to make their new treaties stick by 
encouraging settlers to occupy the eastern and southern portions of Ohio. The Indians in the 
Ohio area had been busy creating a loose confederacy of tribes that were feeling the pinch 
from American expansion. Centered on the Shawnee, Delaware and Miami tribes of central 
and eastern Ohio, they also drew in help from tribes further north and west, such as the 
Potawatomi. These tribes had worked together during the American Revolution with the 
British and were continuing that cooperation with British encouragement. With these 
movements came the inevitable conflict. In 1789, the Ohio tribes attacked the settlements 
along the Ohio River. By the end of the year, President George Washington declared an 
emergency and dispatched Brigadier General Josiah Harmar and an expeditionary force to 
quell the violence. In the fall of 1790, Harmar advanced to the area in between the Maumee 
and Wabash Rivers where many Miami Indian villages were located. As they had done 
many times before, the Indians retreated en masse in front of the American force, leaving 
Harmar to destroy their crops and houses, but losing few people. However, Colonel John 
Hardin, a Harmar subordinate, probed further with his smaller force and was caught out by 
the Indians. Over two days in late October 1790, the Indians led by the Miami chief Little 
Turtle and Shawnee Blue Jacket killed 178 of Hardin’s force. The Indians made their way 
to Detroit soon thereafter to report their actions to the British and ask for relief. The 
destruction of the Miami towns had left the Indians destitute. The British reply was to help 
materially, but to encourage the Indians to seek peace with the Americans. The Indians did 
not feel that the British understood their position. They had decided that the Ohio River line 
of the Treaty of Ft Stanwix of 1768 was non-negotiable and they would fight to defend it. 
They continued their raids along the Ohio River. Lord Dorchester instructed the officials at 
Detroit to keep a close eye on the situation.461  
                                                
460 Wright, Jr., ‘British Designs’, 265-284  
461 Allen, Indian Allies, 70-73 and Grenier, First Way, 195-196 
L i n z y  | 183 
 
There were no reports of British involvement at Harmar’s defeat and certainly no 
direction of the effort, but soon thereafter, Simon Girty would begin going out with the 
Indians as an advisor and observer. Girty had conducted many such missions in the 
Revolution. He was a loyalist who had long lived amongst the Indians and knew several 
Indian languages. He was employed as a British interpreter for the British Indian Agent 
Colonel Alexander McKee and his assistant Matthew Elliott. The three were from western 
Pennsylvania, but turned against the rebels in 1778 to support the British. Although 
Mckee’s and Elliott’s jobs were to support the Indians commercially and Girty’s job was to 
interpret, they were all heavily enmeshed with Indian life in the Ohio region. Their actions 
did not carry much weight with the British officials, but they did with the Indians. As the 
Indian attacks increased in severity into the summer of 1791, Girty kept McKee well 
informed of the Indian actions. Girty’s presence would not have gone unnoticed by 
survivors of the Indian attacks either. He was notorious in Kentucky and southern Ohio. He 
had become well known for his actions in the Revolution. He had been present at the 
Kentuckian defeat at Blue Licks in 1782. To the settlers and the political leaders of the area, 
Girty’s presence meant that the British were supplying and encouraging the Indians to 
act.462 
The Indians had seen their new strength in acting together rewarded with a string of 
victories. Little Turtle had become the de facto leader with a strong back up of the 
renowned warrior Blue Jacket. The Miami-Shawnee alliance was proving much stronger 
than the sum of its parts. Watching these developments in horror were the beleaguered 
settlers of the Ohio. The settlers and political leaders pushed for more federal help. 
Governor St. Clair was given the additional title of Major General and the support to raise a 
new army to deal with the Indian threat. After months of delays and two ineffectual interim 
expeditions, St. Clair entered the Miami country in October 1791. The expedition was riven 
with discord at the senior level and the militia became mutinous. The result was a large 
force bumbling into the confident Ohio confederacy. On 4 November, Little Turtle and 
Blue Jacket struck. The result was the worst defeat of an American army by Indians ever 
recorded. St. Clair was routed with over 650 dead and over 250 wounded. As the survivors 
staggered back to the Ohio River, the reports began traveling to Washington who was 
reportedly distraught. It would take three more years and an abundance of American 
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treasure to make another attempt on the confederacy. The Indians were jubilant as their 
interpreter and advisor, Simon Girty, gave guidance on the importance of the various 
captives and plunder.463 London and Lord Dorchester might have felt they were walking a 
fine line, but as far as the Americans were concerned, they were aiding and abetting the 
Indians. 
The St. Clair defeat forced the Americans to reconsider their strategy. They decided to 
try to treat with the Indians while also building a formidable army under one of their best 
Revolutionary Generals, Anthony Wayne. Throughout 1792 and 1793, the Americans sent 
negotiation overtures, including one from Joseph Brant to the other Indians, but it was too 
late. Two of the emissaries were killed in the process. The confederation of tribes in the 
Ohio area was full of their success, and they thought they could hold off the Americans. 
The militant factions’ success had forced the peace chiefs to accept the situation. The new 
Lieutenant Governor at Detroit, John Graves Simcoe, even helped out by hindering the 
Americans navigating the Great Lakes to meet with the Indians. Simcoe was a veteran of 
the Revolutionary War where he had been wounded and captured. He held the Americans 
in contempt militarily and politically, but actually admired their frontier spirit and self-
sufficiency. During this period of attempted American diplomacy, relations between the 
U.S.A. and Britain were also faltering due to trade imbalances and naval issues. The 
Americans had sent Chief Justice John Jay to Britain to negotiate a settlement. In the early 
1790s, these negotiations were not going well. The correspondence from London to Lord 
Dorchester and Simcoe warned them of a potential conflict. With this in mind, both leaders 
decided they needed to curry favour with the tribes again. Simcoe authorized Alexander 
McKee to inform the tribes that Britain was behind their new found confederacy. On 10 
February 1794, after returning from a trip to London, Lord Dorchester went further with an 
ill-considered speech to an assembled group of Indians. He told the Indians that he 
expected to be at war with the U.S.A. within the year and that Britain and the Indians would 
be allies again.464 Lord Dorchester instructed Simcoe to erect a fort at the falls of the 
Maumee River in preparation. Simcoe, McKee and the Indians were overjoyed. It felt like 
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Britain was taking its alliance with the Indians seriously again.465 A transcript of the speech 
made its way to American newspapers and was widely printed. The Americans were 
outraged and their feelings were expressed to Jay in London. Unbeknownst to them, Britain 
and the U.S.A. were on the verge of signing a treaty that would settle the question of the 
forts in the midwest and establish a much friendlier atmosphere between the two countries. 
By 1794, the spectre of France exporting its revolution was a much bigger concern to 
London that a few forts in the middle of nowhere, so the Indian alliance was once more 
sacrificed for European concerns. Keeping the Americans and the French from allying 
again was much more important to the British. The news of the treaty would not reach 
Canada until late 1795, but the correspondence from London took a much more hopeful 
tone in late 1794. Lord Dorchester and Simcoe were then being ordered to avoid direct 
confrontation with the Americans and to encourage the Indians to do the same. 
By the summer of 1794, General ‘Mad’ Anthony Wayne was marching into the 
Maumee area with the strongest force yet. Wayne issued ultimatums to the Indians to seek a 
negotiated settlement, but the confederacy denied them. The Battle of Fallen Timbers 
would not be a battle where the Indians fought in their normal irregular manner. On 20 
August 1794, with a force of 1,500 warriors, a great confidence from their previous 
encounters, and with a British fort at their back, the Indians took up a defensive position 
amongst the downed trees of a recent tornado. Finally having a conventional encounter to 
deploy their skills in, Wayne’s well trained force out-maneuvered the Indians quickly and 
pushed them into a retreat. As the Indians fled the few miles to Fort Miamis, they were 
expecting help from the British. Unfortunately, the commander of the fort had orders not to 
intervene. The gates were shut to the Indians. Once again the British had betrayed their 
allies to make peace with the Americans.466 
Although the battles and skirmishing in the midwest from 1783 to 1794 were not on 
par with the devastation of the American Revolution, they were an important part of the 
relationship between Britain and the midwest Indians. The Indians had learned the hard 
way that the British were still in the area to support their own objectives and the Indians 
would only be supported if it benefitted the British. However, the Indians had learned that a 
confederacy of tribes to stand up to the Americans was not a forlorn hope. The successes of 
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the early 1790s were proof that they could hold their own in the right circumstances. The 
British officers and Indian Agents certainly showed no hesitation in encouraging the 
Indians against the Americans. The raids against the frontier were performed with British 
supplied trade goods, food, clothing and ammunition. The most interesting individual was 
Lord Dorchester. At the beginning of the American Revolution, he was probably the most 
conciliatory to the Americans which led him to restrain the Indians. By the 1790s, he held 
the Americans in contempt and was much less worried about British supplies going to 
Indians that he knew were attacking the American frontier from 1790 to 1794. Lord 
Dorchester symbolised the complete transformation of the British Army officer who did not 
use Indians offensively when he felt he held a superior position, but immediately relented 
when the British were at a disadvantage. The fact that Britain was facing an existential 
crisis with France had much to do with it. 
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‘Cultivate peace between your different Tribes, that they may become one great people.’ - 
The Trout, Ottawa warrior, 1807467 
8. Final Stand 
Three months after the Battle of Fallen Timbers, Britain and the United States signed 
the Jay Treaty. It would be nearly a year before the details of the treaty reached the 
Midwest, but it became effective in early 1796. Among other issues that the two countries 
had agreed upon, the British had agreed to finally give up the midwestern forts that had 
been supporting the Indians. The British immediately set up new posts near each of the 
existing forts within Canada. The distance might have been small, but the psychological 
distance was larger than ever. After the Jay Treaty was signed, but before it was 
implemented, the Midwest Indians signed the Treaty of Greenville in August of 1795. That 
treaty saw the Indians sign over large parts of Ohio and several other areas around the Great 
Lakes to the Americans in return for cash and trade goods. It was the first time that the 
Indians in the area had formally recognised any claims north of the Ohio River. It had been 
a difficult period, but the Indians of the Ohio had held their lands for twelve years after the 
Treaty of Paris had technically removed their claims. Although defeated and abandoned by 
the British, the Indians of the Ohio and the Gulf south still held vast tracts of land and they 
had proven that they could work together to force both the Americans and the British to 
take note of their grievances. 
The British officials in London felt they had secured peace in the midwest at a time 
when the events in Europe were pressing them. However, the British officials on the ground 
in Canada had a far harder task, especially the Indian agents that continued to deal with the 
tribes. However, the Indians’ need for trade goods and ammunition for their hunting meant 
the Indians maintained contact. The Americans set up posts to deal with the Indians as well, 
but British manufactures and traditional ties with British agents and traders meant the 
strength of custom remained. An important component of the Jay Treaty was that the 
Indians retained the right to move freely between the two countries unhindered. Therefore, 
from 1795 through 1805 a rough, but somewhat peaceful period passed in the midwest.468 
During this time, many Indians in the midwest entered another period of spiritual 
awakening, much like the period around 1760-1764 with the Delaware prophet Neolin. This 
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time the most famous spiritual leader was a Shawnee named a Tenskwatawa or simply The 
Prophet. Forty years had passed, but the message was much the same. After experiencing a 
series of dreams that he claimed changed him in 1805, Tenskwatawa preached an appealing 
message to those who believed that the Indians had brought their grief upon themselves by 
not being true to their creator, customs and culture. Tenskwatawa was not the only one 
preaching this message at the time, but he seemed to have been the most charismatic. He set 
up a community on the Tippecanoe River in modern day Northwest Indiana and attracted 
Indians from all over the midwest to hear his message. Much like the warrior Pontiac was 
associated with Neolin; a warrior named Tecumseh was also associated with The Prophet. 
In fact, they were brothers.469 Tecumseh was born around 1768 to a Shawnee father and a 
Creek mother. He had been a youth during the Revolutionary war, but came of age during 
the period after the war. He participated in the ambushing of settler flatboats on the Ohio 
River in the 1780s. He travelled south and participated in the Chickamauga fights against 
the Franklin settlers around 1790. In 1794, he had participated in the Battle of Fallen 
Timbers. 470 From 1795 to 1805, Tecumseh settled back in the midwest and began to 
rekindle the idea of a pan-Indian confederacy that could withstand the American onslaught 
on their homeland. At this point, the British were not part of his plan, but a series of events 
would soon turn the midwest back into an international war zone. 
As Tenskwatawa’s fame grew, news began passing into the American frontier 
settlements of a brash new form of Indian resurgence. With it came the inevitable attacks 
on settlers, many of whom were once again stretching the limits of treaty boundaries. 
Simultaneously, Britain and America were beginning to agitate each other again. The 
British war against France had been going on for fifteen years with no end in sight. The 
actions that the Royal Navy was taking to secure the Atlantic were impacting upon 
America. In 1807, the Chesapeake affair had the two countries on the brink of war. 
Although calmer heads prevailed, Britain began to court the Indians of the midwest again 
just in case. The connections were once again through British Indian agents and traders. 
The Indians, including Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh were very wary of the British, but took 
the gifts and listened to the British agents anyway. The Americans did not go to war in 
1807, but the affair had set in motion events that would eventually lead to war. Of course, 
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as belligerence towards Britain increased, the suspicions of the British instigating Indian 
attacks arose again as well. Soon, a self-fulfilling series of events began to unfold. 
By 1809, American settlers were looking avariciously west again. The new Governor 
of the Indiana Territory, William Henry Harrison had convinced some of the tribes of the 
midwest to sign a further cession of land in the Treaty of Fort Wayne in late 1809. 
Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa were enraged by the treaty and felt that all the Indians of the 
midwest would need to agree to the new cession. The results of the treaty led Tecumseh to 
the conclusion that war might be required to stop the settler tide. In 1811, Tecumseh 
travelled south to gather support from the southern Indians. Most of the southern Indians 
did not want to hear his message. Many tribes in the south had come to terms with white 
settlement or had not been affected by it yet. The Creeks were split between two factions. 
The ‘White Sticks’ were pro-American and were learning to become more agricultural. The 
‘Red Sticks’ were more in tune with Tecumseh’s vision of maintaining their traditional 
lands and way of life. The Red Sticks agreed to support Tecumseh. Unfortunately, while 
Tecumseh was in the south, Harrison confronted Tenskwatawa at Prophetstown. 
Tenskwatawa was not a warrior, but events spiraled out of his control. At the Battle of 
Tippecanoe on 7 November 1811, Harrison defeated Tenskwatawa’s force and cleared 
Prophetstown. Tecumseh returned north to find his plans were scattered, but still intent on 
holding onto the Shawnee lands.471 
Like many times before, the British were trying to keep the Indians on side, but ratchet 
down conflict. The British were trying to avoid war with the U.S.A., but finding it hard to 
avoid conflict without aiding the French on the high seas. Major General Isaac Brock who 
was the commander of British forces in Upper Canada was monitoring events in the 
midwest with apprehension. By late 1811, he had intelligence coming in about the events 
leading up to Tippecanoe and he was trying to keep the violence from spreading while also 
trying to keep the Indians warm if they were needed to defend Canada.472 In the meantime, 
events on the Atlantic continued to insult the Americans, especially a group of 
Congressmen known as the ‘War Hawks’. Even as Britain tried to alleviate the last of the 
issues, the U.S.A. felt its honour had been indelibly stained and declared war.  
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At the start of the War of 1812, British Army officers in North America had to deal 
with two realities. In Europe, Britain was in a desperate struggle with Napoleonic France 
that many described as a battle for survival. In North America, Britain was dealing with a 
war it did not want in character or timing. Of course, the two issues were intertwined and 
affected each other. The existential nature of the battle in Europe meant that British officers 
in North America knew they could not expect large numbers of professional troops. 
Therefore, the calculation of whether to use Indians changed once again. Some British 
officers still shied away from making the difficult choice of using Indians decisively. By 
1812, Sir Isaac Brock was not an officer of that class. 
Major General Isaac Brock was born on Guernsey in 1769. Brock had spent his 
militarily formative Army years in Europe, mainly in Guernsey and England, with the 8th 
Regiment. Brock saw his first combat against the French in the low countries in 1799 with 
his new regiment, the 49th, and had acquitted himself well. Later, Brock participated in the 
capture of Copenhagen with Admiral Horatio Nelson. In 1802, Brock was sent to North 
America where he would stay until his death in 1812 with only one visit back to Britain and 
Guernsey. Brock began his service in North America having to discourage the Indians from 
attacks on the American outposts in the midwest, but his sympathies lay with the Indians. 
He developed a good working relationship with the British Indian Agent at Amherstburg, 
Matthew Elliott. By the time of the War of 1812, Brock was well familiar with the North 
American terrain, customs and forms of warfare. Although Brock planned on returning to 
service in Europe, he never seemed worried about praising the Indians or hesitating to 
consider using them whilst he had command in Canada.473 Although Brock often despaired 
of not being in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars, he declined the opportunity to return to 
Europe at the outbreak of the War of 1812. 
At the beginning of the War of 1812, Brock sought to change the conventional wisdom 
of actively defending only Lower Canada and the great fortress ports of Montreal and 
Quebec that were so hard to take and could be readily re-supplied and supported by the 
Royal Navy. This strategy had been adopted by the British since the 1760s, but Upper 
Canada had changed in recent years and now was far more populated than in the past. 
Brock thought that if he could surprise the Americans with an unexpected show of strength 
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in the area, the Americans might have to re-consider the whole enterprise. However, above 
Brock was Canadian Commander-in-Chief and Governor General George Prevost who was 
far more conventional in his views and cautious on the issue of using Indians. This might 
be seen as a simple belief in not using the Indians for ethical concerns, but Prevost was also 
not an aggressive military commander with his own troops or the Canadian militia either. 
Prevost, who had been born in New York prior to the American Revolution, harboured 
hopes of a short war with no major campaigns if calmer heads prevailed. Prevost had 
written to Brock that aggressive tactics and the use of Indians might inflame American 
opinion and prolong what Prevost viewed as a most unnecessary war between cousins.474 
Brock knew he would never get the required number of professional troops to defend 
Upper Canada. Additionally, he knew that the local population that would supply the 
militia was both undertrained and often pro-American in their allegiances. These two facts 
made Brock look to the Indians as the only force that was both opposed to American 
hegemony in the area and capable of conducting the wide ranging and distributed form of 
warfare needed to stop the Americans from subsuming Upper Canada. The problem with 
this plan was that the Indians had become very wary of British promises of aid due to their 
most recent history. In the early 1790s, the British had helped provoke the Indians into a 
war with the Americans in the Ohio region. After repeated assurances that help would be 
provided when needed, the British literally shut the door on the Indians after the Battle of 
Fallen Timbers in 1794. Brock would need to prove to the Indians that he was serious about 
defending Upper Canada with British Regulars and militia before he could count on any 
size-able number of warriors joining his ranks.475 
Since his arrival in the region, Brock had dealt with the British Indian Department, 
predominantly at Amherstburg. The Indian Agent there was Matthew Elliot. At eighty years 
old in 1812, Elliott had been involved with the Indians of the upper midwest since the 
1760s. Elliott had been married to a Shawnee woman and they had two sons who also 
worked in the British Indian Department. Elliott’s sympathies with the Indians were well 
known. Elliott, along with other Indian sympathisers in the area, like Simon Girty and 
Alexander McKee, had kept the Americans suspicious of British support for the Indians 
since the end of the American Revolution. Elliott had been dismissed from official 
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capacities for several years before the War of 1812 by the previous Governor for leaning 
too far in favour of the Indians. The British were walking a fine line of keeping the Indians 
friendly, but not so well supplied that the Americans could credibly accuse them of 
instigating hostilities. Only the coming of conflict brought Elliott back into the official 
British establishment, as no white man was more influential with the Indians of the Ohio.476 
Elliott was aware of the brewing troubles between the Americans and the Indians along 
the Wabash River in 1811. The Shawnee and other Indian groups of the midwest were 
being encouraged into a pan-tribal alliance by the Shawnee brother duo of Tecumseh and 
Tenskwatawa (also known as the Shawnee Prophet). Elliott could see that the Indian 
alliance being formed by the Shawnee brothers could be of great use to the British and 
suggested such to Brock. At approximately the same time Brock was writing to his 
superior, Prevost, about this grand plan to secure Upper Canada with a few bold strokes, 
Elliott was proposing a similar plan to his superior, Super-Intendant of Indian Affairs 
Daniel Claus.477 
Elliott’s ideas could be dismissed as just more of his favouritism towards the Indians 
with the balance in the Indians’ favour. However, when Brock took up the idea that the 
strategically important forts at Detroit and Mackinac could be taken quickly by a combined 
force of Indians and British Regulars, the plan took on a new seriousness in the British 
establishment. Brock’s concept was that the Americans could be taken by surprise before 
they had time to re-enforce these forts with militia from the frontier states of Kentucky and 
Ohio. With Detroit and Mackinac under British control, the settlers of the upper midwest 
would seek the safety of moving south and east to avoid the inevitable Indian raids. With 
Upper Canada secured and the population of the midwest on the run, American militia 
recruitment would suffer. If the upper midwest was neutralised, then Brock could 
concentrate his remaining forces on the Niagara corridor and use British naval superiority 
to better effect closer to Lower Canada. Brock displayed little compunction in suggesting 
such a plan. Nor did he shy away from making threats of unleashing the Indians on the 
Americans to induce capitulation. The importance of the Indians in the calculations cannot 
be overstated, but the Indians also brought baggage. They were hard to amass when needed, 
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required constant management with presents and consultation. Their actions of scalping and 
plundering after a battle were often propaganda boon for the Americans. Prevost appeared 
to be the leader with the most apprehensions of using Indians.478 
Brock knew all too well the fear and hatred of the Indians by the Americans. 
Deploying units of Indians, even small units, was a known force multiplier for any British 
commander in deed and in lore. Stories of Indian atrocities were the 19th century 
equivalent of modern day horror movies. Every frontier child grew up hearing horrendous 
tales of babes and nursing mothers being killed by the same tomahawk stroke. Neither 
quilting nor drinking session, nor church picnic was complete without the retelling of the 
latest atrocity. Historian Alan Taylor referred to the Indian’s systematic terror as a ‘theater 
of intimidation’. 479 The Indians were excellent woodsmen and helped the British units 
move faster and leaner. They provided priceless intelligence on terrain and American troop 
movements. In short, the Indians were invaluable allies in Great Lakes warfare. As Taylor 
summarised,  
In the northern borderland, a powerful combination of British 
regulars and Indian warriors repeatedly defeated American troops. 
Together they made a formidable team. Consummate guerrilla 
fighters, Indian warriors guarded the British flanks, while the 
disciplined regulars controlled the center with bayonet charges that 
also terrified raw American recruits. 480 
In the strategic calculations, each side had its strengths and sought to maximise them at 
the other’s expense. British conventional wisdom was that Britain owned the sea, lakes and 
the larger waterways, but could not spare land forces that were needed in Europe. The total 
number of British land forces in Canada was only a little over 8,000. This paltry number 
was the reason that Britain had little to no choice to engage the Indians. Canada had a 
population of approximately 500,000, but only 77,000 of those were in Upper Canada. 
Therefore, Britain looked to maintain its larger population centres, but to cede Upper 
Canada, when appropriate, to husband scarce land resources while the Royal Navy brought 
the American economy to its knees. The American conventional wisdom was to roll up 
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Upper Canada easily on the way to seizing the more heavily defended Lower Canada. The 
strategic thinking was that cutting off Upper Canada would cut off the supplies needed to 
keep the Indians and local militia friendly. In doing so, it would limit the amount of Indians 
and militia available to defend Lower Canada. The Americans calculated that when they 
had taken over Upper and Lower Canada, then the naval bases in the maritime provinces, it 
would remove the easy co-ordination of naval activities off the eastern seaboard. In 
inserting the Indians into an early and decisive stroke against the midwestern American 
posts, Brock was trying to remove the first link in the American strategy.481 
Brock’s originality lay in his ability to see a way to break the strategic deadlock very 
early on by surprising the Americans at Fort Mackinac and Detroit. Brock felt that if he 
could take these lightly defended forts before they could be reinforced, he could break the 
American plan to work up from Upper Canada through the population centres of Lower 
Canada and on to the naval bases on the Atlantic. Along with this major strategic 
interruption of American plans, Brock felt the early successes would assure the Indians that 
the British were serious about defending the area for themselves and the Indians. 
Additionally, having the Indians on side and securing the area would encourage more 
farmers to volunteer for the militia duty. Although brilliant and bold, the plan was also 
risky. Had it failed, it could have meant the fall of Canada very quickly as forces used on 
the offense might have been captured and not available to the more important Lower 
Canada. Prevost very politely advised Brock to keep his ideas, but not to execute unless 
given approval. Brock was not happy, but was polite to Prevost. Brock’s plan was to keep 
pushing his plan until Prevost relented. At other times, commanders in the field might have 
received direction from London on issues such as these, but the administration was far too 
worried about the situation in Europe. In one of the few communications about the Indians 
from Henry Bathurst, 3rd Earl Bathurst, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, he 
stated that he preferred the Indians to be neutral, but did not think it was possible as they 
would side with the Americans otherwise.482 
However, this was not just another example of a local commander chafing at a higher 
headquarters for not understanding the local conditions and taking advantage of them. If 
Prevost, or even London, were to accept the risks of the Brock plans, there was the very 
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real possibility of inflaming the Americans further, losing Upper Canada entirely and 
quickly, along with the militia and regulars stationed there. Although the regulars did not 
represent a large enough force to defend Upper Canada, they could be the decisive factors if 
Montreal or Quebec were to be threatened severely. Prevost liked Brock and thought highly 
of him, but the risks to the overall strategic calculation were just too high. In the forms of 
Brock and Prevost, respectively, stood the age-old strategic dilemma of striving to win 
versus striving to not lose. The situation was made more difficult by the fact that Prevost 
and Brock were not meeting in person, but communicating in writing. Each was careful not 
to be too hard on the other. Prevost praised Brock for his forethought and initiative, but 
simultaneously made clear that preparations were all that was allowed prior to a declaration 
of war. Brock was to remain on the defensive. However, as the Americans declared war, 
events took on a life of their own. 
On 18 June 1812, the United States of America declared war on the Britain. Brock 
alerted all of his subordinates to stand ready to defend Upper Canada as he had agreed with 
Prevost, except to the commander of Fort St. Joseph. At the far northern British post of Fort 
St. Joseph, located where Lake Huron and Lake Michigan meet, conflicting and confusing 
orders were reaching the commander, Captain Charles Roberts. On Michilimackinac Island 
in the strait was the American Fort Mackinac. Initially, Roberts received a letter from 
Brock to take Mackinac, then another letter from Brock telling him to use his judgment to 
take it or not. Roberts chose to take it on 17 July 1812, but received a letter from Prevost 
immediately after the capture stating that he should remain on the defensive and retreat if 
necessary. The American commander at Fort Mackinac, Lieutenant Porter Hanks, was 
faced with a superior force that included many Indians. Hanks decided to save his small 
force and surrendered the fort with full honours. The Indians that accompanied Roberts 
were kept in check. Their mere presence, and the implication of no quarter if Hanks were to 
hold out, meant that a quick surrender was the best that could be hoped for by Roberts. The 
Indians were allowed to plunder the captured American stores that made for a good 
recruiting story for more Indian help in the future. As Brock had predicted, Indian interest 
in the British cause was quickly ignited when they saw that Brock’s forces were serious 
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about securing Upper Canada, but it would be a few weeks before Brock was to know this 
for sure. 483  
Unbeknownst to Roberts and Hanks, General Hull, the Commander of Detroit, had 
crossed into Canada a few days before the capitulation of Fort Mackinac. Hull had landed 
unopposed near Sandwich (modern day Windsor), Upper Canada across the river from 
Detroit. The Americans, especially Hull, had real fears of the Indian threat.484 As the first 
Governor of the Michigan territory, Hull knew all too well the leanings of the Indians 
towards the British. The first thing Hull did when he invaded Upper Canada was to issue a 
proclamation threatening total war if the population encouraged the Indians as part of their 
war plans. The Proclamation had a special threat to those who allied with the Indians, 
If the barbarous and savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and 
the savages be let loose to murder our citizens, and butcher our 
women and children, this war will be a war of extermination. The 
first stroke of the tomahawk, the first attempt with the scalping 
knife, will be the signal of one indiscriminate scene of desolation. 
No white man, found fighting by the side of an Indian, will be taken 
prisoner—instant destruction will be his lot. If the dictates of 
reason, duty, justice, and humanity, cannot prevent the employment 
of a force which respects no rights and knows no wrong, it will be 
prevented by a severe and relentless system of retaliation.485 
Initially, Hull’s bravado worked. Many of the locals around Sandwich agreed to Hull’s 
demands. Brock immediately shot back with a proclamation of his own on 22 July 1812, 
declaring that the Americans were the aggressor and they had no right to dictate that 
people, settler and aborigine, whose land had been invaded should be prohibited from 
fighting back in alliance to preserve their right to quarter. Brock stated to the Canadians 
that their government and its allies would seek to stop Hull and that the residents should not 
be worried. Brock specifically defended the Indians by stating, ‘If their warfare, from being 
different to that of the white people, be more terrific to the enemy, let him retrace his 
steps— they seek him not—’ Here was Brock declaring that the Indian way of war was 
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legitimate, especially for a force that is defending its homeland. There are no apologies for 
using Indians or allowing them to use their traditional forms of warfare.486 As tough as 
Brock sounded, he had fears that the worst was yet to come. The Upper Canada militia was 
not covering itself in glory and it was not clear if the Indians were going to side with the 
British or sit the campaign out. Brock sent Colonel Henry Procter to Amherstburg, which 
Brock assumed was the ultimate objective for Hull, to rally the defences and negotiate with 
the Indians there to join forces.487 Procter arrived at Amherstburg on 26 July 1812. 
Hull eventually received the news on 4 August 1812 that Fort Mackinac had fallen to 
the British, with the support of a large force of Indians, without a fight that made him 
extremely nervous of his own position. Brock had been correct in thinking that Mackinac 
was far more important to the Americans than its size warranted. To add to Hull’s worry, 
Tecumseh and a small Indian force was busy harassing his communications to his south 
near Brownstown and Maguaga. Not only did Tecumseh’s raids have the desired effect of 
spooking Hull, but also much of the American General’s correspondence had been 
intercepted on 5 August 1812 and sent immediately to Brock.488 
Brock sensed that the tide might be turning at this point and moved towards 
Amherstburg to take personal command of the forces amassing there. It was a mixed group 
of detachments of regulars, militia and a few Indians from the Grand River area. Brock 
arrived at Amherstburg on 14 August to find that Hull had already moved the majority of 
his force back across the river to Detroit. Brock could not believe his luck and began 
immediately making plans to assault Detroit. He hoped to shame many of the local militia 
into rallying to the cause now and use the Mackinac, Brownstone, Maguaga, and Sandwich 
successes to recruit more Indians to the cause. It was at this point that Brock met Tecumseh 
and the famous immediate friendship was instigated. Brock found Tecumseh to be a sober 
and “sagacious” warrior with whom he could work well. Tecumseh apparently felt the same 
and was impressed that Brock was so keen to take the offensive against Hull. With little 
fanfare, the two sealed a deal that would deliver nearly one thousand warriors to aid 
Brock’s plans for Detroit. 489 There seems to be no detailed account of Brock insisting that 
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special measures be taken by Tecumseh to avert atrocities. It seems the dire situation and 
the opportunity at hand was all that was on Brock’s mind. 
Meanwhile, back in Detroit, Hull was fending off mutinous declarations from his own 
officers and declaring that Fort Dearborn (modern day Chicago) was no longer defensible 
due to the fall of Fort Mackinac and the shakiness of his own communications. Hull 
instructed Captain Nathan Heald of Fort Dearborn to abandon the fort and move his forces 
and dependents to Detroit. Heald’s party was ambushed on 15 August by Indians, 
unassociated with Brock or Tecumseh, south of Dearborn with two-thirds of the party being 
killed and the remainder taken prisoner.490 Things were about to get even worse for Hull. 
With the fall of Fort Mackinac and the interception of Hull’s communications, even 
Prevost was feeling much more confident about Brock’s chances in Upper Canada. Prevost 
freed more resources to Brock, but still not much. Brock would move with what he had. On 
the day the Fort Dearborn party was ambushed, Brock spared no time in sending a party to 
treat with Hull at Detroit with the following demand, 
The force at my disposal, authorizes me to require of you the 
immediate Surrender of Fort Detroit-- 
 It is far from my inclination to join in a war of extermination, but 
you must be aware that the numerous body of Indians, who have 
attached themselves to my Troops, will be beyond my Controul 
[sic] the moment the contest commences-- You will find me 
disposed to enter into such conditions, as will satisfy the most 
scrupulous sense of Honor-- Lt Colo McDonnell & Major Gregg 
are fully authorized, to conclude any arrangement, that may lead to 
stop the unnecessary effusion of blood--491 
If Brock had any concern about his honour in using Indians on this occasion, he did not 
display it. This threat is reminiscent of General John Burgoyne’s threat in the Saratoga 
campaign in the American Revolution.492 Burgoyne was to later try to defend himself in 
Parliament by declaring it an empty threat that he never intended to allow to happen. 
Whether Brock would have claimed the same if the situation had turned into bloodbath of 
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scalping, we will never know. Hull initially refused the demand, but continued to be rattled 
by the possibility of a fight with a large Indian force. As the British artillery opened up on 
the fort, Hull could see the 1,000 strong force of Indians taking up positions. Hull’s obvious 
fear of an Indian rout after a strong defence animated his imagination far beyond the 
capability of the small British and Indian force. Having read Hull’s intercepted 
correspondence and taken measure of Hull’s withdrawal from Sandwich, Brock made a bet 
that Hull would fold or make a very bad decision in his defence. Brock was right and Hull 
soon thereafter ran up a white flag to open surrender negotiations on 16 August 1812. Not 
long after, Brock entered Detroit to accept full capitulation.493 
Brock was elated and effusive in his praise for all that had participated in the surrender 
of Detroit. Brock singled out the Indians for special praise, 
A few prisoners were taken by them during the advance, whom they 
treated with every humanity; and it affords me much pleasure in 
assuring your excellency, that such was their forbearance and 
attention to what was required of them, that the enemy sustained no 
other loss in men than what was occasioned by the fire of our 
batteries.494 
This declaration in correspondence was not unique. Atrocities with prisoners taken by 
Indians were such a common occurrence that praise like this was common when allied 
Indians did not commit an atrocity.495  
The surrender of Detroit electrified the American midwest. For the Americans, it had 
taken less than two months to go from extreme confidence of the fall of Upper Canada to 
losing Forts Mackinac, Dearborn and Detroit in quick succession with little prospect of 
regaining them without a large force to open up and keep open the lines of communication 
from Kentucky to Detroit. Not only had they not secured Upper Canada, but also now they 
had the very real possibility of a full-blown Indian war on their own soil. 496 
Immediately after the Detroit victory, Brock headed back to Fort George, his 
headquarters on the Niagara corridor where U.S. troops had been amassing. On 13 October 
1812, the Americans crossed the river and attacked Queenston and quickly took the high 
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ground at Queenston Heights. Brock assembled a small force and tried to dislodge the 
Americans but failed and was killed leading the charge. Later, a combined British and 
Indian force succeeded in removing them. After 3 months of war in Upper Canada, the 
British and the Indians were victorious on all fronts. However, the man who conceived the 
aggressive and surprising plan was dead. The British had lost their most capable General in 
Canada and the Indians had lost their most fervent and loyal supporter in the British 
establishment. There was little fighting for the rest of 1812.497 
Honour did not hinder Brock or the British leadership in Canada. There is no evidence 
in the record by Brock or about Brock from others that suggested that he was concerned 
about his reputation for using Indians. There did not seem to even be any concern about 
threatening a possible post battle massacre, if Hull did not surrender Detroit. What was 
displayed was a General who was strong in his conviction that there were only two options. 
The first option was to surrender Upper Canada slowly, but surely, with the meager Regular 
units and weak militia units, who were concerned about their own families’ safety from the 
Indians. The second option was to take the initiative and use the Indians effectively to take 
the American posts by surprise and continually harass their lines of communications. Brock 
felt that taking the initiative was the only way to win the war. 
Like other British Generals who used Indians willingly, Brock knew the Indians and 
the Indian Agents from having served in North American for a long period of time. He was 
respectful of their customs and capabilities, but also a clear-eyed realist on their 
weaknesses. Although Brock had agitated for an assignment back in Europe, Brock chose 
to remain in North America when given the chance to return to Europe. After ten years in 
Canada, it is entirely possible that Brock’s European based honour groups held less sway 
on him than his North American honour groups. These two circumstances of long North 
American service and a decision to stay could be prerequisites in being willing to use 
Indians. This issue will warrant further examination in comparison to other British Army 
officers. 
Brock had been correct that if he could take the initiative in the western end of Upper 
Canada, it would free him to defend the eastern end more vigorously. However, the 
Americans were going to test him there too. Shortly after taking Detroit, Brock had to 
return to the Niagara region to defend an American invasion near Queenston near the falls 
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of the Niagara River. Although he had a much larger force of regulars and militia than at 
Detroit, Brock also had approximately 600 Indian warriors, mainly from the Six Nations at 
Grand River settlement. He lost no time in sending much of the Indian force across the 
river to scout on and harass the American forces that were preparing to assault across the 
river. On 13 October 1812, the Americans landed and took the Queenston Heights. Brock 
immediately led a counter-attack. It would be his last battle. The British force faltered after 
Brock was killed, but the next in command, Major General Roger Sheaffe took over. 
Sheaffe sent a detachment of Iroquois under John Norton to harass the Americans on the 
heights while he formed another counter-attack. The British took the heights this time. 498 
Queenston Heights showed that Brock’s use of Indians was not a one-time event. He used 
the Indians in an independent capacity by sending them out as scouts and skirmishers. The 
action was swift, so he had little time to think about the repercussions of using Indians 
forward of his regulars and militia. However, there was little in the way Brock acted or in 
the orders he issued that would lead one to think that he was hindered in any way in his use 
of his Indian allies. Brock’s big gamble had worked. Prevost and the London had sought a 
conventional view of how to protect Canada. Sir Isaac Brock’s initiative and bold use of his 
Indian allies had delayed the American successful assault on Canada for nearly a year. 
Sheaffe also showed little reluctance to use his Indian allies to re-capture Queenston 
Heights. 
With Brock lost to the cause, command of the forces around Detroit fell to Colonel 
Henry Procter. Two days before his death, Brock wrote to Procter to provide guidance on 
how to defend Detroit. He instructed Procter to remain active and not to wait for the 
inevitable American thrust to try to re-take Detroit. He instructed Procter to actively engage 
with Tecumseh and use the Indians to harass them. Even in death Brock’s unequivocal 
orders were to use the Indians in the capacity that they were most useful. Procter would 
follow those instructions when he heard that an American force was moving north in 
January of 1813. 499 The lead American unit of Harrison’s force was led by Brigadier 
General James Winchester. He occupied the village of Frenchtown on the river Raisin on 
17 January 1813 and dispersed the British militia and Indians, but at a cost of several killed. 
Winchester kept his force at Frenchtown as he re-grouped to prepare for the continued 
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movement on Detroit. However, the delay would cost him. Procter advanced quickly and 
stealthily on Frenchtown and arrived on 22 January 1813 with a force of 1,200 of which 
nearly 600 were Indians, mainly Wyandot. In the bloody and confused battle that ensued, 
Procter lost over 200 killed or wounded, but Winchester lost over 400 killed and 500 
captured. Procter had used his Indian allies effectively on the flanks of Winchester’s force. 
However, it would be the aftermath of this battle where his use of Indians would cause the 
British the most trouble.500 
With reports that Major General William Henry Harrison’s main force was quickly 
closing on Frenchtown, Procter decided the prudent action was to retire to Detroit and 
secure a good defensive position. However, he had 500 ambulatory captives and his own 
wounded to transport. Procter made the fateful decision to leave approximately sixty-five 
American captives who were too wounded to transport under the care of a small group of 
medical staff and his allied Indians. Years of propaganda and personal reports have clouded 
what actually happened on the night of the 22nd and 23rd of January 1813. However, what is 
known is that a body of 200 warriors re-entered the town and took command of the 
American wounded. The most severely wounded were killed and scalped on the spot. 
Those able to walk were set out onto the road. Those that could not keep up were killed 
along the way. What would become known as the River Raisin Massacre was the worst 
atrocity of the war. Procter would become the object of American outrage and ‘Remember 
the Raisin’ the rallying cry of the subsequent American campaign on Upper Canada.501 
Although Procter showed no reluctance to use Indian allies, just had Brock had not, Procter 
was the one to take the strike against this honour. The American propaganda machine went 
into high gear with news of the River Raisin. Procter was concerned about the accusations, 
but it did not prevent him from using his Indian allies in the coming months. Procter was 
promoted to Brigadier General for his victory at Frenchtown, but was to continue to 
struggle with the fallout of the River Raisin massacre. 
With Winchester’s force decimated, Harrison decided to bring his force to a halt and 
build Fort Meigs near the falls of the Maumee River. Harrison wanted to build up his force 
and supplies before moving on Detroit. Procter had retired to Detroit to stabilize that area. 
Procter’s Indian allies, who made up more than half of his force, were still dubious of the 
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British commitment to help them regain the Ohio area. Tecumseh pushed him to take the 
fight to Harrison as proof of British intentions. Once Procter got the Detroit area in a stable 
condition, he moved on Fort Meigs on 1 May 1813. Harrison had prepared well and the 
four-day siege did not go well for Procter. The Indians helped by attacking work parties, 
but had little they could do to support a European style siege. On 5 May, a large relief 
column from Kentucky came to Fort Meigs. Harrison had half the force fight its way in and 
the other half under a Major Dudley cross the river and take out a British artillery position. 
Dudley’s militia force took out the batteries across the Maumee, but their ill-discipline 
found them following the dispersing British troops. Seeing an opportunity, Procter and 
Tecumseh set upon Dudley’s force of nearly nine-hundred militiamen. Over four-hundred 
were killed or wounded and over five-hundred were taken prisoner back to the nearby 
British Fort Miamis. There the Indian force got out of control and began killing the 
prisoners. Tecumseh and Elliott eventually showed up and stopped the massacre. 
Reportedly, Tecumseh was angry for not stopping the massacre, but Procter pleaded 
helplessness at the slaughter. Fort Meigs had produced a huge force for plunder, but the fort 
had not fallen. Nor would it fall in a subsequent attack in July. Procter would also give in to 
Tecumseh’s demands to attack nearby Fort Stevenson, but that would also fail. 502 
Throughout the summer, Tecumseh and Procter held each other at arm’s length. 
Procter was fearful that the Indians might desert him, so he tried to do as the Indians 
wanted, but it just made him look weak to Tecumseh and to his superiors in Lower Canada. 
Tecumseh and his Indians doubted the British’ resolve to do anything other than defend 
Upper Canada. However, on 10 September 1813, Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry took 
five vessels of the Royal Navy at the Battle of Lake Erie. Perry immediately repaired the 
British craft and provided transport for Harrison’s troops. This action made Detroit and 
Amherstburg untenable. Procter feared that the Indians would turn on him if he retreated 
toward lower Canada, but he had no choice. In a tense confrontation, Tecumseh decided to 
stay with Procter’s force as it fought a rear guard action up the River Thames. The 
retreating force lost its discipline. Harrison was in hot pursuit and the two forces met near 
Moravian town at the Battle of the Thames on 5 October. At this point, Tecumseh’s force 
was acting like a British line force. Harrison’s cavalry attacked and routed Procter and 
Tecumseh’s force. Tecumseh was killed. Procter escaped, but was later court-martialed for 
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the conduct of the retreat. The struggle to save the western portion of Upper Canada and 
help the Indians re-claim their Ohio homeland had come to an end. There would continue to 
be fighting around Niagara in 1814, but by 22 July Harrison had completed another Treaty 
of Greenville (1814) that secured peace with the Midwest Indians and ended their 
cooperation with the British in the north.503 
Circumstances drove Brock and Procter to secure the Indians as allies in Upper 
Canada. Military Honour did not hinder either of them. Brock’s death saved him from the 
problems associated with Indian massacres at the River Raisin and Fort Meigs, but did not 
spare Procter’s reputation. What did hinder the senior British leadership was their defensive 
line of thinking that precluded aggressive action in Upper Canada. This line of thinking 
started and ended with preserving their strengths at all costs. Britain had to win in Europe. 
Therefore, preserving the strength of the Royal Navy through impressments and restricting 
the Atlantic flow of supplies to France were the first order. For this, Britain was willing to 
provoke a war that could have cost them Canada, but had hoped until the last moment to 
avoid through measured conciliations. Additionally, the Indians required a reasonably large 
show of material and troop support to believe that the British were serious about the 
defence of the area for the Indians’ sake and not just their own. Therefore, a partial solution 
to this situation would not have worked either. In 1811 and early 1812, it was worth not 
actively using the Indians to avoid explicitly provoking the Americans. However, once the 
war was imminent, British weakness in Canada led them to conclude that it was worth 
losing Upper Canada to preserve Lower Canada and the maritime bases that supported the 
Royal Navy North American station’s activities along the American eastern seaboard.  
Consequently, the British strategic position was clear prior to the War of 1812 that they 
would not defend Upper Canada at the expense of the larger strategic requirements that 
were absolute necessities to winning in Europe. Many of the decisions and much of the 
deliberation may have included worry about the honour in using Indians as allies and the 
importance of restraining the Indian way of war, but the strategic calculations were always 
superior to such conversations. The British had so few options and the stakes were so high 
in Europe that the normal hand wringing on whether to use the Indians or not was not 
prevalent. One can argue whether Prevost or Brock was correct, but neither General seemed 
                                                
503 Jeremy Black, Age of Napoleon, 218 
L i n z y  | 205 
 
overly concerned with their honour in deploying the Indians when the circumstances were 
right. 
In the southern midwest, the picture was more mixed. After years of destructive war 
with the British and the Americans, the Cherokee had decided battles with the Americans 
usually ended in their towns and crops being destroyed. The Chickamaugas were still not 
friendly to American settlers, but had managed to mostly stay out of their way during this 
period. Other Cherokee had managed to adapt somewhat and became allies of the 
Americans in the gulf coast operations from 1813-1815, mainly against the Creeks in the 
Creek War of 1813-1814. That war was the result of the 1811 call to arms by Tecumseh. It 
had ended in the Battle of Horseshoe Bend where Major General Andrew Jackson and 
allied Cherokee warriors crushed a band of ‘Red Sticks’ in one of history’s most lop-sided 
victories.504 It was followed by the harsh Treaty of Fort Jackson where the Creeks ended up 
ceding twenty-three million acres to the Americans. It was into this situation that the British 
Royal Navy and Marines entered in 1814. Since this part of the operation did not involve 
the British Army, it falls outside the purview of this paper. However, by late 1814, a British 
Army General would command the land forces and have to decide whether to use the 
Indians or not. Therefore, a brief examination of the naval and marine operations is in order 
to understand what was available later. 
Royal Navy Admiral Alexander Cochrane had taken a plan that had floated around 
Whitehall for several years that encouraged the use of the Creeks, Seminoles (Indians 
residing in Spanish Florida), and possibly Choctaws to participate in a joint operation with 
British forces against the Gulf of Mexico ports of New Orleans, Mobile and Pensacola. The 
concept of the operation was to land Royal Marines and possibly British Army regiments at 
New Orleans and have the Indians under Royal Marine leadership descend on New Orleans 
from the North. The difficulty of the plan was in its implementation. The British had lost 
direct influence over the southern Indians in 1783. There were British traders and limited 
communication links, but, in the final scheme, a handful of Royal Marine officers were 
dropped unannounced on the beach at the Apalachicola River mouth to find the Creeks and 
Seminoles and convince them to join their plans for the gulf coast. What Major Edward 
Nicolls of the Royal Marines found were the remnants of the Red Stick Creeks who were 
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starving and on the run from the Americans after the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. Nicolls 
gathered these remnants at Prospect Bluff on the Apalachicola River and began feeding, 
clothing, arming, and training them in British warfare methods. This was a decisive 
departure in the way Indians were normally used by the British. Nicolls was acting on 
orders from Cochrane to restrain the Indians, but Nicolls also seemed to have a strong 
moral streak himself. The attempt was to try to keep the Indians from committing atrocities 
while serving as allies to the British. Nicolls conducted small operations around the gulf 
coast, including seizing Pensacola with his Indian force, but the question was whether they 
would be used as intended against New Orleans.505 
In the meantime, the Peninsular War with Napoleon was coming to an end and the 
British government felt it could release more troops to help end the war with the 
Americans. In late 1814, London sent Major General Sir Edward Pakenham and British 
Army re-enforcements to New Orleans. He was the brother-in-law of the Duke of 
Wellington and had a highly regarded service record in Spain. Cochrane had already begun 
landing British troops near New Orleans in December 1814 when Sir Edward arrived. He 
was not happy with the landing area, but decided to attack anyway. The Indians that Nicolls 
had so painstakingly trained were not deployed, but were holding down an American force 
in the West Florida swamps. It is not in the records whether Sir Edward considered using 
the Indians, but his belief that the American forces were no match for his British veterans 
drove him to attack without waiting for them or a better position. Andrew Jackson, the 
American commander at New Orleans, did use his Cherokee and Choctaw Indian allies 
effectively on the picket line. Their active ranging from the American line denied the 
British the reconnaissance of Jackson’s position. The details of the Battle of New Orleans 
are well known, but Sir Edward Pakenham’s assault at New Orleans would fail and he 
would die on the battlefield.506 The War of 1812 would end in the next few months with a 
return to the status quo ante. Even the Duke of Wellington thought it was best for Britain to 
end the War of 1812 to focus the peace in Europe. Napoleon would shatter that illusion in 
1815, but the Duke’s European concerns are instructional about British military attitudes 
towards North America in general and the Indians in particular.  The strategic calculations 
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with the war against Napoleon could not justify further conflict in North America. In 1814 
the British were tired of war in North America and war in general.507 
Therefore, the War of 1812 formed a microcosm of the previous fifty-eight. When the 
British had the option to use regular troops and their superior naval abilities, Indian use was 
less prominent. When there was no choice, senior commanders dithered on the Indians 
active use, but the local commanders made great use of the Indians available to them. When 
the Indians were a small proportion compared to the whites and conducted in tight 
formations, atrocities were few. However, when large numbers of Indians began to dwarf 
British forces, the risk of losing control and experiencing atrocities soon followed. By the 
end of the war, several different Indian leaders were actively involved and even showed 
levels of restraint not seen previously in stopping atrocities. 
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‘At this point our historical survey can end.… It follows that the events of every age must 
be judged in the light of its own peculiarities’.  
-- Carl von Clausewitz508 
9. Analysis and Conclusion 
The Sixty Years’ War is an alluring formulation of the warfare in the North American 
midwest from 1754-1815, because it is simple. However, in examining the British Army’s 
behaviour during this period, little is simple. The British Army was from a different mold 
and felt itself part of ‘Military Europe’ first and foremost. Almost all of its reasoning came 
from how a given action would affect its standing in Europe or how it would secure the 
British Isles. The warfare in North America from 1755-1815 was for the control of a 
specified piece of ground that involved active physical battle at times and political and 
diplomatic battle at other times. It was a primary objective for the Americans from the 
1750s onwards. The Americans wanted it and were willing to fight, militarily and 
diplomatically, whoever controlled it in order to get it. The Indians controlled it, sometimes 
through alliances with the French, the Spanish, and the British. The Indians wanted to keep 
it and were willing to fight for it militarily, but largely lacked the diplomatic means to do so 
otherwise. The British government mainly wanted to keep other European powers from 
controlling it, but had no substantial plans, outside of the fur trade, to actively use it 
themselves during the period of 1754-1815. They much preferred to control it and deny 
control of it through diplomatic, commercial, and political means. The British knew after 
1763 that the Indians were fighting for the midwest, but they may have not known the 
Americans were fighting for it until long after it was lost to them. This ambivalent view of 
the midwest by the British directly contributed to cold and hot wars for which the British 
Army was not well suited or prepared, either in numbers or capabilities. This led the British 
Army to consider American Indians as allies or auxiliaries.  
However, due to terrain and custom, the Indians did not fight like ‘Military Europe’, of 
which the British Army was a long standing member. Military Europe conducted battle 
according to a code that was widely known to the participants. The code held in high regard 
many positive martial values like courage, loyalty, and discipline. Additionally, the code 
held certain prohibitions in warfare through law and custom like torture, mutilation, and 
murder of prisoners. Wherever possible, it also tried to avoid attacking civilians, especially 
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women and children. British Army leaders generally held their conduct up for inspection on 
their adherence to this code. They also tried to hold their enemies up to the same code. This 
adherence to the code was known as one’s military honour. The Indian war customs were 
quite different. They also valued martial values like courage, loyalty, and discipline to 
follow their rules. However, the conduct of war to Indians was a cultural and spiritual event 
that did involve rituals of torture, mutilation, and murder of prisoners. They would at times 
try to avoid civilian casualties, but they were not averse to visiting warfare on civilians, if 
necessitated by their objectives. Indian military honour was judged on their adherence to 
these rituals. Therefore, during active warfare in North America, British Army leaders had 
to make decisions on the use Indians as allies or auxiliaries based on their adherence to the 
code of military honour. This paper has outlined the geo-political, tactical, and cultural 
landscape of 1754-1815 as a background. It has examined the operational history of battle 
during this time and analysed the time-localised effects of these decisions. In this final 
chapter, this paper will analyse the combined operational history to determine the answer to 
the central question of ‘Did military honour hinder the British Army’s effective use of 
Indians in the era?’ 
9.1 Analysis 
Bruce Buchan described the Enlightenment’s view of warfare in two ways: moral and 
rational. The moral meant the adherents would conduct warfare in a more humane and 
‘civilised’ manner. The rational meant that they would use technology, science and 
administrative tools to be more efficient in warfare.509 These two concepts are positive in 
nature. However, Paul Robinson states that Enlightenment views of warfare could be 
reduced to prohibited tactics, weapons, and targets.510 If viewed together, these are not as 
incompatible as they may first seem. Tactics and weapons can be rational if they meet the 
Enlightenment’s view of using them efficiently. However, some tactics and weapons could 
be considered immoral and inhumane, such as tactics to spread communicable diseases 
among an enemy population. Targets could be moral or immoral, depending on the rational 
definition of legitimate combatants. However, the definition of a legitimate combatant 
could be very hard to discern at certain times on a battlefield, such as a child bringing 
weapons to a legal combatant. Other than artillery, weapons were very similar between the 
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Indians and British. Although Indians would very rarely use artillery, there is little evidence 
that they viewed artillery as immoral or inhumane. Their reluctance to use it seems to be 
only because they lacked sophisticated manufacturing and logistical systems to move and 
supply artillery. Both Indians and British used muskets and rifles. Both used blades as well, 
albeit different types and in different ways. Indians used knives and hatchets. The Indians 
primarily used their blades to strike or cut. The British would sometimes use knives and 
hatchets, but their preferred blades were the bayonet and the saber or sword. The British 
primarily used their blades to slash or impale. For the sake of this analysis, with a few 
notable exceptions, weapons will not be a primary differentiator when examining the 
British Army leaders’ decision making process. 
This analysis will use a combined version of Buchan’s and Robinson’s principles 
distilled to tactics and targets that then will be categorized according to each party’s view 
of whether they were moral and rational. The British Army leaders’ view of these 
principles will help quantify the reasons for their reluctance to use Indians. In addition to 
tactics and targets, where appropriate, I will use Dr. Wayne Lee’s categories for analysing 
the decision making process: capacity, control, calculation, and culture. I will use these to 
quantify the British Army leaders’ process for deciding whether a tactic or target that was 
outside of his moral and rational boundaries or rationale could still be used. Lee defines 
capacity as a force’s ability to overwhelm the enemy by capability. In the late eighteenth 
century this normally meant the force’s size, weaponry, tactics, or ability to stay in the field 
were greater than the enemy’s. Control is defined as the ability to sustain and usefully 
control the force in the field. It also includes control over societal norms. Calculation is 
defined as the ‘conscious calculation of the material and moral factors within a specific 
vision of success as they [the leader] perceived them’. Finally, culture is the moral and 
ethical connector between tactics and targets and calculation. Because calculations were so 
heavily influenced by military honour, British Army culture was often the deciding factor 
of the four categories. 
In 1755, the campaigns of Major General Edward Braddock to expel the French form 
the midwest did not employ Indians well. Braddock did not seem bothered that he had only 
a few Indian scouts. His view that well-trained and disciplined regulars would defeat the 
rag-tag grouping of French provincial forces and Indians was unshakeable. The record does 
not show that Braddock was overly concerned about atrocities, but more so about keeping 
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discipline. In this, he viewed the Indians as a threat to his force from the inside more than 
he feared the threat of French allied Indians from the outside.511 Furthermore, when his 
small group of Indian scouts did try to advise him on wilderness warfare, he dismissed their 
views out of hand. When he was not merely dismissing their value and their advice, 
Braddock was busy offending them by telling them the King of England would do what he 
liked with the land once Braddock had secured it for him. This was an astonishing lack of 
good sense. Not only had he offended those that might have helped him, he had managed to 
cause his potential allies to become enemies with knowledge of his plans. Braddock was a 
creature of Military Europe. His entire career had been built on the idea that the European 
model of warfare was superior to all others. A more intelligent officer might have 
understood that the new environment required new thinking or at least a comprehensive 
review of how European tactics would apply in such a situation. However, given his 
background, he was probably incapable of considering the Indians as worthy adversaries. 
He thought so little of them that he designed a series of campaigns that were to be led by 
military novices like Johnson and Shirley and he actually expected them to be carried out. 
Once again this showed an astonishing lack of good sense. This evaluation might seem 
harsh, because he was a product of his times and had no training to think differently. 
However, men with far less experience than Braddock managed to understand the 
difference between European and American warfare; just none of them were in command 
of the British Army in 1755. Since Shirley and Johnson were mere colonials and would 
employ militia with little to no help from regulars, Braddock assumed they would need 
Indians to fill out the numbers in their forces. However, with a force of regulars led by him, 
he felt he had no need to sully himself with a large body of Indians. Military honour very 
definitely kept Edward Braddock from using Indians effectively in his campaign.512 
The campaign led, or rather pushed, by William Shirley was a disaster from the 
moment he was appointed to lead it. He had no quarrel with using Indians, nor did he mind 
their war customs. As a colonial Governor, he had employed forces that openly conformed 
to Indian tactics and choice of targets. Shirley is a much maligned figure and rightly so. His 
actions show that he did not possess the morals and ethics to care about targets, nor the 
rational decision making to carry on a military campaign efficiently. His inability to move 
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past Oswego in the autumn of 1755 was not because he did not use Indians effectively. 
Even though he used Indians, he did not use them effectively which led them to become 
disdainful of the British war effort. However, this had little to do with military honour. It 
was because he was incompetent at leading any kind of military campaign. 
William Johnson too was not experienced at leading large military campaigns. 
However, he had experienced Indian warfare. He knew the advantages and limits of it, but 
realised that he knew little of the technicalities of siege warfare or the logistics of moving 
large bodies of troops. William Johnson’s defence of Fort William Henry is the most 
complex to analyse during this early period. He had no worry of using Indians, but he 
insisted on using Indians in a much more conventional way than he had in the past. 
Hendrick was not comfortable with this, but did what he could to help his friend Johnson. 
The Mohawk nation’s friendship with Johnson would be sorely tried over the next few 
years due to Johnson’s decision to use them in the manner he did. Had he used Hendrick’s 
forces in their traditional manner of raiding, reconnaissance in force and harrying the 
extremities of an approaching force, they may have been more effective, but they almost 
certainly would not have lost so many warriors in the process. Additionally, Johnson’s 
concern and protection for a captive like Dieskau when Mohawk warriors captured him 
showed the Mohawk nation who he really cared about. Not only was he unwilling to let the 
Indians fight with their traditional tactics, he was unwilling to let them deploy their 
traditional customs on their prisoners. Unlike Edward Braddock, William Johnson was not 
a product of Military Europe, but he seems to have tried to ingratiate himself into it by his 
change of the way he had dealt with the Mohawks in the past. This change made him the 
hero of Fort William Henry to the British establishment and brought him a Baronetcy, but it 
cost him the unflinching support of the Mohawk nation. Therefore, a newly emerging sense 
of European-styled military honour did not cost Johnson a victory at Fort William Henry, 
but it did precipitate the withdrawal of Mohawk support and kept him for achieving more 
that season and over the next few years.513 
In 1756 Lord Loudon became the Commander-in-Chief in North America and 
immediately began assembling the necessary logistical effort to support operations in such 
a large and undeveloped country. He also brought a new sense of practicality in dealing 
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with the Indians. The record certainly does not show the same dismissiveness that 
Braddock had shown in 1755. His correspondence is filled with despondency over his 
inability to recruit Indians. The record shows that he truly understood how weak his 
reconnaissance capabilities were without Indians. The Duke of Cumberland also seemed to 
harbour no inhibitions on their use. However, Sir William Johnson had little luck in 
recruiting the Iroquois after the 1755 campaigns. In fact, some of them were actively 
working for the French. Cherokee and Catawba warriors had finally been coaxed into 
action by the southern Governors. They were being deployed with small militia units on the 
Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier, but these were controlled, when controlled at all, by the 
colonial leaders of the those colonies. The colonial Governors like Dinwiddie were not 
inhibited in using the Indians in conjunction with Rangers and incentivizing them with 
scalp bounties, but most Governors never had had a problem with using Indians against 
Indians. How Lord Loudon and his commanders would have used Indians or controlled 
their behaviour is largely a moot point, because they did not have any in any appreciable 
numbers. However, this did not mean they were not concerned about their military honour. 
Lord Loudon worried about the actions of Rangers on his honour, but acknowledged that he 
had no choice. With this acknowledgement, Lord Loudon went beyond tactics and targets. 
He had looked at his capacity to conduct war effectively and found it lacking. His 
calculation was that he would need to give up some control over the way the war would be 
fought in order to perform the basics of reconnaissance. This is significant as it is the first 
unequivocal and demonstrable point where a British Army officer is displaying the 
calculation that forced him to put his military honour at risk. Loudon’s weak position and 
inability to know what the French were doing led to the French and Indian massacres at 
Fort Oswego and Fort William Henry in 1756 and 1757, respectively. The inability of the 
French commander Montcalm to control large bodies of Indians did not dampen the British 
desire to recruit them, but, until 1758, very few northern Indians were willing to serve the 
British.514 
Lord Loudon was replaced by Major General James Abercromby for the 1758 
campaigns. The new commander showed no reluctance to use Indians on his campaign to 
take Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) in 1758. A few Mohawks were brow beaten by sir 
William Johnson to join the expedition, but once again they would not be impressed by the 
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British effort. Despite having a much larger force, Abercromby failed against Montcalm at 
Carillon. Fear of being fired by the results driven Pitt, Abercromby sent a force under 
Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet to attempt to take Fort Frontenac on the north shore of 
Lake Ontario. Bradstreet was happy to have the seventy Iroquois that Sir William Johnson 
could convince to join him, including a young Mohawk warrior named Joseph Brant who 
will figure prominently in our analysis later.515 Crucially, this small force in relation to the 
overall size of Bradstreet’s force was easier to control than Montcalm’s thousands. 
Bradstreet was able to take Frontenac and keep the Iroquois from committing an atrocity, 
but let them share handsomely in the generous plunder of the rich fort. In using the Iroquois 
Bradstreet had not feared their tactics in helping him move through hostile territory, but 
restricted their targets to forces in the field and prohibited an attack on the surrendered 
French fort’s soldiers and civilians. In this action, Bradstreet became the rarest of things 
during this period, a British commander who used Indians as valuable auxiliaries, but 
restrained their activities. 
Brigadier General John Forbes led an expedition to retake Fort Duquesne through 
Pennsylvania in 1758. The southern Governor’s delivered to Forbes what they could not 
deliver to Braddock, 500 Cherokee warriors. However, Forbes tried to treat them as regular 
forces and refused to let them range in front of his plodding march. The methodical nature 
of his march plan was a success for the British, but totally inappropriate for impatient 
Indian warriors who were seeking glory and plunder. By the time Forbes arrived at Fort 
Duquesne almost all of this Indian allies had gone home. However, Forbes learned from his 
mistakes and actively engaged the Ohio Indians in diplomacy. The lack of French goods in 
the Ohio region was forcing the Indians to take a renewed view of their relationship with 
the French. Bradstreet did have qualms about how Indians were used in his force and he 
tried to control them to ensure no atrocities were committed. However, in doing so, he lost 
their use. In this respect he certainly did not use them effectively. However, in turning the 
Ohio Indians neutral, he did use them effectively. Forbes’ hard won wisdom would follow 
him to the grave in early 1759. He tried to pass on to British commanders how the Ohio 
Indians felt and how strong they were in defending their own country, but Jeffrey Amherst 
and others could not see as clearly as Forbes what they were facing. Therefore, by the late 
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1750s the British, excepting Bradstreet and Forbes, had rarely used Indians at all, but had 
become much better at using Rangers to fill the gap in their skills.516 
Jeffery Amherst took command in 1759 and began with an aggressive set of objectives 
of Fort Niagara, Fort Ticonderoga, and Quebec. Luckily for him, as the tide turned against 
the French, many Indians began to lean towards a British alliance. Nearly 1,000 Iroquois 
agreed to help the British take Fort Niagara. For the campaign, Brigadier John Prideaux had 
to make concessions with his large Iroquois force, almost a quarter of his force, to keep 
them on side. His promise of first plunder on the fort probably saved his campaign, but he 
ran the very real risk of a massacre. He may have had reservations, but at this point in the 
war, British Generals were willing to take chances. Luckily, another battle raged nearby at 
La Belle Famille that slaked the Iroquois’s thirst for scalps. They still plundered, but did 
not abuse the French prisoners. Amherst himself led the Ticonderoga and needed only a 
few Iroquois for scouting. In the end, the French abandoned the fort without a fight. The 
same could not be said for James Wolfe at Quebec. He was not using Indians in his 
campaign, but he did allow many of his soldiers to fight like Indians in the vicious fighting 
around Quebec. Only a stunning victory at the Plains of Abraham saved Wolfe’s reputation 
from the depravities committed around Quebec. At this point in the war, neither Prideaux, 
nor Amherst, nor Wolfe had any reservations in using Indians as allies. Excluding Niagara, 
the only problem they had was that the Indians were still reluctant to serve the British.517 
The most interesting part of the 1759 campaign season in relation to this paper were 
the raids and campaigns against Indians at St. Francis and in the lower and middle towns of 
the Cherokee. Amherst’s increasing frustration and anger at what he felt was perfidy on the 
part of the Cherokee led him to begin thinking of the Indians as inhuman. This seemed to 
have opened a gate for him to begin loosening his views of what was acceptable. The 
Indian and Ranger tactics were already accepted, but in 1759 Amherst begin unleashing 
these tactics on new and more vulnerable targets like the village of St. Francis. His fear that 
the Quebec campaign might not be going well forced him to change his calculation about 
his capacity to inflict a meaningful defeat on the French and Indians in 1759. Would 
Amherst have launched the St. Francis raid, if he had known that Quebec had capitulated? 
History will never know, but, for certain, the British Army was on new ground. When faced 
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with a real chance of failure, the British Army was willing to do what was required to win 
regardless of the chance of atrocity. The two Cherokee campaigns in 1760 and 1761 were 
similar. His capacity calculation changed slightly since he had more available troops in 
1761, but the only other considerable difference was that Amherst had become angrier. 
Amherst began sounding like a frontier politician. He wanted revenge and he wanted it to 
be so severe that the Indians would not consider crossing him again. There was certainly no 
discussion on whether the Catawbas, Stockbridge, Mohawk or Chickasaws should be used 
or not. Both Montgomery and Grant seemed glad to have them and used them effectively. 
Whether Grant’s frustration with the Cherokee peace negotiations had led him to a more 
irreconcilable position is unknown, but his order to ‘put every soul to death’ in the 
Cherokee middle towns was reminiscent of the Duke of Cumberland’s order of ‘no quarter’ 
in the Scottish rebellion of 1745.518 
British forces did use a few Indians, mostly Mohawks, against the midwestern Indians 
during the 1763-1764 Indian rebellion, but by then it was no longer unusual. Pontiac’s 
rebellion is noteworthy in this paper only because of the lengths Amherst was willing to go 
to deal with the Ohio Indians. Amherst had truly given up any notion of restraint when he 
issued the order to distribute Small Pox infected blankets. The fact that his subordinates had 
already done it without his orders is immaterial. By introducing biological warfare on the 
Indians, Amherst had opened up a new Pandora’s Box of using immoral weapons and not 
just tactics and targets. Amherst was to be relieved shortly, but it was because he could not 
end the war, not because of his methods. There was little to prove that London minded the 
methods that were being used from 1759-1764.519  
The British Army had begun the war with ideals that British regulars did not need help 
from the Indians to win and they would not stomach the Indian way of war to gain them as 
allies. This was due to their view that Indian warfare was not moral in its tactics or targets. 
Additionally, their high esteem for their own capabilities and their association with Military 
Europe led them to the calculation that their capacity and control of warfare was more than 
a match for the Indians and French provincials. They had to adapt these views dramatically 
to win the war. The break with those ideals was complete by 1764 due mainly to Wolfe’s 
and Amherst’s leadership, although the reasoning had been carefully constructed in turning 
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the Indians into ‘inhuman barbarians’ that deserved no better than they gave and sometimes 
worse. However, military honour, internal and external, did keep the British from using the 
Indians effectively early in the period. The time and prestige lost during the period between 
1755 and 1759 meant that the Indians held the British capabilities in contempt. The 
Proclamation of 1763 only proved to the Indians, and probably the Americans, that the 
British were not nearly as strong as they thought they were. That contempt was 
instrumental in denying the British effective control over the midwest. 
From 1764 to 1774, the British were far too concerned with the escalating crisis with 
the colonies to think much about the possibility of an alliance with the Indian tribes. The 
reporting in the British press of the Indian wars and the atrocities that were part of it had 
made the British establishment and the public very wary of ever getting involved with it 
again. As long as the fur trade was still working, few wanted to deal with the midwest at 
all. However, the Americans were lusting after the land in the midwest at every level of 
society. The British efforts to manage the midwest and pay for it were an underlying driver 
of the issues in the rebellion against British rule. As the crisis grew out of control in 1775, 
the question of using the Indians became very real.  
The British Army leaders at the beginning of the American Revolution normally fell 
into two camps. Those that were looking for conciliation with the rebels certainly did not 
want to unleash the Indians on their American cousins. The hard liners felt that all means 
necessary should be used to bring the rebels into line, but even many of these did not feel 
that the Indians were needed to be part of the solution. The deciding factor seemed to be 
whether any particular leader in question thought that the British Army had the capacity to 
deal with the rebels. Capacity came in three forms; possession of superior troops and 
leadership, more troops, or help from other allies. Most British Army leaders, hardliners 
and conciliators, felt the British force was far superior to the American militia and the 
nascent Continental Army, but they needed to keep the Indians neutral in this scenario. 
Some, such as Lieutenant General Sir Jeffery Amherst felt that it was possible to put down 
the rebellion, but only with many more troops than were in North America. Finally, there 
was Thomas Gage, almost alone in wanting to use Indians almost immediately.520 
Major General Thomas Gage had taken over from Major General Sir Jeffery Amherst 
as Commander-in Chief of North American forces in 1763. He served in this position until 
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1775. When only acting as an administrator, he performed well, but as the American crisis 
gained momentum in the early 1770s, he made a series of miscalculations that led London 
to lose confidence in him. However, he was a man who knew American warfare better than 
any other senior leader and he felt that the Indians would be needed to win the war. Having 
seen the British process for dealing with the midwest during the French and Indian war, he 
had concluded that British allied Indians were needed to relieve pressure on the British 
Army on the coast. He would have achieved his wishes as well had he had not had two 
subordinates, Governor General Guy Carleton in Canada and Indian Superintendent John 
Stuart in the south, who ignored his orders to release the Indians onto the frontiers. Carleton 
was a conciliator who felt that the Americans would come around to reason if treated well. 
Therefore, he felt that using Indians on the frontier was unbecoming of his military honour 
when fighting against the Americans. John Stuart was more of a hardliner, but still felt the 
war could be won with British troops rather than Indians who might be indiscriminate of 
loyalists and rebels once released. In effect, both Carleton and Stuart had made the 
calculation that the British Army could defeat the rebels without help and did not want to 
be associated with releasing a scourge that was unneeded to win the war. No one can 
question their humanity. They had both seen Indian warfare and the results of it. They knew 
the killing would be upon friends as well as foes. However, each categorically misread the 
strength of the American opposition. Their refusal to follow Gage’s orders lost the British 
Army two years of having the Indians draw off American strength to defend the frontiers.  
It is arguable that they never recovered. Military honour, both in terms of tactics and targets 
and the miscalculation of capacity certainly hindered the British war effort in the early 
years.521 
After finding the American rebellion harder to defeat than expected, the British Army 
in 1777 calculated that help would be needed in the form of Hessian troops and Indians. 
There was still concern over targets and tactics, but the capability and control calculation 
had changed radically. The British hardliners were pulling the gloves off.  The decision was 
not a popular one in Britain, but Lord Germain and the British Army leadership agreed they 
were needed. The Indians teamed with loyalists in the south and were supported by Stuart. 
In the north, the Indians operated mostly independently out of Detroit and were supported 
by Governor Henry Hamilton. Both groups were successful in drawing off American forces 
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from the coast. Their actions had a certain propaganda expense to them, but their overall 
effect was positive to the war effort. However, the Indians in campaigns led by Major 
General John Burgoyne and Lieutenant Colonel Barrimore St. Leger were much less 
effective and the propaganda war on the use of Indians was lost for good with the Jane 
McCrea affair. In the years of 1777-1778, military honour did not impede the British 
Army’s use, but the leaders involved, excepting Henry Hamilton, did not use them 
effectively. 
For the rest of the war, the British Army lived a double life in relation to Indian use. 
Senior British Army officers operated on the coast with knowledge of Indian operations on 
the frontier, but with little input or control. Using the Indians was incredibly unpopular in 
Britain. However, after the Saratoga disaster and the entry of France into the war, the 
calculation had been made that the war would be lost very soon if they were not used to 
draw off American forces from the coast. Lord Germain was hardly involved from that 
point forward, but the operations continued anyway. Indian use was a much more low-key 
affair for the British Army. It would be directed by lower level officers and Indian agents 
from the interior, such as Henry Hamilton, John Stuart, John and Walter Butler, John 
Johnson and Daniel Claus. Atrocities still appeared in the press, but none were directly 
attributable to senior British leaders as the Saratoga campaign had been with Burgoyne and 
Lord Germain. These operations in the midwest were some of the most effective of the war 
for the British Army. They drew off rebel militia in the south, Pennsylvania and Kentucky. 
In New York, they drew off a large contingent of regulars under Major General Sullivan. 
The military honour of senior officers might have been sullied by their use, but it continued 
unabated to the end of the war. The lower level officers and Indian agents directly 
responsible for their operations seemingly felt no stain against their honour in using 
them.522 
Once again, the British Army, excepting Thomas Gage, began a war thinking that they 
could win it without sullying themselves with Indian allies. Their miscalculations were 
corrected, but the two year delay was arguably long enough for the Continental Army to 
find its feet and for state militias to form and prepare for a frontier war as well. Indian ally 
use in the Burgoyne era was a propaganda disaster, largely because of Burgoyne’s 
bombastic behaviour and incompetent leadership. Adoption of frontier tactics and targets 
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began to pay off for the British late in the war, but it was probably too late to change the 
course of the war. Military honour definitely hindered the British Army’s effective use of 
Indians in the early part of the war. This was especially important to the outcome of the 
midwest becoming American in the Treaty of Paris 1783. The delay in attacking the upper 
midwest and Kentucky allowed leaders like George Rogers Clark to prepare and equip 
militia forces. Historians are split on the issue, but arguably Clark’s operations in the area 
gave credence to the American claim that the midwest was to be included in the peace 
settlement. It is entirely feasible that Indian operations in this area earlier in the war could 
have led to the holding of this area to the end and after the war. British actions from 1784 to 
1794 certainly indicated that they wished they had held onto it.523 
From 1784 to 1794, a new British government in London and Canada tried to make 
sense of the new environment in the midwest. The British could not control it with troops, 
but the Americans were not really in control of it either. The fur trade was still incredibly 
lucrative to the British and American trade was not yet up to the task of manufacturing the 
items that the Indians desired. Therefore through delaying tactics and strategic calculations 
in 1786, the British decided that they would maintain the posts in the midwest to service the 
fur trade and supply the Indians. London might not have grasped the concept, but the newly 
returned Canadian Governor-General Lord Dorchester (formerly Sir Guy Carleton) and 
Upper Canada Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe understood that this support 
would still mean Indians attacks on the American frontier. Lord Dorchester had become 
much more cynical about the Americans since his days as a conciliator from 1775-1778. 
Simcoe had been a hardliner in the War of rebellion and believed that the Indians had been 
very badly treated by the Americans. Through their weak position, strategic interests in the 
Ohio and Mississippi valleys, and their sympathy for the Indians, they calculated that 
support for the Indians was required to keep the American upstarts from holding too much 
power in the midwest. Lord Dorchester specifically seemed to have lost his concerns for 
humanity in supplying and encouraging the Indians on the frontier.524 
In practical terms, the northwest and southern frontier wars from 1786-1794 were 
supported not at the British Army level, but by Indian Department agents in the north and 
south. Men like Alexander McKee, Simon Girty, and Matthew Elliott were supplying more 
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than just goods and trade. They were military and diplomatic advisors. Britain’s support for 
these agents, whether they understood the full measure of their Indian support or not, 
alarmed the Americans and kept the frontiers alight with rumours of British perfidy. The 
situation could not continue and it came to a head at Fallen Timbers. However, the British 
Army’s abandonment of the Indians in 1794 had less to do with military honour than 
diplomatic calculations. Although Lord Dorchester and Simcoe were vocal supporters of 
the Indians, that support had limits. When they were told to stand down to achieve a 
diplomatic solution with the Americans, they did. Although North America and the 
midwest in particular had seemed all important to the British from 1755 to 1794, the 
Indians learned the hard way that the most important issues for Britain still resided in 
Europe.525 
After the Jay Treaty’s implementation in 1796, the British Army in Canada took a 
backseat in Indian affairs. The Indians were incredibly skeptical of any official British 
promises anyway. The Indian department was still the real source of British connection to 
the Indians when the posts were moved to Canadian soil. The same families ran this 
department and, although there were some shake-ups of the old order, they still constituted 
the bulk of British diplomatic power in the midwest. In the south, the connections were 
more tenuous, but through the firm of Panton, Lesley and Company being supplied out of 
the Bahamas, the British did hold some influence. There was no question where the 
sympathies of these agents and traders stood. Military honour was not a question for these 
men who were thoroughly integrated into Indian society. They felt the Indians had been 
treated atrociously by the Americans and would take any opportunity to help the Indians 
strike back. The British Indian agents were hated in the frontier settlements anyway, so 
there was no loss of honour in their actions there. 
The wars with France throughout this period meant that British Army power in the 
midwest was at its lowest level in fifty years. In the buildup to the next round of war in the 
midwest from 1807-1811, honour was much spoken of by the Americans. They felt their 
external honour was being disrespected by the British in their heavy-handedness in 
international trade and sailor impressment. However, military honour held little to stop the 
British Army using Indians as allies in this war, because there simply was no choice. The 
capacity calculations made the situation plain. The American population explosion in Ohio, 
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Kentucky and Tennessee meant that Britain would need an army of European proportions 
to save Canada if the Americans.526 
When the War of 1812 began, The Governor General of Canada George Prevost and 
the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, Major General Isaac Brock displayed a level of 
understanding of the situation that had eluded British leaders in the past. Brock, especially, 
understood that there simply was no choice in the decision to use Indians as allies. Not only 
British influence in the midwest, which had been declining for a decade anyway, but 
Canada itself was at risk. Governor General Prevost, on the other hand, was using a 
different calculation. He was not necessarily against using the Indians, but assumed Upper 
Canada would eventually be lost, so he did not want to risk an Indian war that might turn 
against them when trying to defend the more strategically important Province of Quebec. A 
General of less confidence than Brock would have taken this as a stop sign to developing an 
Indian alliance. However, Brock was no ordinary officer. His close relationship with 
Matthew Elliott meant that he also held more authority with the Indians around Detroit than 
did other leaders. Brock was as concerned about this military honour as any European 
officer, but his years in Canada had led him to some very stark conclusions. He felt 
confident that if he moved on Detroit, Mackinac, and Niagara quickly, he could make a 
good defence of Upper Canada. This in turn would force the Americans to re-enforce the 
area and relieve pressure on Quebec. This confidence in his conclusions was a strong draw 
for warriors like Tecumseh. Brock’s initiative worked and it did force the Americans to 
send much more force into the area. Therefore, unlike Britain’s previous hot wars in North 
America, a strong decision to use the Indians as allies had put them in a better position than 
most of the British leaders thought was possible.527 
Unfortunately for the Indians and for Upper Canada, Brock’s death at Queenston 
Heights left them with Colonel Henry Procter. Procter was not a bad officer, but was not as 
strong and charismatic as Brock. Tecumseh and the Indians sensed this and began to 
demand demonstrable proof that the British were serious about holding Upper Canada and 
helping the pan-Indian movement to take back Ohio. In Brock they had seen a new kind of 
British leader who would stand by them. In Procter they saw more of the traditional British 
officer who equivocated on the nature of warfare in North America when the British need 
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faded. For Procter the situation was perilous. He needed the Indian’s support, but feared the 
stain on his honour as news of the atrocities made the press. As he acceded to their 
demands in Ohio, the atrocities increased. As he began to lose his hold on Upper Canada, 
Tecumseh and the Indians realised that they were strapped to a sinking ship. With 
Tecumseh’s death and Procter’s loss of Upper Canada in late 1813, the British-Indian 
alliance largely failed for the final time. Neither had accomplished what they wanted, but 
Brock’s early decisiveness probably saved Upper Canada for the British and it was clear 
that they had needed the Indian alliance to accomplish it.  
In the south, the British had a late start on developing a fighting force with the Creeks. 
The plan to develop the Creek relationship had been around for a while, but had not been 
acted upon for the strategic calculation had assumed that British naval authority in the Gulf 
of Mexico would be enough to control the strategically important southern ports. The delay 
meant that the Red Stick Creeks fought the Americans alone in 1813-1814 with disastrous 
results. By the time the Royal Marines did arrive in 1814, it was too late to save the Creeks. 
Additionally, the British felt the need to try to use the Creeks as a conventional force and 
removed their unique capabilities to disrupt the rear of the American’s long supply lines. In 
one final miscalculation, the arrival of European based re-enforcements and Major General 
Edward Pakenham led the British to assume that they could defeat the Americans at New 
Orleans. Without Indian help in the American rear and on incredibly difficult ground an 
amphibious assault was begun. The British influence in the midwest was extinguished with 
Pakenham’s death in early 1815. Once again, the British Army were foiled as their external 
military honour about their superiority and their reluctance to use readily available Indian 
allies in a timely manner led them to make disastrous choices.528 
9.2 Conclusion 
To summarise, throughout the period of 1755-1815, the British Army’s leadership 
made erroneous decisions on the use of Indian allies. The decisions were not always against 
using Indians, but coming to the decision was more often than not too late to gain the full 
advantage they needed. Their reasoning varied depending on circumstance, but was 
represented largely by the following line of reasoning. They did not want to use Indians as 
allies for fear of Indian tactics and choice of targets. They also feared loss of control of 
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their armies and battles which they viewed as very technical and rational affairs. They 
would consider using Indian allies if they felt they did not have the capacity to win without 
them. However, their contempt for most of their enemies’ capabilities led them to poor 
calculations of their own capacity. To conclude, the British Army’s leadership did allow 







L i n z y  | 225 
 
10. Bibliography 
10.1 Primary Sources: 
 
National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew (NA) 















WO 71/40 – 44 
 
British Library, London (BL) 
Haldimand Papers 
Add MS 21702 
Add MS 21756 
Add MS 21759 
Add MS 21764 
Add MS 21766 
Add MS 21769 
Add MS 21770 
Add MS 21774 
Add MS 21781 
Add MS 21782 
Add MS 21799 
Add MS 21887 
 
Shakespeare, William. King Henry IV, Part I. London, 1598. 
 
Newberry Library Chicago, Illinois (NL) 
Edward E. Ayer Manuscript Collection 
Cochran, Gavin. Treatise on the Indians of North America:  Letter to Lord Halifax, [1764] 
Ayer MS 176) 
Norton, John, Papers [manuscript] 1804-1816 
Old Abraham, The Indians answer [manuscript]: present as before / Old Abraham speaker, 
[1776], Ayer MS 7. 
L i n z y  | 226 
 
Proposals To Prevent Scalping, &c. Humbly offered to the Considerations Of A Council of 
War. [sic] New York: Parker and Weyman, 1755. Author unknown, AS 183, Evans 
no. 7551 
 
William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan at Ann Arbor (WLCL) 
Dalton Family Papers 
Gage, Thomas, Papers,  
 --- (AS 120) American Series 120 - 11 June - 4 July 1774 
 --- (AS 121) American Series 121 -  5 - 31 July 1774 
 --- (AS 122) American Series 122 -  1 August - 4 September 1774 
 --- (AS 123) American Series 123 -  5 September - 14 October 1774 
 --- (AS 124) American Series 124 - 15 October - 24 December 1774 
 --- (AS 125) American Series 125 - 25 December 1774 - 10 February 1775 
 --- (AS 126) American Series 126 - 11 February - 20 March 1775 
 --- (AS 127) American Series 127 - 21 March - 22 April 1775 
 --- (AS 128) American Series 128 - April 23rd - May 14th 1775 
 --- (AS 129) American Series 129 - May 15th - June 13th, 1775 
 --- (AS 130) American Series 130 - June 14-30th, 1775 
 --- (AS 131) American Series 131 - July 1-20th, 1775 
 --- (AS 132) American Series 132 - July 20th-31st, 1775 
 --- (AS 133) American Series 133 - August 1st - 15th, 1775 
 --- (AS 134) American Series 134 - August 16th - 31st, 1775 
 --- (AS 135) American Series 135 - September 1st - 30th, 1775 
Sackville Germain, George, Papers 
Simcoe, John Graves, Papers 
 
10.2 Printed Primary Sources: 
 
Amherst, Jeffery. J. Clarence Webster, Ed. The Journals of Jeffery Amherst. Toronto: The 
Ryerson Press and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. 
Bougainville, Louis Antoine de, and Hamilton, Richard P, Ed. Adventures in the 
Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 1756-1760. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964. 
Commager, Henry Steele and Morris, Richard B., Eds. The Spirit of ‘Seventy-Six: The Story 
of the American Revolution as Told by Participants. Edison, New Jersey: Castle 
Books, 2002. 
Cruikshank, E.A., Ed. Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of 
Detroit 1812. Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1913. (via 
http://archive.org/stream/cu31924032759742#page/n5/mode/2up) Last accessed 31 
August 2012 
Cruickshank, E.A., Ed. The Correspondence of Lieutenant Governor John Graves Simcoe 
with Allied Documents Relating to his Administration of the Government of Upper 
Canada, Volume II. Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1924. 
Esarey, Logan, Ed. Indiana Historical Collections: Governors Messages and Letters 
Volume 1, 1800-1811: Messages and Letter of William Henry Harrison. 
Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922. (via 
L i n z y  | 227 
 
http://www.archive.org/stream/messagesletterso01harr#page/n9/mode/2up) Last 
accessed 31 August 2012 
Force, Peter, Ed. American Archives, Fourth Series, Volume II. Washington, D.C.: M. St. 
Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839. 
Force, Peter, Ed. American Archives, Fourth Series, Volume IV. Washington, D.C.: M. St. 
Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1843. 
Hadden, James. Journal and Orderly Books. Albany: Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1884. 
Hansard, T.C. The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 
1803, Volume XIX. Peterborough Court, Fleet Street, London: T.C. Hansard, 1814. 
James, James Alton. Ed. George Rogers Clark Papers. Springfield, Illinois: Illinois State 
Historical Library, 1912. 
Johnson, William. James Sullivan, Preparer. The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 1. 
Albany, NY: The State University of New York, 1921. 
Johnson, William. James Sullivan, Preparer. The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 2. 
Albany, NY: The State University of New York, 1922. 
Johnson, William. James Sullivan, Preparer. The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Volume 3. 
Albany, NY: The State University of New York, 1921. 
Labaree, Leonard W. et al., Eds. The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Volume 29. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1992. Online  Edition at 
http://franklinpapers.org/franklin// , Last accessed on 16 September 2013. 
Mays, Edith, Ed. Amherst Papers 1756-1763: The Southern Sector. Westminster, Maryland 
: Heritage Books, Inc., 2006. 
Michigan Historical Commission. Michigan Historical Collections, Volume 9, Second 
Edition. Lansing: Pioneer Society of the State of Michigan, 1908 ( via 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015071219466;view=1up;seq=9 ) Last 
accessed 31 July 2014. 
Michigan Historical Commission. Michigan Historical Collections, Volume 10. Second 
Edition. Lansing: Pioneer Society of the State of Michigan, 1908. ( via 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015071219474;view=1up;seq=11 ) Last 
accessed 31 July 2014. 
Michigan Historical Commission. Michigan Historical Collections, Volume 19. Lansing: 
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, 1891. (1911 Reprint) ( via 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015071219573;view=1up;seq=9 ) Last 
accessed 31 July 2014. 
Michigan Historical Commission. Michigan Historical Collections, Volume 20. Lansing: 
Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, 1892. (1912 Reprint) (via 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015071219581;view=1up;seq=9 ) Last 
accessed 31 July 2014. 
Michigan Historical Commission. Michigan Historical Collections. Volume 40. Lansing: 
Michigan Historical Commission, 1929 (via 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015071219797 ). Last accessed 31 July 
2014. 
O’Callaghan, Edmund Bailey, Ed. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State 
of New-York; Procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn 
Brodhead, Esq. Volume VI. Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 
1855. 
O’Callaghan, Edmund Bailey, Ed. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State 
of New-York; Procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn 
L i n z y  | 228 
 
Brodhead, Esq. Volume VIII. Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 
1857. 
O’Callaghan, Edmund Bailey, Ed. Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State 
of New-York; Procured in Holland, England and France by John Romeyn 
Brodhead, Esq. Volume X. Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 
1858. 
Rogers, Robert, Todish, T. J. & Zaboly, G., Eds. The Annotated and Illustrated Journals of 
Major Robert Rogers. Purple Mountain Press, 2002. 
Ross, Charles, Esq. Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis, Volume I. 
London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1859. 
Smyth, Albert Henry. The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, collected and edited by Albert 
Henry Smyth, Volume VIII, 1780-1782. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1907. 
archive.org facsimile edition, 
http://archive.org/stream/writingsbenjami13frangoog#page/n460/mode/2up Last 
accessed 18 September 2013 
Tupper, Ferdinand Brock. The Life and Correspondence of Sir Isaac Brock. London: 
Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1845. 
 
10.3 Secondary Sources: 
 
Ackerman, Felicia. ‘”Never to Do Outrageousity nor Murder”: The World of Malory’s 
Morte Darthur in French, Shannon E. The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior 
Values Past and Present. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 2005. 
Alden, John R. John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier. Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 1944. 
---. The South in the Revolution 1763-1789. Louisiana State University Press and The 
Littleton Fund For Southern History Of The University of Texas, 1957. 
---. A History of the American Revolution. Da Capo Press, 1969. 
Allen, Robert S. His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policies in the Defence of 
Canada, 1774-1815. Toronto and Oxford: The Dundurn Press, 1993. 
Alvord, Clarence Walworth. The Mississippi Valley in British Politics : A Study of the 
Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments in Imperialism Culminating in the 
American Revolution (2 Volumes) Cleveland, Ohio: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1917. 
Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British 
North America, 1754-1766. London: Faber and Faber, 2000. 
Anonymous. Notes and Illustrations by Robert Heron, Esq. The Letters of Junius Volume II. 
Philadelphia : Samuel F. Bradford, 1804. 
---. An Impartial Account of Lieut. Col. Bradstreet’s Expedition to Fort Frontenac. London 
: T. Wilcox, et al., 1759. 
---. Proposals To Prevent Scalping, &c. Humbly offered to the Considerations Of A 
Council of War. [sic] New York: Parker and Weyman, 1755 [From the Edward 
Ayers Collection of the Newberry Library, Chicago, Illinois] 
Antal, Sandy. A Wampum Denied: Procter's War of 1812. Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton 
University Press, 1998. 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Begin. New York and 
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010. 
L i n z y  | 229 
 
Armour, David A. “DePEYSTER, ARENT SCHUYLER,” in Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography, vol. 6, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed July 29, 
2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/depeyster_arent_schuyler_6E.html. 
Arthur, Elizabeth (2003) “HAMILTON, HENRY,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 
vol. 4, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed September 29, 
2013, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/hamilton_henry_4E.html. 
Axtell, James. The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of colonial North 
America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
---. The Invasion Within: The Contest of cultures in Colonial North America. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985. 
---. Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North America. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
Axtell, James & Sturtevant, W. C. 'The Unkindest Cut, or Who Invented Scalping', The 
William and Mary Quarterly 37 (3) (1980): 451--472. 
Barr, Daniel P., ed. The Boundaries between Us: Natives and Newcomers along the 
Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750-1850. Kent State University Press, 
2006. 
Barnhart, John D. ‘A New Evaluation of Henry Hamilton and George Rogers Clark’, The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Volume 37, Number 4 (March 1951): 643-
652 
Beattie, Daniel J. ‘The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763’ 
in Adapting to Conditions: War and society in the eighteenth Century. Maartin 
Ultee, Ed. The University of Alabama Press, 1986. 
Best, Geoffrey. Honour Among Men and Nations: Transformations of an Idea: The 1981 
Joanne Goodman Lectures. Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 
1982. 
Bickham, Troy. Savages within the Empire: Representations of American Indians in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain. Oxford: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
---. Making Headlines: The American Revolution as Seen through the British Press. 
DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009 
---. The Weight of Vengeance: The United States, The British Empire, and the War of 1812. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Billias, George Athan, editor. George Washington’s Generals and Opponents: Their 
Exploits and Leadership, volumes I & II. Da Capo Press, 1994. 
Black, Jeremy. The War of 1812 in the Age of Napoleon. Norman: The University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2009. 
---. Crisis of Empire: Britain and America in the Eighteenth Century. New York and 
London: Continuum, 2008. 
---. 'Eighteenth-Century English Politics: Recent Work', Albion: A Quarterly Journal 
Concerned with British Studies 32 (2) (2000): 248--272. 
---. 'Britain's Foreign Alliances in the Eighteenth Century', Albion: A Quarterly Journal 
Concerned with British Studies 20 (4) (1988): 573--602. 
Blackmon, Richard D. Dark and Bloody Ground: The American Revolution Along the 
Southern Frontier. Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, LLC, 2012. 
Borneman, Walter R. 1812: The War That Forged a Nation. New York: Harper Perennial, 
2005. 
L i n z y  | 230 
 
Bowen, H. V. War and British Society, 1688-1815. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998. 
Bowman, James. Honor: A History. New York: Encounter Books, 2007. 
Braund, Kathryn. E. Holland. Deerskins and Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-
America, 1685-1815. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. 
Braund, Kathryn. E. Holland and Waselkov, Gregory A., Ed. William Bartram on the 
Southern Indians. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995. 
Brumwell, Stephen. Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
---.‘”A Service Truly Critical”: The British Army and Warfare with the North American 
Indians, 1755-1764’, War in History 5 (1998): 146-175 
---. White Devil: A True Story of War, Savagery, and Vengeance in Colonial America. Da 
Capo Press, 2006. 
Bryant, G. J. ‘Asymmetric Warfare: The British Experience in Eighteenth-Century India’. 
The Journal of Military History, Vol. 68, No. 2 (Apr., 2004): 431-469 
Buchan, Bruce. ‘Pandours, Partisans, and Petite Guerre: Two Dimensions of Enlightenment 
Discourse on War’. Intellectual History Review, (2012): 1-19. 
Buckner, Philip and Reid, John G. editors. Revisiting 1759: The Conquest of Canada in 
Historical Perspective. Toronto, Buffalo, London: The University of Toronto Press, 
2012, Kindle edition. 
Burgoyne, John. A State of the Expedition from Canada. London: Printed for J. Almon, 
1780. 
Burt, Afred Leroy. “The Quarrel between Germain and Carleton: An Inverted Story,” 
Canadian Historical Review, 11 (1930): 202–22 
Butler, Marilyn. Romantics, Rebels & Reactionaries: English Literature and its 
Background 1760-1830. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981. 
Calloway, Colin G. Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1987. 
---. The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American 
Communities. Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
---. New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America. The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 
---. The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 
---. The Shawnees and the War for America: The Penguin Library of American Indian 
History series. London: Penguin Books, 2008. 
---. White People, Indians, and Highlanders: Tribal People and Colonial Encounters in 
Scotland and America. Oxford University Press, USA, 2008. 
Cave, Alfred A. ‘The Delaware Prophet Neolin: a Reappraisal’, Ethnohistory, Volume 46, 
Number 2 (Spring 1999): 265-290 
Census Regions and Divisions of the United States http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-
data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf - Last accessed, 31 July 2014 
Chartrand, René. The Forts of New France in Northeast America 1600 – 1763. Oxford: 
Osprey Publishing, 2008. 
Chet, Guy. Conquering The American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in 
the Colonial Northeast. University of Massachusetts Press, 2003. 
Clary, David A. George Washington’s First War: His Early Military Adventures. New 
York: Simon & Shuster Paperbacks, 2011. 
L i n z y  | 231 
 
Claus, Daniel. Daniel Claus' Narrative of his Relations with Sir William Johnson and 
Experiences in the Lake George Fight. New York: Society of Colonial Wars in the 
State of New York, 1904. 
Clausewitz, Carl von, Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. On War. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976. 
Coleridge, Samuel Tylor and Shawcross, J., Editor. Biographia Literaria Volume I. 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1907. 
Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2009. 
---. Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1815. London: Pimlico, 2003. 
---. 'Going Native, Telling Tales: Captivity, Collaborations and Empire', Past & Present 
(168) (2000): 170--193. 
Conway, Stephen. ‘To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the 
Revolutionary War’, The William and Mary Quarterly 43(3) (1986): 381-407. 
---. The British Isles and the War of American Independence. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002. 
---. ‘The British Army, “Military Europe,” and the American War of Independence’, The 
William and Mary Quarterly, Volume 67, Number 1 (January 2010): 69-100 
Cook, Don. The Long Fuse: How England Lost the American Colonies, 1760-1785. New 
York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995. 
Copeland, David A. Debating the Issues in Colonial Newspapers: Primary Documents on 
Events of the Period. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing, Inc., 2000. 
Cox, Caroline. A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington’s 
Army. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004. 
Crocker, Thomas E. Braddock's March: How the Man Sent to Seize a Continent Changed 
American History. Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, 2009. 
Danley, Mark H. and Speelman, Patrick J., Ed. The Seven Years’ War: Global Views. 
Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012. 
Daunton, Martin & Halpern, Rick, Ed. Empire and Others: British Encounters with 
Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1999. 
Davis, Andrew MacFarlane. ‘The Employment of Indian Auxiliaries in the American War’ 
The English Historical Review, Volume 2, Number 8 (October 1887): 709-728 
Dederer, John Morgan. War in America to 1775: Before Yankee Doodle. New York and 
London: New York University Press, 1990. 
DePeyster, Arent Schuyler & John Watts (ed.), Miscellanies, by an officer. Dumfries, 
Scotland: C. Monro, 1813 & New York: A. E. Chasmar, 1888. 
Digby, Kenhelm Henry. The Broad Stone of Honour: or, Rules for the Gentlemen of 
England. London: C. & J. Rivington, Printed by R. Gilbert, London, 1823. 
Archive.org edition last accessed 27 September 2013 - 
http://archive.org/stream/broadstoneofhono00digbuoft#page/n5/mode/2up 
Dixon, David. Never Come to Peace Again: Pontiac’s Uprising and the Fate of the British 
Empire in North America. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005. 
Dowd, Gregory Evans. A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for 
Unity, 1745-1815. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. 
---. War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire. Baltimore, 
Maryland: Johns Hopkins Paperbacks, 2004. 
L i n z y  | 232 
 
Downes, Randolph C. Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in 
the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989. 
Duffy, Christopher. The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 1715-1789. New York: 
Barnes and Noble Books, 1987. 
Etheridge, Robbie. Creek Country: The Creek Indians and their World. Chapel Hill and 
London: the University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 
Fenn, Elizabeth A. ‘Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond 
Jeffery Amherst’, The Journal of American History, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Mar., 
2000):1552-1580 
Ferling, John E. A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America. Westport, 
Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1980. 
Fischer, Joseph R. A Well-Executed Failure: The Sullivan Campaign against the Iroquois, 
July – September 1779. Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2008. 
Fortescue, John W. The History of the British Army, Volumes II-X. Naval and Military 
Press, 2004. 
Fowler, Jr., William M. Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for 
North America, 1754-1763. New York: Walker and Company, 2006. 
French, Shannon E. The Code of the Warrior: Exploring Warrior Values Past and Present. 
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 
Fulford, Tim. Romantic Indians: Native Americans, British Literature, & Transatlantic 
Culture 1756-1830. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Gates, Charles. ‘The West in American Diplomacy, 1812-1815’, The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, Volume 26, Number 4 (March, 1940): 499-510 
Gibbon, Edward, ESQ. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Volume 
XI of XII. London : Plummer and Brewis, Printers, Love Lane, Little Eastcheap, 
1820. Facsimile edition last accessed on 25 September 2013 on 
http://archive.org/stream/historydeclinea53gibbgoog#page/n6/mode/2up 
Gilbert, A. N. 'Law and Honour among Eighteenth-Century British Army Officers', The 
Historical Journal 19 (1) (1976): 75-87. 
Gipson, Lawrence Henry. The British Empire before the American Revolution, Volume X : 
The Triumphant Empire : New Responsibilities with the Enlarged Empire, 1763-
1777. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956. 
---. The British Empire before the American Revolution, Volume VI: The Years of Defeat, 
1754-1757. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946. 
Giroaurd, Mark. The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1981. 
Graymont, Barbara. The Iroquois in the American Revolution, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1975. 
Grenier, John. The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier. Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
Griffin, Patrick.  American Leviathan: Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier. New 
York: Hill and Wang, 2007. 
Hamer, Philip M. ‘John Stuart's Indian Policy During the Early Months of the American 
Revolution’ , The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Dec., 1930): 
351-366. 
Hammack, Jr. James Wallace. Kentucky and the Second American Revolution. Lexington, 
Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009. 
L i n z y  | 233 
 
Hammon, Neal and Taylor, Richard. Virginia’s Western War 1775-1786. Mechanicsburg, 
Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2002 
Harrison, Lowell H. George Rogers Clark and the War in the West. Lexington, Kentucky: 
The University of Kentucky Press, 1976. 
Hatley, Thomas M. The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era 
of Revolution. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Helderman, L. C. ‘The Northwest Expedition of George Rogers Clark, 1786-1787’, The 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Dec., 1938): 317-334 
Henry, Philip, 5th Earl of Stanhope. Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington, 
1831-1851. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1888. 
Higginbotham, Don. The War Of American Independence. Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1983. 
---. 'The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal', The William and 
Mary Quarterly 44 (2) (1987): 230--273.  
Hinderaker, Eric. The Two Hendricks: Unraveling a Mohawk Mystery, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
Holmes, Richard. Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket. London: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 2001. 
Holton, Woody. ‘The Ohio Indians and the Coming of the American Revolution in 
Virginia’, The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Aug., 1994): 453-478 
"honour | honor, n.". OED Online. June 2014. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/88227?rskey=vyVTkO&result=1 (accessed July 
29, 2014). 
Horsman, Reginald. The Causes of the War of 1812. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1962. 
---. Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1992. 
---. Matthew Elliott, British Indian Agent. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964. 
---. ‘British Indian Policy in the Northwest, 1807-1812’, The Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jun., 1958): 51-66 
---. ‘The British Indian Department and the Resistance to General Anthony Wayne, 1793-
1795’, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Sep., 1962): 269-
290 
Howard, Michael. ‘Constraints on Warfare’ in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in 
the Western World. Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. 
Shulman, 1-11. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994.  
Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. New York: 
The Free Press, 1960. 
Jennings, Francis. Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years War 
in America. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. First Norton 
Paperback, 1990. 
Johnson, James M. Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats: The Military in Georgia, 1754-
1776. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 2000. 
Johnson, William. The Papers of Sir William Johnson. The University of the State of New 
York, 1921. 
Kellogg, Louise Phelps. Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio, 1778-1779. Westminster, 
Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 2008. Reprint of the 1916 edition by the Wisconsin 
Historical Society 
L i n z y  | 234 
 
---. Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio, 1779-1781. Madison, Wisconsin: Wisconsin 
Historical Society, 1917. 
Kelsay, Isabel Thompson. Joseph Brant, 1743-1807, Man of Two Worlds. Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1986. 
Laxer, James. Tecumseh & Brock: The War of 1812. Toronto, Ontario: House of Anansi 
Press Inc., 2012. 
Lee, Wayne E. Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865 Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
---. ‘Peace Chiefs and Blood Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare, 
1500–1800’ The Journal of Military History - Volume 71, Number 3, (July 2007): 
701-741. 
---. ‘Early American Ways of War: A New Reconnaissance, 1600-1815’ The Historical 
Journal - Volume 44, Number 1 (2001): 269-289. 
Linklater, Eric. Crisis In Heaven: A Elysian Comedy. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1944 
Linzy, TJ. ‘Did Military Honour Hinder the Royal Navy’s Effective Use of North 
American Indians in the Gulf of Mexico Campaign in the War of 1812?’ (Masters’ 
diss., King’s College London, 2009) 
Luzader, John. Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American 
Revolution. New York: Savas Beatie, 2008. 
Lynn, John A. Battle: A History of Combat and Culture: From Ancient Greece to Modern 
America. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Westview Press, 2004. 
Mackesy, Piers. The War for America, 1775-1783. Lincoln, Nebraska and London: 
University of Nebraska Press and Bison Books, 1993. 
Mahon, John K. The War of 1812. Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, Da Capo 
Press, Inc. re-print, 1972. 
---. ‘British Strategy and the Southern Indian: War of 1812’, The Florida Historical 
Quarterly, Volume XLIV, Number 4, (April, 1966): 285-302. 
---. 'Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794', The Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review 45(2) (1958): 254--275. 
Malone, Patrick M. The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics among the New 
England Indians. Lanham, New York and Oxford: Madison Books, 2000. 
Marshall, P.J. & Williams, Glyndwr. The Great Map of Mankind: Perceptions of New 
worlds in the Age of Enlightenment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1982. 
Martines, Lauro, Furies: War in Europe 1450-1700. Bloomsbury Press: New York, 2013. 
McConnell, Michael. N. Army and Empire: British Soldiers on the American Frontier, 
1758-1775. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. 
---. A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and its Peoples 1724-1774. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press. First Bison Book Printing, 1997. 
McDonnell, Michael A. ‘Charles-Michel Mouet de Langlade: Warrior, Soldier, and 
Intercultural “Window” on the Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes’ in Skaggs, 
David C. & Nelson, Larry L., Eds. The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-
1814. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001. 79-103 
McIlraith, Jean N. Sir Frederick Haldimand. London: T.C. & E.C. Jack, 1905. 
Merwick, Donna. ‘Violence as a Trait of Colonial North American Culture’, Australasian 
Journal of American Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (July, 1988): 40-51 
Middleton, Richard. Pontiac’s War: Its Causes, Course, and Consequence, 1763-1765. 
Routledge: New York and London, 2007. 
L i n z y  | 235 
 
Morgan, Edmund S. ‘The American Revolution: Revisions in Need of Revising’, The 
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Volume 14, Number 1 (Jan., 1957): 3-15 
Morris, James. Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire. A Harvest Book, 1968. 
Daniel S. Murphree, ‘Tonyn, Patrick (1725–1804)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/53722, accessed 29 July 2014] 
Namier, Sir Lewis. England in the Age of the American Revolution. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1966. 
Nester, William R. The Frontier War for American Independence. Mechanicsburg, 
Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2004. 
Nichols, Franklin Thayer. ‘The Organisation of Braddock’s Army’, The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Third Series, Volume 4, Number 2 (April 1947): 125-147. 
Nicolson, Adam. Men of Honour: Trafalgar and the Making of the English Hero. London: 
Harper Perennial, 2005. 
Oliphant, John. Peace and War on the Anglo-Cherokee Frontier, 1756-63. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 
O'Toole, Fintan White Savage: William Johnson and the Invention of America. London: 
Faber and Faber, 2005. 
Owsley, Jr., Frank Lawrence. Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the 
Battle for New Orleans 1812-1815. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of 
Alabama Press, 2000. 
---. ‘British and Indian Activities in Spanish West Florida During the War of 1812’, The 
Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume XLVI, Number 2, (October, 1967): 111-123. 
Pargellis, Stanley McCrory, ed. Military Affairs in North America 1748 - 1765: Selected 
Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle. New York & London: 
D. Appleton-Century Company Incorporated, 1936. 
Parker, Geoffrey. ‘Early Modern Europe’ in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in 
the Western World. Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. 
Shulman, 40-58. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994.  
Parkman, Francis. Montcalm and Wolfe: The French and Indian War. Da Capo Press, 
2001. 
---. The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada, Volume 
2: From the Spring of 1763 to the Death of Pontiac. University of Nebraska Press, 
1994 
Parmenter, Jon W. ‘Pontiac's War: Forging New Links in the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant 
Chain, 1758-1766’. Ethnohistory, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997): 617-654 
---. ‘After the Mourning Wars: The Iroquois as Allies in Colonial North American 
Campaigns, 1676-1760’. The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 64, 
No. 1, Free to Enslave: Politics and the Escalation of Britain's Translantic (Jan., 
2007): 39-76 
Peckham, Howard H. The Colonial Wars: 1689-1762. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1964. 
Pratt, Julius. ‘Western Aims in the War of 1812’, The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
Volume 12, Number 1 (June, 1925): 36-50 
Pratt, Stephanie. American Indians in British Art 1700-1840. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2005. 
L i n z y  | 236 
 
Preston, David L. ‘“Make Indians of Our White Men”: British Soldiers and Indian Warriors 
From Braddock’s to Forbes’s Campaigns, 1755-1758’ Pennsylvania History, Vol. 
74, No. 3 (SUMMER 2007): 280-306 
Richter, Daniel. K. Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 2003. 
Riley, Jonathon. A Matter of Honour: The Life, Campaigns and Generalship of Isaac 
Brock. London: Frontline Books, 2011. 
Ritcheson, Charles R. British Politics and the American Revolution. Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1954. 
---. Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Toward the United States 1783-1795, New 
York: The Norton Library, 1971. 
Robinson, Paul. Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq. 
London and New York: Routledge, 2006. 
Rodger, Nicholas A.M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-
1815. London: Penguin Group, 2004. 
---. ‘Honour and Duty at Sea, 1600-1815’, Historical Research, Volume 75, Number 190, 
(November 2002): 425-447. 
Ross, John F. War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of 
America’s First Frontier. New York: Bantam Books Trade Paperbacks, 2011. 
Rothenberg, Gunther. ‘The Age of Napoleon’ in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare 
in the Western World. Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. 
Shulman, 86-97. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994.  
Russ, C.J. “LE MARCHAND DE LIGNERY, FRANÇOIS-MARIE,” in Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, vol. 3, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, 
accessed July 29, 2014, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/le_marchand_de_lignery_francois_marie_3E.html  
Russell, Peter E. 'Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in 
Europe and America, 1740 to 1760', The William and Mary Quarterly 35(4) (1978): 
629--652. 
Selesky, Howard E. (1994), ‘Colonial America’ in The Laws of War: Constraints on 
Warfare in the Western World. Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and 
Mark R. Shulman, 59-85. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994.  
Semple, Ellen Churchill. American History and Its Geographic Conditions. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts : The Riverside Press, 1933. 
Shakespeare, William. King Henry IV, Part I. London, 1598. 
 
Shannon, Timothy J. Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier: The Penguin 
Library of American Indian History. New York: Penguin Books, 2008. 
Sheehan, Bernard W. ‘The Famous Hair Buyer General- Henry Hamilton, George Rogers 
Clark, and the American Indian’, Indiana Magazine of History, Volume 79, Issue 1 
(1983): 1-28 
Shy, John. Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American 
Revolution, Second Edition. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1975. A 
reprint by ACLS Humanities Print on Demand. 
---. A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American 
Independence, Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2000. A reprint by ACLS 
Humanities Print on Demand. 
L i n z y  | 237 
 
---. ‘The American Military Experience: History and Learning’, The Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter, 1971), 205-228 
Silver, Peter. Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America. New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2007. 
Simms, Brendan. Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British 
Empire. London: Penguin Books, 2008. 
Skaggs, David C. & Nelson, Larry L., Eds. The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-
1814. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2001. 
Snapp, Russell J. John Stuart and the Struggle for Empire on the Southern Frontier. 
Louisiana State University Press, 1996. 
Snow, Dean R. ‘Searching for Hendrick: Correction of a Historic Conflation.’ New York 
History, (Summer 2007): 229-253 
Sosin, Jack M. Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 
1760-1775. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1961. 
---. ‘The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re-assessment of 
Responsibility.’ Canadian Historical Review, 46 (June 1965): 101-121. 
---. The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763-1783. New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Toronto, 
London: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967. 
Spring, Matthew H. With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in 
North America, 1775-1783. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. 
Stacey, Robert C. ‘The Age of Chivalry’ in The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in 
the Western World. Ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. 
Shulman, 27-39. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994.  
Starkey, Armstrong. European and Native American Warfare 1675-1815. Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1998. 
---. ‘War and Culture, a Case Study: The Enlightenment and the Conduct of the British in 
America, 1755-1781’, War in Society, Volume 8 Number 1 (May 1990): 1-28 
---. ‘Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry During the American Revolution’, 
The Journal of Military History, Volume 58, (January 1994): 7-27 
Steele, Ian K. Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the Massacre. New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990. 
---. Warpaths: Invasions of North America. New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994. 
---. 'Shawnee Origins of Their Seven Years' War', Ethnohistory 53 (4) (2006): 657-687. 
Stevens, Laura M. The Poor Indians: British Missionaries, Native Americans, and Colonial 
Sensibility. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
Stevens, Paul Lawrence. ‘His Majesty’s Savage Allies: British Policy and the Northern 
Indians During the Revolutionary War. The Carleton Years, 1774-1778’, Ph.D. 
diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1984. Retrieved from ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses. 
Stewart, Frank Henderson. Honor. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1994. 
Stockdale, John, The Parliamentary Register; or, History of the Proceedings and Debates 
of the House of Lords. Vol. IX, London: reprinted for John Stockdale, by Wilson 
and Co., 1802. 
Stuart R. J. Sutherland, Pierre Tousignant, and Madeleine Dionne-Tousignant, 
“HALDIMAND, Sir FREDERICK,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 5, 
L i n z y  | 238 
 
University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed July 29, 2014, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/haldimand_frederick_5E.html.  
Sugden, John. Tecumseh: A Life. New York: Henry Holt and Co., A John Macrae / Owl 
Book, 1999. 
---. Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003. 
Sword, Wiley. President Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 
1790-1795. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993. 
Taylor, Alan. The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & 
Indian Allies. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. 
Tanner, Helen Hornbeck. Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History. Published for the Newberry 
Library. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987. 
Tootle, James Roger. ‘Anglo-Indian Relations in the Northern Theatre of the French and 
Indian War, 1748-1761’. PhD Dissertation: The Ohio State University, 1972 
Tousignant, Pierre and Dionne-Tousignant, Madeleine (2003),  “LA CORNE, LUC DE, 
Chaptes de La Corne La Corne Saint-Luc,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 
vol. 4, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed September 29, 
2013, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/la_corne_luc_de_4E.html. 
Thwaites, Reuben Gold. Documentary History of Dunmore’s War 1774. Madison : The 
Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905. 
Thwaites, Reuben Gold and Kellogg, Louise Phelps. The Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 
1775-1777. Baltimore: Clearfield Company, Inc., 2002. 
Pierre Tousignant and Madeleine Dionne-Tousignant, “LA CORNE, LUC DE, Chaptes de 
La Corne La Corne Saint-Luc,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 4, 
University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed August 1, 2014, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/la_corne_luc_de_4E.html. 
Trap, Paul. MOUET DE LANGLADE, CHARLES-MICHEL,’ in Dictionary of Canadian 
Biography, vol. 4, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed July 30, 
2014, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/mouet_de_langlade_charles_michel_4E.html  
Tuck, Richard. The Rights of Peace and War: Political Thought and International Order 
from Grotius to Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Vattel, Emerich de. The Law of Nations: Or, The Principles of the Law of Nature Applied 
to the Conduct of Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. 
Johnson and Co., 1883. 
Vaughan, Alden T. Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-1776. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
Ward, Matthew C. Breaking The Backcountry: Seven Years War In Virginia And 
Pennsylvania 1754-1765. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003. 
---. ‘“The European Method of Warring is Not Practiced Here”: The Failure of British 
Military Policy in the Ohio Valley, 1755-1759’, War in History, Volume 4 (3) 
(1997): 247-263. 
---. ‘Fighting the "Old Women": Indian Strategy on the Virginia and Pennsylvania Frontier, 
1754- 1758’ The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 103, No. 3 
(Jul., 1995): 297- 320. 
---. ‘Crossing the Line? The British Army and the Application of European “Rules of War” 
in the Quebec Campaign’ in Revisiting 1759: The Conquest of Canada in Historical 
Perspective, edited by Buckner, Philip and Reid, John G. Toronto, Buffalo, London: 
The University of Toronto Press, 2012, Kindle edition. 
L i n z y  | 239 
 
---. ‘The Microbes of War: The British Army and epidemic Disease among the Ohio 
Indians, 1758-1765’ in Skaggs, David C. & Nelson, Larry L., Eds. The Sixty Years' 
War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814. East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 2001. 
Washburn, Wilcomb E. ‘Indians and the American Revolution’ [The annotated text of a 
speech given at Riverside, CA on an unknown date] (published by the 
AmericanRevolution.org website at http://www.americanrevolution.org/ind1.html - 
Last accessed at 19:23 on 29 July 2014) 
Watson, J. R. Romanticism and War: A Study of British Romantic Period Writers and the 
Napoleonic Wars. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 
Watt, Gavin K. A dirty, trifling piece of business [sic] Volume I: The Revolutionary War as 
Waged from Canada in 1781. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2009. 
---. I am heartily ashamed [sic] Volume II: The Revolutionary War as Waged from Canada 
in 1782. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010. 
Way, Peter. 'Rebellion of the Regulars: Working Soldiers and the Mutiny of 1763-1764', 
The William and Mary Quarterly 57 (4), (2000): 761--792. 
Welsh, Alexander. What is Honour? A Question of Moral Imperatives. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2008. 
White, Richard. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes 
Region, 1650-1815. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
Williams, Glenn. F. Year of the Hangman: George Washington's Campaign against the 
Iroquois. Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme Publishing, 2005. 
Willig, Timothy D. Restoring the Chain of Friendship: British Policy and the Indians of the 
Great Lakes, 1783-1815. Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. 
Wordsworth, William. The Complete Poetical Works of William Wordsworth: Students 
Cambridge Edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press for Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1907. 
Wright, Jr., J. Leitch. Britain and the American Frontier 1783-1815. Athens: The 
University of Georgia Press, 1975. 
---. ‘British Designs on the Old Southwest: Foreign Intrigue on the Florida Frontier, 1783-
1803’, The Florida Historical Quarterly, Volume XLIV, Number 4, (April, 1966): 
265-284. 
 
